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INTRODUCTION

Appellate waiver or forfeiture of issues or contentions not raised in
lower court proceedings or sufficiently on appeal has been long deemed to
require "zealous fidelity" and a rule which can neither be ignored nor2
brushed aside as a "pettifogging technicality or a trap for the indolent."
Equally entrenched is the recognition that the raise or lose rule remains one
of "discretion" and that there can be no general rule as the "[o]rderly rules

of procedure do not require sacrifice of the rules of fundamental justice.3

The discretionary approach to new or unpreserved issues on appeal
is the result of the collision between the principle of party presentation
underlying the adversarial process and the role of the appellate court as

both the guardian of a fair proceeding and final arbiter of applicable law.
Yet, when the governing rule is declared to be both firm but discretionary,
the hairs on the back of the neck tend to bristle 4 particularly as, unlike a
trial court's discretion, appellate discretion is not likely subject to any other
or further review.
The discretionary nature of the raise or lose rule strikes at the heart
2

Nat'l Ass'n. of Soc. Workers v. Harwood, 69 F.3d 622, 627 (1st Cir. 1995). The principle

is long standing and even recognized in Blackstone. WILLIAM

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

*455 ("It is practice unknown to our law ... when a superior court is reviewing the sentence of an
inferior, to examine the justice of the former decree by evidence that was never produced
below."); see also Clements v. Macheboeuf, 92 U.S. 418, 425 (1875) (stating "[m]atters not
assigned for error will not be examined"); Robert J. Martineau, Considering New Issues on
Appeal: The GeneralRule and the GorillaRule, 40 VAND. L. REv. 1023, 1061 (1987) ("The rule
preventing an appellate court from considering an issue not raised in the trial court is as old as the
common-law system of appellate review."); Derrick Carter, A Restatement of Exceptions to the
Preservation of Error Requirement in Criminal Cases, 46 U. KAN. L. REv. 947 (1998)
(describing reasons for error requirement during appellate review); Rhett R. Dennerline, Note,
PushingAside the General Rule in Order to Raise New Issues on Appeal, 64 IND. L.J. 985, 98586 (1989) ("The rule against considering new issues on appeal developed from the writ of error
model of appellate review as it was handed down from eighteenth century English common
law."); Comment, Raising New Issues on Appeal, 64 HARV. L. REv. 652, 654-55 (1951)
(generally discussing exceptions to raise or lose rule).
3 Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941); see Martineau, supra note 2, at 1028;
Dennerline, PushingAside supra note 2, at 985 ("a difficult problem to which legal scholars have
paid little attention ... is where a litigant attempts to raise an issue in a reviewing appellate court
that it did not present in the trial court."); Raising New Issues, supra note 2, at 652-53 ("[o]ne of
the central problems of appellate procedure is whether in civil cases one can raise in a reviewing
court issues which might have been raised in the trial court but were not"); Barry A. Miller, Sua
Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of an Opportunity to Be Heard, 39 SAN
DIGO L. REv. 1253, 1257 (2002) ("The rule that points not argued will not be considered is
more than just a prudential rule of convenience; its observance, at least in the vast majority of
cases, distinguishes our adversary system from the inquisitorial one.") (quoting United States v.
Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring))).
4 See In re Pet Food Products Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333, 360 n.2 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting
appellate review of unpreserved error or new issues "subject of spirited academic discussion").
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of the integrity of the adversarial process and the appellate function. It
provides substantial flexibility to address the particular circumstances of
any case, yet can be marked by uncertainty and unevenness in application,
leaving it subject to the harsh criticism that a "new issue is decided solely
on the basis of whether a majority of the court considers the new issue
necessary to decide the case in accordance with their view of the relative
equities of the parties." 5
The discretionary exception to the raise or lose rule is embodied in
the rubric of "exceptional circumstances." This "exception" has developed
into either or both of an array of discrete factors or interests, as well as the
plain error/substantial risk of miscarriage of justice review as to procedural
default. The coterminous relationship between these two strands of the
discretion can be uneasy and potentially provide disparate treatment, as
well as add a measure of uncertainty and imprecision. This loss of clarity
and consistency is only amplified by the lack of uniform criteria or
identifiable scale as to individual or cumulative weight to be given to the
multi-factor strain of the discretionary exception.
Not only is there a measure of inconsistency and lack of clarity, but
many appellate court decisions provide no or little explanation of why
exception to forfeiture is being exercised; down play or ignore the right of
the advocate to address waiver claims; and otherwise, at times, loosely
reference and/or weigh the recited discretionary governing criteria. The
resulting wound to principled decision-making serves to dilute societal and
litigant respect and acceptance of the appellate decision.
This article examines the discretion underlying application and
exception to the raise or lose principle. Part I defines and overviews
appellate forfeiture and the justifications for the raise or lose rule. Part II
examines the origin and establishment of both plain error and the various
other "exceptional circumstances" that have been found to justify departure
from the raise or lose principle. It provides an overview of the discretion as
it has developed and been articulated in both the First Circuit and
Massachusetts as well as other states and federal circuits.
Part IV attempts to take a critical look at the discretion and,

See Martineau, supra note 2, at 1061, 1034-61 (1987) (critiquing inconsistent and
unprincipled way courts decide issues raised for first time on appeal); Jonathan Erving Marsh_
State v. Shumacher: Dual Standards of Review for Waived Claims or Error in Wisconsin
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, 1989 WIs. L. REv. 773, 774-75 (1989) ("[N]either court

has consistent criteria for choosing whether to apply the statutory exception or a given common
law exception to the presumptive rule barring review of waived errors."); see generally Turner v.
Memphis, 369 U.S. 350, 353-54 (1962); Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J.
447, 463 (2009) ("[Federal courts act] with little rhyme or reason" regarding exceptions to raise

or lose rule).
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particularly, the various factors or circumstances that have come to
comprise "exceptional circumstances" discretion outside of plain error. It
advocates for stringent protection of litigant input and proposes a construct
that combines both lines of discretion into a singular inquiry applicable to
all cases. The construct attempts to unify the language and contours of the
discretion with the fundamental aim to promote equal treatment and to
enhance the discussion and evolution as to coherency and principled
decision-making. In the end, the discretionary "exception" to the principle
of raise or lose may well represent to some a shining example of the genius
of the common law, while to others it will remain
an "unruly concept in a
6
judicial system dedicated to the rule of law.",
II.

RAISE OR LOSE: DEFINITION, JUSTIFICATION AND RIGOR

Appellate "waiver" presents in two primary forms: where an issue
or contention is made on appeal that was not raised or sufficiently raised in
the lower proceedings and where, regardless of whether or not raised
below, there is a failure to raise or sufficiently raise the issue or contention
on appeal.
Waiver has been used interchangeably with forfeiture, but the two

are distinguishable. Waiver is the "intentional relinquishment of a known
right.

,

7

Since the failure to raise or properly preserve an issue is many, if

not most times, inadvertent or the result of ignorance, omission, or silence, 8
it is more precisely understood as "forfeiture. " 9

As such, "waiver is

6 Maurice Rosenberg, Professor of Law, Columbia University, Presentation at a Seminar for
Federal Appellate Judges (May 13-15,
1975)
(transcript at 28, available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/review.pdf/$file/review.pdf).
7 See United States v. Zubia-Torres, 550 F.3d 1202, 1205 (10th Cir. 2008) ("[W]aiver is
accomplished by intent, [but] forfeiture comes about through neglect.") (quoting United States v.
Carrasco-Salazar, 494 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2007))); United States v. Torres-Rosario, 658
F.3d 110, 115 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting that concession can constitute waiver); see also Wood v.
Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826, 1832 n.4 (2012) (noting distinctionbetween waiver and forfeiture).
8 See Chestnut v. Lowell, 305 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding city's failure to raise
municipal immunity defense result of omission).
9 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993); United States v. Chaney, 647 F.3d 401,
406 n.6 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Rodriguez, 311 F.3d 435, 437 (1st Cir. 2002); see also
Crispin-Taveras v. Municipality of Carolina, 647 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2011) ("A party's failure, on
account of ignorance or neglect, to timely oppose a motion ... constitutes forfeiture."); United
States v. Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d 110, 115 (1st Cir. 2011) (stating waiver intentional and
therefore a permanent abandonment of a right); United States v. Walker, 538 F.3d 21, 22 (1st Cir.
2008) (stating same); Rivera-Torres v. Ortiz-Velez, 341 F.3d 86, 102 (1st Cir. 2003) (stating
same); Iqartua v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 603 (1st Cir. 2010) (explaining consequences of
waiver and forfeiture); Patterson v. Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104, 112 (2d Cir. 2006) (discussing
difference between forfeiture and waiver).
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accomplished by intent," while forfeiture results through neglect. 10
The underlying justifications for the raise or lose rule are the
adversarial process, judicial efficiency and finality, and respect for the
differing roles of the trial and appellate courts."
The rule seeks to
encourage full presentation as well as correction in the lower court; fairness
to both the adversary and the trial court; and prevention of prejudice .12
Primary to the raise or waive rule is the understanding that our
adversarial system is based on the "principle of party presentation."' 3 As
stated by the United States Supreme Court:
In our adversary system, in both civil and criminal cases,
in the first instance and on appeal, we follow the principle
of party presentation. That is, we rely on the parties to
frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role
of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present.14
'o Zubia-Torres, 550 F.3d at 1205 (quoting United States v. Carrasco-Salazar, 494 F.3d 1270,
1273 (10th Cir. 2007)); see also United States v. Rodriquez-Berrios, 573 F.3d 55, 63 (1st Cir.
2009) (noting failure to object is forfeiture while "conscious relinquishment of objection"
constitutes waiver"); Microfinancial, Inc. v. Premier Holidays Int'l, Inc., 385 F.3d 72, 80 n.5 (1st
Cir. 2004) (noting failure to object at trial and pursuant to pre-trial constitutes waiver, not
forfeiture); but see Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d at 115 ("Forgiving waiver however, merely remits.
..argument to the test of plain error"). Further, because forfeiture arises in many varied contexts,
"the nature of the issue on review influences the outcome of the forfeiture analysis," and thus,
"what constitutes forfeiture is more one of degree and judgment by the appellate court." United
States v. Gallant, 306 F.3d 1181, 1187 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting rigorous requirement for precise
jury instruction objection, but forfeiture regarding sentencing claim less rigid); see also Yee v.
Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534 (1995) (holding appellate review of new argument proper because
"parties... not limited to precise arguments below").
" See generally Carter, supra note 2, at 950; In re Net-Veldzquez, 625 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir.
2010) (stating raise or lose founded upon important considerations of fairness, judicial economy
and practical wisdom") (Nat'l Ass'n of Soc. Workers v. Harwood, 69 F.3d 622, 627 (1st Cir.
1995))); Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 416 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining general rule
serves important judicial interests); HTC Corp. v. IPCom GmbH & Co., KG, 667 F.3d 1270,
1281-82 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (listing policies and citing cases supporting policies). The interests
consist of "protect[ing] litigants from unfair surprise; promot[ing] the finality of judgments and
conserv[ing] judicial resources." Webb v. Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 2009)
(alterations in original).
12 Sharp, 638 F.3d at 417-18; see Bergeron v. Mansour, 152 F.2d 27,
32 (1st Cir. 1945)
("Had the defendant interposed this defense seasonably, the plaintiff would have had an
opportunity to explain her delay in instituting this action after learning of the defense of the
statute of limitations."); Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1996) ("The decision to
consider an issue not raised below is discretionary, and such an issue should not be decided if it
would prejudice the other party."); Martineau, supra note 2, at 1028-35; Dennerline, supra note 2,
at 986-988; Carter, supra note 2, at 950.
13 Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008).
14 Id. at 243-44; see also Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 678 F.2d 453, 457 n.1 (3d
Cir. 1982) (noting contemporaneous objection requirement "go[es] to ... heart of ...common
law tradition and the adversary process"), vacated, 462 U.S. 523 (1983).
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It is for the advocates to frame the issues and bear the burden to
properly and sufficiently present appellate contentions to the appeals
court. 5 All issues and claims are then tested by the adversarial process
further refining and defining the facts and law in dispute. 16 This trait of the

adversarial system renders the raise or waive rule "more than just a
prudential rule of convenience; . . . distinguish[ing] our adversary system
of justice from the inquisitorial one."' 7
The interests of fairness and finality 8 also underlie the raise or lose
rule and follow from the principle that an "appeal must be based on what
took place at the trial, not on anything which is presented for the first time
before an appellate court." 9 If errors not raised below in the lower court
could be raised on appeal, unsuccessful litigants would be free to second
guess tactical or deliberate decisions made in the lower court or otherwise
seek to re-try or re-adjudicate the matter on appeal when the desired result
is not reached below.2 0 The rule thus serves predictability and "[w]ithout

15

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 468 U.S. 1214, 1216 (1984) ("the adversary process functions most

effectively when we rely on the initiative of lawyers, rather than the activism of judges, to fashion
the questions for review"); see also Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) ("This is a court of review, not a tribunal unbounded by rules. We do not sit like a
kadi under a tree dispensing justice according to considerations of individual expediency."); U.S.
v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Judges are not pigs, hunting for truffles buried in
briefs."); Linrud v. Linrud, 552 N.W.2d 342, 345 (N.D. 1996) ("Judges are not ferrets.").
16 Endres v. Ind. State Police, 809 N.E.2d 320, 322 (Ind. 2004) (explaining raise or waive
rule assures a claim is tested by adversarial process).
17 See U.S. v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring); Eriline Co. S.A. v.
Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 2006) ("As a defense waivable by the inaction of a party,
the statute of limitations bears the hallmarks of our adversarial system ... in which the parties
are obliged to present facts and legal arguments before a neutral and relatively passive decisionmaker.").
1s Commonwealth v. Randolph, 780 N.E.2d 58, 64 (Mass. 2002) (stating waiver requirement
dual purpose protecting society's interests in finality of judicial proceedings and efficiency);
Commonwealthv. Bly, 830 N.E.2d 1048, 1055 (Mass. 2005). An early Massachusetts case, Cady
v. Norton, explained the finality rule as follows:
[The finality rule] proceeds upon two grounds; one, that if the exception is
intended to be relied on, and is seasonably taken, the omission may be
supplied, or the error corrected, and the rights of all parties saved. The other
is, that it is not consistent with the purposes of justice, for a party knowing
of a secret defect, to proceed and take his chance for a favorable verdict,
with the power and intent to annul it, as erroneous and void, if it should be
against him.
31 Mass. 236, 237 (1833).

Commonwealthv. Olson, 510 N.E.2d 787, 790 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987).
See Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 917 (Mass. 1998) (stating
principle governing appellate review) (quoting Olson, 510 N.E.2d at 790)); Iverson v. Boston
452 F.3d 94, 103 (1st Cir. 2006) ("raise-or-waive rule serves the salutary purpose of preventing
litigants from gaming the system by seeding complaints with Delphic references in the hope of
19

20
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predictability the appellate process becomes little more than an exercise by
which the appellant attempts to persuade the appellate court that the result
reached by trial court was not the 'right result.' 21 The raise or waive rule
is thus the litigation "winnowing process" and "part of the machinery by
which courts narrow what remains to be decided." 22 Absent a raise or lose
rule, both the parties and the public are put to increased expense, especially
where if a timely objection or raising of the issue or error had been made,
the lower court could have corrected or ameliorated the error perhaps
obviating the need for any appeal. 23 The loss of a chance for cure impacts
the substantial policy behind finality and orderly procedure. Similarly, the
raise or lose rule not only seeks to insure an opportunity for the opposing
party to present a response, but allows the lower court, in the first instance,
to fully address the issue.24 The absence of any considered decision of the
trial court for the appellate court to consider and evaluate is not
insubstantial.2 5 Some courts view it as impossible to determine if there was

facilitating an escape should the district court's ruling on their advertised claims fail to suit");
Bergeron v. Mansour, 152 F.2d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 1945) ("To allow a party to put forth new
defenses on appeal would give him an incentive to postpone such defenses until after he has had
his day in court."); People v. Hoover, 377 Fed. Apex. 461, 463 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating forfeiture
rule prevents "sandbagging") (citation omitted); see also TECO Mech. Contractor, Inc. v.
Commonwealth, No. 2009-SC-000821-DG, 2012 WL 975732, at *7 n.15 (Ky. Mar. 22, 2012)
("An appellant is not 'permitted to feed one can of worms to the trial judge and another to the
appellate court."') (citation omitted).
21 Martineau, supra note 2, at 1034.
22 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 487 n.6 (2008) ("The reason for the rules is
not that litigation is a game, like golf, with arbitrary rules to test the skill of the players. Rather,
litigation is a 'winnowing process,' and the procedures for preserving or waiving issues are part
of the machinery by which courts narrow what remains to be decided.") (quoting Poliquin v.
Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 531 (1st Cir. 1993))).
23 See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134 (2009) ("In the case of actual or invited
error, the district court can often correct or avoid the mistake so that it cannot possibly affect the
outcome."); Andersonv. Beacon Oil Co., 183 N.E. 152, 153 (Mass. 1932) ("[The purpose of raise
or lose rule is] to warn the trial judge of his alleged error, so that he may correct it at the time and
thus terminate the litigation"); United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 977 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting
contemporaneous objection rule to alert trial judge so immediate curative measure can be taken).
24 See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 134; United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 72 (2002) (noting
importance of raising issues at lower court); United States v. Kinsella, 622 F.3d 75, 83 (1st Cir.
2010) (stating rule's purpose to avoid needless reversals and remands); see also Commonwealth
v. Foley, 263 N.E.2d 451, 453 (Mass. 1970) ("For us to consider alleged claims of error in cases
where no exceptions were taken would deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to reconsider his
ruling. It would make a shambles of our trial procedure to consider such assignments of error
except in rare and unusual circumstances.").
25 Commonwealth v. Bly, 830 N.E.2d 1048, 1059 (Mass. 2005) (noting failing to
raise or
object at trial means no review consideration of trial opinion); Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S.
552, 556 n.5 (1941) ("The Board's rulings on questions of law, while not as conclusive as its
findings of fact, are nevertheless persuasive, and it is desirable that a reviewing court have the
benefit of such rulings."); United States v. Argentine, 814 F.2d 783, 791 (1st Cir. 1987) ("It is not
our role to use second sight when parties have maneuvered to deprive the district judge of an
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error if not addressed by the trial court.2 6 More generally, "there is
something unseemly about telling a lower court it was wrong when it never
was presented with the opportunity to be right., 27 Requiring presentation
to the lower court gives the lower court a meaningful opportunity to
address the matter and reach a proper result, contribute valuable input into
the process, and more fully develops the record.28
Both prejudice and fairness are also fundamental to the raise or
lose rule. Mandating that all issues be raised in the lower court prevents
the adverse party from being prejudiced by the other party's failure to
object or raise the issue. To force the adverse party to defend an issue on
appeal where he had no opportunity to present factual arguments or
evidence would be unfair and prejudicial.29 Similarly, where an issue or
error is not raised below, there is many times a lack of a complete or
developed record upon which the appellate court can fairly and properly
perform its review function. A complete record where evidence and
argument has been presented is fundamental to the appellate proceeding

and meaningful review. 0
The rigor with which the rule of forfeiture/waiver is applied is

initial glimpse of the putative problem."); see also Waco v. Bridges, 710 F.2d 220, 228 (51h Cir.
1983) ("facilitation accorded appellate review by a lower court's consideration of the legal issues
and judicial resolution of factual disputes commands that [the general rule] not be disregarded
lightly").
26 Doe v. Doe, 634 S.E.2d 51, 54 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006) ("Without an initial ruling by the
trial
court, a reviewing court simply is not able to evaluate whether the trial court committed error.");
see Herron v. Century BMW, 719 S.E.2d 640, 642 (S.C. 2011) ("Issue preservation rules are
designed to give the trial court a fair opportunity to rule on the issues and [provide] platform for
meaningful appellate review.").
27 Commonwealth v. Alphas, 712 N.E.2d 575, 585 (Mass. 1993) (Greaney, J., concurring)
(quoting State v. Applegate, 591 P.2d 371, 373 (Or. Ct. App. 1979)); see also Khatchatourian v.
Encompass Ins. Co., 935 N.E.2d 777, 783 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010) (noting that prudence dictates
that judge should have first chance to address issue); Hardley v. State, 905 N.E.2d 399, 405 (Ind.
2009) (stating raise or waive rule rationale is desire to obtain trial court's view on issue). The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has remarked that reviewing unpreserved errors which the
trial court never had a chance to consider "would make a shambles of our trial procedure." Foley,
263 N.E.2d at 453; Toscano v. Chandris, 934 F.2d 383, 385(1st Cir. 1991) ("Rules serve a
valuable purpose. Without them, the judicial system would be in shambles."); Trach v. Fellin817 A.2d 1102, 1119 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) ("[T]he Superior Court, as an error-correcting court,
may not purport to reverse a trial court's order where the only basis for a finding of error is a
claim that the responsible party never gave the trial court an opportunity to consider.") (quoting
Harber Phil. Center City Office Ltd. V. LPCI, 764 A.2d 1100, 1105 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000))).
28 See Spratt v. MDU Res. Grp., Inc., 797 N.W.2d 328, 333 (N.D. 2011); Beeter v. Sawyer
Disposal LLC., 771 N.W.2d 282, 288 (N.D. 2009).
29 Dennerline, supra note 2, at 988 (describing fairness justification for rule against
considering new issues on appeal).
'o See Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 417-18 (3d Cir. 2011) (highlighting waiver
rule provides greatest force where timely objection permits parties to develop factual record)
(citing Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 835 (3d Cir. 2011))).
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reflected in the stem manner to which it is referred by both the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and the First Circuit; i.e., the rule of
waiver is to be invoked "with near religious fervor" (First Circuit); 31 is not
to be "ignored nor brushed aside as a pettifogging technicality or a trap for
the indolent" (First Circuit); 32 that "objections, issues or claims-however
meritorious that have not been raised in the trial court are deemed waived"
(Supreme Judicial Court);33 and that the rule is "ironclad, 3 4 "crystalline"
(First Circuit) 35 or "bedrock '

36

(First Circuit and Supreme Judicial Court);

with any exception "narrowly configured and sparingly dispensed ' 37 (First
Circuit).
III. EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES: PLAIN ERROR AND
BEYOND
A. Singleton and Hormel: Confirmation of Discretion
Over 80 years ago Justice Black declared that "[t]here may always
be exceptional cases or particular circumstances which will prompt a
reviewing or appellate court, where injustice might otherwise result, to
consider questions of law which were neither pressed nor passed upon by
the court or administrative agency below., 38 In the oft-quoted passage,
Justice Black continued:
Rules of practice and procedure are devised to promote the
ends ofjustice, not to defeat them. A rigid and undeviating
31 Nat'l Ass'n of Soc. Workers v. Harwood, 69 F.3d 622, 627 (1st Cir. 1995).
32

id.

33 Wynn & Wynn P.C., v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 729 N.E.2d 1068, 1083

(Mass. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Stonehill Coll. V. Mass. Comm'n Against
Discrimination 808 N.E.2d 205 (Mass. 2004).
34 In re Carp, 340 F.3d 15, 26 (1st Cir. 2003).
35 Bos. Beer Co. Ltd. P'ship. v. Slesar Bros. Brewing Co., 9 F.3d 175, 180 (1st Cir. 1993)
("The law in this circuit is crystalline: a litigant's failure to explicitly raise an issue before the
district court forecloses that party from raising the issue for the first time on appeal."); see also
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local No. 59 v. Superline Transp. Co.,
953 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1992) ("If any principle is settled in this circuit, it is that, absent the
most extraordinary circumstances, legal theories not raised squarely in the lower court cannot be
broached for the first time on appeal.").
36 United States v. Slade, 980 F.2d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 1992).
37 Wynn, 729 N.E.2d at 1083-84; see also Daigle v. Maine Med. Ctr., 14 F.3d 684, 688 (1st
Cir. 1994) (stating the same and "raise-or-waive rule applies with full force to constitutional
challenges"); Iverson v. Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 103 (1st Cir. 2006) (discretion "is to be used
sparingly and only in exceptional cases").
38 Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941); see also Youakimv. Miller,
425 U.S. 231,
234 (1976).
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judicially declared practice under which courts of review
would invariably and under all circumstances decline to
consider all questions which had not previously been
specifically urged would be out of harmony with this
policy. Orderly rules of procedure 39do not require sacrifice
of the rules of fundamental justice.
This broad declaration pales considerably to the narrow tax appeal
before the Court. 40 The Court could have simply relied on the applicable

statute governing appellate review of tax board decisions to affirm the
circuit court's determination to decide the tax question on a section of the
tax code not raised or relied upon by the taxing authorities before the Tax

Board. 41 Moreover, the interpretation of the code section first relied upon
before the circuit court, and not in the earlier proceedings before the Tax
Board, was based on a decision by the Supreme Court after the hearing
before the Tax Board. 42 Nonetheless, the Court declared and reiterated the
broad general discretion 43 making clear that the raise or lose rule was not

'9 Hormel, 312 U.S. at 557; see also Cruz v. Comm'r of Pub. Welfare, 478 N.E.2d 1262,
1264 (Mass. 1985) (quoting Hormel); cf Beaupre v. Cliff Smith & Assocs., 738 N.E.2d 753, 760
n.8 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) ("the mandate that the [Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure] are
instruments for the promotion of justice, not the exaltation of mere technicalities"); United States
v. Seigel, 168 F.2d 143, 146 (1948) (stating importance of adhering to rules of procedure). The
court in Seigel stated:
[R]easonable adherence to clear, reasonable and known rules of procedure is
essential to the administration of justice . . . [i]f the courts must stop to
inquire where substantial justice on the merits lies ever time a litigant
refuses or fails to abide [by] the reasonable and known rules of procedure,
there will be no administration of justice . . . . Just as soon as rules of
procedure are ignored in order to do substantial justice on the merits in a
particular case, there are no rules. What is done in one case must be done in
all.
Id.

40 See Hormel, 312 U.S. at 557 (stating issue before court). At issue was a tax delinquency

assessed against the appellant, Hormel. Id. The Board of Tax Appeals rejected the Tax
Commissioner's position that income from a certain trust at issue was taxable. Id.
The
arguments presented by the Commissioner before the Tax Board centered on sections 167 and
166 of the then Tax Code. Id. at 554. On appeal, the Commissioner relied on another section of
the code, section 22(a), in asserting that the income was taxable. Id. at 554-55. The Circuit Court
agreed. Id. at 555. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Hormel argued that this new ground could
not be relied upon as it was never referenced before the Tax Board. Id. at 557-58.
41 Id. at 552. The statute provided that the appellate courts could modify, reverse
or remand
decisions not in accordance with law "as justice may require." Id. at 552.
42 Id. at 557-58 (discussing Court's reasoning in Helvering v. Wood, 309 U.S. 344 (1940)).
41 Id. at 557. The rule of discretion as to appellate waiver has its roots in the merger of law
and equity. See Sunderland, Improvement ofAppellate Procedure, 26 IowA L. REv. 3, 7 (1940).
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an "inflexible practice 44 and that "appellate courts . . . [should not] lose
sight of the fact that such appellate practice should not be applied where the
obvious result would be a plain miscarriage of juste."45 As the tax
provision and interpretation at issue was outcome determinative, in that
failing to address the omitted legal argument would have resulted in the
petitioner escaping the otherwise owing tax payment, "this is exactly the
type of case where application of the general practice would defeat rather
than promote the ends of justice, and the court below was right in so
46
holding.
Later, in Singleton v. Wuf 47 the Supreme Court proclaimed that
the raise or waive rule was one of "discretion., 48 Justice Blackmun made

clear there can be no "general rule" as to the potential exceptions to the
raise or waive rule:
The matter of what questions may be taken up and
resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to
the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on

the facts of individual cases.

We announce no general

rule. Certainly there are circumstances in which a federal
appellate court is justified in resolving an issue not passed
on below, as where the proper resolution is beyond
any
49
doubt or where 'injustice might otherwise result.'

The rule against considering new issues on appeal originated from the common law writ of error
and the "attaint." See id.; Dennerline, supra note 2, at 985. Whether a review of a jury for a
"false verdict" or of a judge for a "false judgment," it was considered unfair to allow
consideration of issues not part of the initial proceedings and only errors brought up in the initial
proceeding could be considered. Sunderland, supra, at 7.
44 Hormel, 312 U.S. at 556.
45

Id. at 558.

46

Id. at 560.

47 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
41

Id. at 121.

49 Id. (citations omitted). In Singleton, the Court was faced with an issue of the standing
of a

group of physicians challenging a state statute limiting abortion funding. Id. at 108. The Court
upheld the Appeals Court's determination as to standing but reversed the determination to address
the merits. Id. at 118-119. Only the standing issue had been litigated below and the Supreme
Court held that the state's health department (appellant) had the right to introduce evidence in
defense of the challenge to the statute as well as proffer applicable legal arguments. Id. at 120.
In so finding, the Supreme Court held that "injustice was more likely to be caused than avoided
by deciding the issue without petitioner having an opportunity to be heard." Id. at 121; see also
Bird v. United States, 241 F.2d 516, 521 (1st Cir. 1957) (confirming exception to forfeiture in
"exceptional cases or particular circumstances where injustice might otherwise result") (citing
Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941))). By at once stating the general rule and then
declaring the matter one of discretion, the result is what one commentator has referred to as the
"gorilla rule" based on the famous riddle that asks where an 800 pound gorilla sleeps-anywhere
it wants. Martineau, supra note 2, at 1023. That is, the decision not to announce a "general rule"
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More recently, the Supreme Court has re-affirmed this approach,
stating that whether to deviate from the waiver rule is one of discretion "to
be exercised on the facts of individual cases" and that "we have previously
stopped short of stating a general principle to contain
appellate courts'
50

discretion and we exercise that same restraint today."

The fundamental justification for rendering the raise or lose rule
one of discretion is that the appellate court is responsible for saying what
the law is in any particular dispute, that its fundamental function is to
ensure a fair trial, and that it cannot have its hands tied by the parties
presentation. Reduced to essentials, the position is that the appellate court
cannot be restrained from considering legal rules, claims, or issues omitted
by the parties.5 ' To some, the right of a federal court to frame and decide

cases on its own terms regardless of whether raised or not is "a necessary
dimension" of Article III of the Constitution.

2

As one commentator has

noted:

is the "Gorilla rule" in which the matter remains one of discretion. Case Note, Clark A. Donat,
Every Attorney Deserves a Second Chance: Considerationof Issues Not Raised at the Trial Court
Level in Jones v. Flowers, 62 ARK. L. REv. 831, 843 (2009) (discussing Martineau, supra note 2).
Justice Selya of the First Circuit, borrowing from Ralph Waldo Emerson, has expressed a similar
sentiment declaring that as to the general waive or lose rule "foolish consistency is the hobgoblin
of little minds." Nat'l Ass'n of Soc. Workers v. Harwood, 69 F. 3d 622, 627 (1st Cir. 1995)
(citations omitted); see also State v. Greene, 473 S.E.2d 921, 926 (W. Va. 1996) (Cleckley, J.,
concurring) ("However, foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, and, in the last
analysis, all these principles discussed above are procedural rules of discretion. Thus, although
the rule requiring all appellate issues be raised first in the circuit court is important, it is not
immutable") (citation omitted). To escape the hobgoblins, the Court must be able to free itself of
rigid application of the raise or waive rule in order to do justice. Id.
50 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 487 (2008). In Baker, the Ninth Circuit ruled
on a preemption argument that the trial court had determined had been waived. Id. at 487-88.
The Court reiterated the general discretion of the Appeals Court to reach such issues but went on
to state in a footnote that there was insufficient "unusual circumstances" justifying departure from
the general rule. Id. at 487 n.6. The Court noted:
[I]f the case turned on the propriety of the Circuit's decision to reach the
preemption issue we would take up the claim that it exceeded its discretion.
Instead, we will only say that to the extent the Ninth Circuit implied that the
unusual circumstances of this case called for an exception to regular
practice, we think the record points the other way.
Id. It proceeded to note that "the complexity of a case does not eliminate the value of waiver and
forfeiture rules, which ensure that parties can determine when an issue is out of the case. Id.
51 See Bergeron v. Mansour, 152 F.2d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 1945) (stating Hormel exception to
forfeiture is in order to "prevent miscarriage of justice"). The exception "is confined to situations
where evidence has been newly discovered or where counsel and the trial court has overlooked a
governing case or a crucial statute." Id.
52 Joseph R. Pope, Snyder v. Phelps: Issue Waiver and the Scope of Appellate Discretion,
THE APPEAL, Summer 2010, at 4.
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In those cases where the parties fail to accurately and
completely describe applicable legal doctrine or abandon a
viable argument presented before the trial court, the court's
duty to follow the party presentation principle collides with
its duty to announce an accurate uncolored rule of law.
Indeed, as judicial decisions are objective statements
describing the meaning of law, and not statements
concerning the subjective view of the law taken by
litigants, courts must be able to sua sponte take notice of
issues and legal principles either mistakenly or
intentionally omitted by the parties.53
This view is not confined to the limited jurisdictional courts of the
federal system, but is applicable to state courts of general jurisdiction as
well with one such court remarking:
Appellate review does not consist of supine submission to
erroneous legal concepts even though none of the parties
declaimed the applicable law. Our duty is to enunciate the
law on the record facts. Neither the parties nor the trial
judge, by agreement or passivity,
can force us to abdicate
54
our appellate responsibility.
Under this view, the appellate court has a duty to dispense,
administer, and promote justice regardless of any lack of preservation by
counsel.55 According to the First Circuit, "[w]e may ourselves choose to
consider newly minted arguments from the parties or devise them

53 Pope, supra note 52, at 4; see also Frost, supra note 5, at 472 (defending judicial issue
creation as constitutional obligation corollary to articulate meaning of contested legal issues).
54 Ochoav. State, 794 P.2d 1127, 1136 (Idaho 1990) (citations omitted) (quoting Empire
Life

Ins. Co. of Am. v. Valdak Corp., 468 F.2d 330, 334 (5th Cir. 1972)). It is thus contended that

"[d]espite much pretense to the contrary by judges and lawyers, it is one of the marks of a great
judge to recast the issues in cases in his own image rather than to assume a passive, 'umpireal
stance."' Pope, supra note 52, at 3 (quoting Richard A. Posner, Cardozo: A Study in Reputation
144 (1990)).
55 United States v. One Urban Lot Located at 1 St. A-1, Valparaiso, 885 F.2d 994, 1007 (1st
Cir. 1989) ("In our roles as arbiters of cases and administrators of justice, we are entrusted with

protecting rights of those who seek resolution of their rights within the judicial process ...
[flailure to vacate the default judgment against Bruno would be a gross miscarriage of justice and
offend our philosophy that cases should be resolved on the merits."); Frost, supra note 5, at 472

("Because judicial decisions are objective statements about the meaning of law, not statements
about how the parties subjectively interpret the law, courts must be able to take notice of legal

arguments that the parties fail to see.").
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ourselves, but this is not an entitlement of the parties. 56
Other justifications for exception to the raise or lose rule through
discretion are that the court can review the entire proceeding and preserved
or unpreserved errors can be effectively addressed based on such a posture,
and that significant legal issues deserve and demand appellate attention,
particularly in criminal cases where life or liberty is at stake. By leaving it

to discretion, the court is free to assess the facts and circumstances
of the
57

particular case un-tied to any confining or general per se rule.
Either or both of Hormel and Singleton have, at some point, been
cited by virtually every federal circuit as well as a substantial number of
state courts including Massachusetts.58 The Singleton Court's reference to
exceptional circumstances including "where the proper resolution is
beyond any doubt ... or where 'injustice might otherwise result"' is found
repeatedly in the case law.5 9
B. Plain Errorand Discretion:The Supreme Court
The federal "plain error" doctrine was developed at common law
and is embodied in Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,60
Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 6' the Supreme Court

56 Sierra Club v. Wagner, 555 F.3d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing United States v.La Guardia,
902 F.2d 1010, 1013 (1st Cir. 1990)).
57 Id.
58

See infra note 357 and accompanying text.
U.S. at 121 (citing Hormel, 312 U.S. at 557).

59 Singleton, 428
60 FED. R. CRmW.

P. 52 of the Criminal Rules of Procedure provides:
(a) Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not
affect substantial rights must be disregarded.
(b) Plain Error. A plain error that affects substantial rights may be
considered even though it was not brought to the court's attention.
FED. R. CRI. P. 52.
61 FED. R. Civ. P. 51 ("Instructions to the Jury; Objections; Preserving a Claim of Error").
Rule 51 was amended in 2003 to add subsection (d)(2), which permits plain error review even
when a party failed to properly object before the district court if the error affects substantial
rights. FED. R. Civ. P. 51(d)(2) ("Plain Error. A court may consider a plain error in the
instructions that has not been preserved as required by Rule 51(d)(1) if the error affects
substantial rights"); see 9C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2558 (3d ed. 2008) ("The 2003 amendment ... of Rule 51 codified the
previous practice followed by most circuits that said that the appellate court may reverse for plain
error in an instruction to the jury even if there had been no objection to it."); see also Ji v. Bose,
Corp., 626 F.3d 116, 125 (1st Cir. 2010) (concluding plain error applies to failure to object or
preserve claim pertaining to instruction). The accompanying advisory committee notes to Rule
51 state:
Preserving a claim of error and plain error . . . . Many circuits have
recognized that an error not preserved under Rule 51 may be reviewed in
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Rules, 62 and the Federal Rules of Evidence. 63 Between 1896 and 2010, the
Supreme Court has issued a handful of decisions demarcating the doctrine
under Rule 52 with the principle otherwise being codified in the Rules of
Procedure beginning in 1944.
In its 1896 decision in Wiborg v. United States,64 the Court stated
that "if a plain error was committed in a matter so absolutely vital to
defendants, we feel ourselves at liberty to correct it" even though no
exception was made to the error at trial. 65 This was express recognition of
the existing acceptance in common law to "do justice" where there has
66
been a fundamental error and in spite of the failure to object or preserve.
Under Wiborg, the miscarriage of justice standard that evolved equated to

"the conviction of one who but for the error probably would have been
acquitted." 67
exceptional circumstances. The language adopted to capture these decisions
in subdivision (d)(2) is borrowed from Criminal Rule 52. Although the
language is the same, the context of civil litigation often differs from the
context of criminal prosecution; actual application of the plain-error
standard takes account of the differences . . . . The court's duty to give
correct jury instructions in a civil action is shaped by at least four factors.
The factor most directly implied by a "plain" error rule is the obviousness of
the mistake. The importance of the error is a second major factor. The costs
of correcting an error reflect a third factor that is affected by a variety of
circumstances. In a case that seems close to the fundamental error line,
account also may be taken of the impact a verdict may have on nonparties.
FED. R. Civ. P. 51 advisory committee's note on 2003 amendment.
62 SuP. CT. R. 24(1)(a) ("the Court may consider a plain error not among the questions

presented but evident from the record and otherwise within its jurisdiction to decide").
63 See FED. R. Civ. P. 103(a) (defining reversible error evidentiary rulings wherein "a
substantial right of the party" is affected). Rule 103(e), in turn, provides that "[a] court may take
notice of a plain error affecting a substantial right, even if the claim of error was not properly
preserved." FED. R. Civ. P. 103(e). Both part a and e of the rule utilize the term "substantial
right" and if given the same meaning would result in no differentiation between preserved and
unpreserved errors. FED. R. Civ. P. 103(a) & (d). As a result, courts have sought to define plain
error more narrowly requiring that such error be more serious than simply reversible error.
64 163 U.S. 632 (1896).
65 Id. at 658; see also Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 222 (1905) (invoking plain
error
review by requiring Government prove all claim elements to ensure public confidence).
66 Tiborg, 163 U.S. at 658-59.
In Wiborg, the Supreme Court reversed the convictions of
two of the three defendants making clear that there was insufficient proof on the record. Id.
67 United States v. Martinez-Torres, 912 F.2d 1552, 1558-59 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing United
States v. Silberstein, 732 F.2d 1338, 1349 (7th Cir. 1984)), vacated 944 F.2d 51 (1st Cir. 1991);
see also O'Neil v. State of Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 364-65 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting). Justice
Field stated:
I think . . . that this court . . . should take notice of the error of its own
motion; for, if the denial by the court below of the immunity claimed against
the cruel and unusual punishment imposed was an error, it was one of the
gravest character, leaving the defendant to a life of misery,-one of perpetual
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In 1936, in United States v. Atkinson, 6 a civil case, the Court
defined the parameters of the modem day plain error doctrine by stating

that "[i]n exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases, appellate
courts . . . may, of their own motion, notice errors to which no exception
has been taken, if the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously
affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 69
Under this formulation, either an "obvious error" or an error affecting the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings meets the
required "exceptional circumstance.
The focus expressly included an
71
inquiry as to the impact of the error on the judicial process.
Rule 52(b), enacted in 1944 and codifying plain error for criminal

matters, does not explain or define the concepts of "plain error" or
"affecting substantial rights," although the advisory committee notes
indicate that the Rule was meant to codify the doctrine articulated in

Wiborg and that it was a "restatement of existing law." 72 Somewhat
conspicuously absent from the notes is any mention or discussion of
Atkinson's "exceptional circumstances" or public interest criteria for the
exercise of appellate court discretion.
In 1946, the Court in Kotteakos v. United States73 indicated that

"affecting substantial rights" for both Rule 52(a) (harmless error for
preserved issues) and Rule 52(b) (plain error for unpreserved issues) meant
"the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining
the jury's verdict., 74 This standard has evolved into "a reasonable

imprisonment and hard labor.
Id.
6'
69
70

297 U.S. 157 (1936).
Id. at 160.
Id. (citing New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 310, 318 (1929)); Brasfield v.

United States, 272 U.S. 448, 450 (1926) (outlining exceptional circumstances where appellate
courts may notice errors where no exception taken). In Johnson, the Court stated that despite the
lack of objection the public interest required "litigation be fairly and impartially conducted"
including the need to correct verdicts influenced by passion or prejudice. 279 U.S. at 318. In
Brasfield, the concern was with serious error "affect[ing] the proper relations of the court to the
jury." 272 U.S. at 450.
71 See United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936). Atkinson made clear
that plain
error was to be recognized only in "exceptional circumstances" and that such errors affect the
"fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings" and thus, in the "public interest,"
appellate courts "may" notice the errors. Id. It also noted that plain error would be more likely in
criminal case where life or liberty is at stake and that a court had the authority to recognize such
error on its own. Id. The Court summarily concluded that "no such case is presented here." Id.
72 FED. R. CRlVI. P. R. 52 advisory committee's
notes.
7 328U. 750 (1946).
74 Id. at 757 n.9. According to the Court in Kotteakos:

2012]

RAISE OR LOSE

probability that, but for
the error claim, the result of the proceeding would
75
have been different.,
In 1983, the Supreme Court held that Rule 52(b) was not
applicable to collateral attacks upon convictions and remarked that plain
error was "to be used sparingly and only when miscarriage ofjustice would
otherwise result., 76 According to the Court, "the intention of [Rule 52(b)]
is to serve the ends of justice therefore it is to be invoked in exceptional
circumstances where necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice., 77 The
rule was found to reflect "careful balancing" between the intention of
"encourag[ing] all trial participants to seek a fair and accurate trial the first
time around"
and the "insistence that obvious injustice be promptly
78
redressed.

Two years later, the Supreme Court re-stated that plain error was to
be found sparingly and was not to be subjected to unwarranted extension;
required examination of the entire record; and would require reversal only
if the error "undermine[s] the fundamental fairness of the trial and
contribute[s] to a miscarriage ofjustice.,"79 It made clear the miscarriage of
justice standard referenced in Frady was synonymous with that set forth in
Atkinson-i.e., "seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings." 80 The Court was concerned with making a
distinction between harmless error and that "an error ...must be more than
obvious or readily apparent ...to trigger appellate review [under plain

If, when all is said and done, the [court's] conviction is sure that the error
did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the
judgment should stand ....But if one cannot say, with fair assurance, after
pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the
whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is
impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected. The inquiry
cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from
the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself
had substantial influence, If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the
conviction cannot stand.
Id.at 764-65 (emphasis added).
75 United States v. Dominguez Benitiz, 542 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2004).
76 United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n.14 (1982). The Court in Frady held that Rule
52(b) "was intended for use on direct appeal" and was "out of place" as to collateral attacks postjudgment. Id. at 164.
77 id.
78 Id. at 163.
79 United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16 (1985).
so Id. at 15 (quoting United States v.Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)). The use of"only"
as a qualifier of the "seriously affects" prong first appeared in Johnson v. UnitedStates. 520 U.S.
461, 467 (1975).

196

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XVII

error] .81

The most recent Supreme Court formulation of the rule came in
United States v. Olano.8 2 There, the Court held that the presence of
alternative jurors among the deliberating jury was not plain error.83 The
Court stated that the appellate court must find the unpreserved matter raised
on appeal to be an "error," that is "plain,"8 4 and that "affects substantial
'
rights."85
Such errors are to be noticed if it "causes the conviction or
sentencing of an actually innocent defendant [miscarriage of justice]" 86 or
where, in the discretionary judgment of the court, the "error seriously
affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings. 87
Post-Olano, the Court has emphasized that the existence of "plain
error," particularly as to prejudice/public interest, must be addressed "on a
case specific and fact-intensive basis."88 It has also reiterated that even
81 Young, 470 U.S. at 16, n.14.
82 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
83
84

Id.at 741.
Id. at 734. Error is considered "a deviation from a legal rule," and "plain" is obvious or

clear or not subject to reasonable dispute. Id; Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467 ("the word plain error is
synonymous with clear or, equivalently obvious") (quotations omitted).
85 0lano, 507 U.S. at 731-37. "Affects substantial rights," in turn- means the
party claiming
error has been prejudiced in that there is a "reasonable probability the error affected the outcome
of the trial." United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2194 (2010); see, e.g., United States v.
Brandao, 539 F.3d 44, 58 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Borrero-Acevedo, 533 F.3d 11, 15-16
(1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Padilla, 415 F.3d 211, 220-21 (1st Cir. 2005); see also AcevedoGarcia v. Monroig, 351 F.3d 547, 570 (1st Cir. 2003) ("[P]rejudice [for] the plain error test,
requires a strong causal link between the harm to the aggrieved party and the legal error."); The
court stated that the possibility of harm does not satisfy a finding of prejudice. Id; see, e.g.,
Marcus, 130 S. Ct. at 2194; Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009); United States v.
Casas, 356 F.3d 104, 113 (1st Cir. 2004).
86 Olano, 507 U.S. at 736 (citing Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632 (1896)).
87 Id. (quotations omitted). Applying this four-part test, the Court in Olano found
that there
was unquestionably an error: Rule 24(c) requires the discharge of alternate jurors after the jury
has begun its deliberations, and waiver could not apply because the Government conceded the
plain error. 570 U.S. at 737-38. The key inquiry was whether the error affected the defendant's
substantial rights. Id.But there was no evidence of prejudice, and a violation of Rule 24(c) is not
of such a magnitude that affects substantial rights "independent of its prejudicial impact." Id.at
737. Because substantial rights were not affected, the Court declined to address whether, if the
error was prejudicial, the Court of Appeals should have exercised its discretion under the fourth
prong of the test to correct the error. Compare id at 737-38, with United States v. Cotton, 535
U.S. 625, 634 (2002) ("The real threat then to fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial
proceedings would be if [the defendant], despite the overwhelming an uncontroverted evidence
[of guilt, had the conviction overturned on appeal.]") (quotations omitted).
88 Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. at 142. In Puckett, the Court found that the
Government's breach of a plea agreement must satisfy all of the elements of plain error for
reversal and that "[w]hen the Government reneges on a plea deal, the integrity of the system may
be called into question, but there may well be countervailing factors in particular cases." Id. at
142-43. Similarly, in United States v. Marcus, the Court rejected the contention that the failure of
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"serious errors" are subject to the full plain error inquiry and that
constitutional errors will not always affect the framework in which the trial
proceeds and, as such, like any other unpreserved error, requires a showing
of prejudice. 9

the trial court to instruct the jury that they could only convict the defendant on post-criminal
statute conduct and not pre was automatic plain error. See 130 S. Ct. at 2166. Mere possibility
that the non-criminal conduct was the basis of the conviction was not the proper standard. Id.
According to the Court:
[W]e see no reason why this kind of error would automatically "affect
substantial rights" without a showing of individual prejudice.
That is because errors similar to the one at issue in this case-i.e.,
errors that create a risk that a defendant will be convicted based exclusively
on noncriminal conduct come in various shapes and sizes. The kind and
degree of hanm that such errors create can consequently vary. Sometimes a
proper jury instruction might well avoid ham; other times, preventing the
ham might only require striking or limiting the testimony of a particular
witness. And sometimes the error might infect an entire trial, such that a
jury instruction would mean little. There is thus no reason to believe that all
or almost all such errors always "affec[t] the framework within which the
trial proceeds," or "necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair
or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence.
Id. at 2165-66 (citations omitted).
89 Id. at 2164; Puckett, 556 U.S. at 141 (noting that "the rule of contemporaneous objection is
equally essential and desirable [to policy in establishing trust between prosecutors and defendants
affected by government plea breach] and when the two collide we see no need to relieve the
defendant of his usual burden of showing prejudice"). The Olano formulation has not gone
without some disagreement within the Court. See Marcus, 130 S. Ct. at 2169. Justice Stevens,
who dissented in Olano, stated as recently as 2010:
In our attempt to clarify Rule 52(b), we have, I fear, both muddied the
waters and lost sight of the wisdom embodied in the Rule's spare text ....
This Court's ever more intensive efforts to rationalize plain-error review
may have been born of a worthy instinct. But they have trapped the
appellate courts in an analytic maze that, I have increasingly come to
believe, is more liable to frustrate than to facilitate sound decisionmaking.
Id. at 2169. There have been differences in the Court as to application as well. In Puckett, for
instance, a majority held that the unpreserved claim on appeal of the government's breach of a
plea agreement was subject to plain error review, was not a structural error, and required a
showing of both prejudice (affects substantial rights, i.e. affected sentencing) and that the error
seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 556 U.S. at
140-41. Justices Souter and Stevens dissented agreeing with the plain error test but disagreeing
as to the relevant interest for purpose of determining prejudice. Id. at 143-47. They contended
that the substantial rights implicated for purposes of determining prejudice was not the sentence
(length of incarceration-where error likely had no effect) but "conviction in the absence of trial or
compliance with the terms of the plea agreement dispensing with the Government's obligation to
prove its case." Id. at 144. As to prejudice and particularly the "fairness, integrity or public
reputation" prong it was stated:
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The Supreme Court has otherwise not fully weighed in on or
clarified whether the discretion set forth in Singleton and Hormel is limited
to plain error or encompasses other circumstances. 90
In three post

Hormel/Singleton cases, its reference to exception to waiver appeared to be
92
91
However, in one case, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,
as to plain error.
the High Court did note (without any reference to plain error) that neither
the complexity nor the significance of the overall case was sufficient to
invoke the discretionary exception to forfeiture or waiver under Singleton.93

If... the protected interest is in the guarantee that no one is liable to spend a
day behind bars as a convict without a trial or his own agreement, then the
fairness and integrity of the Judicial Branch suffer when a court imprisons a
defendant after he pleaded guilty in reliance on a plea agreement, only to
have the Government repudiate the obligation it agreed upon.
Id.at 147. In Johnson v. UnitedStates, the Court also addressed the discretionary public interest
prong under plain error. 520 U.S. at 467. There, the case involved an error by the trial court in
deciding the materiality of asserted false statements to a grand jury comprising a perjury charge
instead of giving the determination to the jury. Id.at 464-65. In denying discretionary relief
under the public interest prong of the plain error inquiry, the Court found that the evidence of the
defendant's guilt was overwhelming and that the question of materiality was "essentially
uncontroverted at trial." Id.at 470. According to the Court:
On this record there is no basis for concluding that the error seriously
affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
Indeed, it would be the reversal of a conviction such as this which would
have that effect. Reversal for error, regardless of its effect on the judgment,
encourages litigants to abuse the judicial process and bestirs the public to
ridicule it.
Id. (citations and quotations omitted) (alterations in original).
90 See Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 408 (2006)
("Arguments raised for the first time on appeal may be entertained, for example, if their
consideration would prevent manifest injustice.") (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121
(1976))); Newport v. Fact Concerts Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 274-75 (1981) ("Rule 51 is susceptible to
flexible interpretation when strictly necessary to avoid a clear miscarriage of justice"); Anderson
v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 217 n.5 (1974) (noting plain error exception importance in
criminal case where error affects proceeding's fairness or integrity).
91 See supra note 90 (discussing review of claims when it affects integrity of judicial
proceedings).
92 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
9' See id. at 488 n.6; see also Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 954 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("Even when an error is not 'plain,' this Court has in extraordinary circumstances
exercised discretion to consider claims forfeited below."). According to the Court:
It is the general rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not
consider an issue not passed upon below," when to deviate from this rule
being a matter "left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be
exercised on the facts of individual cases,". ....
We have previously
stopped short of stating a general principle to contain appellate courts'
discretion, and we exercise the same restraint today ....
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In yet another case, City of Newport v. Fact Concerts Inc.,9 the Court
reviewed the merits of a challenge to a punitive damage award under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 even though timely objection was not made to the jury
instruction below. 95 The Court summarily held that review was not limited
to "plain error" as it would be "particularly in-apt" under the
circumstances. 96 Review without regard to plain error was provided as the
trial court had opted to address the merits despite the waiver and to resolve
"uncertainty" as to the availability of punitive damages which novelty,
importance,
and likelihood of recurrence "counsel[ed] unconstricted
",97
review.
There was a dissent by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens
which responded that there was no basis not to apply plain error review
and, that by not doing so, the majority was "carv[ing] out an expansive
exception" to procedural default which was "unprecedented and
unwarranted." 98
C. First CircuitDiscretion:Plain Errorand the Krynicki-Harwood
Factors
First Circuit discretion as to addressing unpreserved claims of error

We will only say that to the extent the Ninth Circuit implied that the unusual
circumstances of this case called for an exception to regular practice, we
think the record points the other way.
Of course the Court of Appeals was correct that the case was complex
and significant, so much so, in fact, that the District Court was fairly
required to divide it into four phases, to oversee a punitive-damages class of
32,000 people, and to manage a motions industry that threatened to halt
progress completely. But the complexity of a case does not eliminate the
value of waiver and forfeiture rules, which ensure that parties can determine
when an issue is out of the case, and that litigation remains, to the extent
possible, an orderly progression. "The reason for the rules is not that
litigation is a game, like golf, with arbitrary rules to test the skill of the
players. Rather, litigation is a 'winnowing process,' and the procedures for
preserving or waiving issues are part of the machinery by which courts
narrow what remains to be decided."
Exxon, 554 U.S. at 488 & n.6 (citations omitted) (citing Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d
527, 531 (1st Cir. 1993)). The District Court's sensible efforts to impose order upon the issues in
play and the progress of the trial deserve our respect. Id.
94 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
95 Id. at 255-56.
96 Id. at 256 ("No

'right' to a specific standard of review exists in this setting, any more than
a 'right' to review existed at all once petitioner failed to except to the charge at trial.").
97 Id at 257.

98 Id. at 271-72, 276 n.7 (Brennan,J., dissenting); see Romano v.U-Haul Int'l, 233 F.3d 655,

664 (1st Cir. 2000) (limiting Newport exception to plain error review to instances lower court
addressed issue); Elwood v. Pina, 815 F.2d 173, 176 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating same).
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or new issues on appeal presently encompasses both plain error and other

"exceptional circumstances" based on certain factors or interests. The First

Circuit applies and follows the Supreme Court precedent as to plain error in
both civil and criminal proceedings and has otherwise delineated a list of
factors informing the discretion as to other exceptional circumstances.

There thus is a dual discretionary exception to waiver encompassing both a
plain error as well as separate, but overlapping, multi-factor approach.
The First Circuit has long recognized the power to reach issues or
errors not assigned, in both criminal and civil matters, so long as they
constituted plain error. 99 This was held as a matter of both common law
and local circuit rule prior to the adoption of the Civil Procedural Rules in
In these early cases, it was noted that the power was to be
19 4 4 .100
exercised "sparingly and cautiously, and only to prevent gross injustice.
In one decision, the First Circuit stated that exception to address an issue
not raised only would arise if refusal to hear it "would shock the judicial

conscience. "102 Interestingly, it went on to remark that such cases are
"grouped with a somewhat careless expression to the effect that, whatever
the rules of practice are, plain errors may well be considered. "13
This sentiment has carried over to the more recent and current
decisions of the First Circuit. Similar to most other circuits, it is repeatedly
admonished that the plain error exception or default standard is to be
applied "stringently" 104 in civil cases. "The standard is high" and "itis rare
indeed for a panel to find plain error in a civil case."1' 5 The right to reach
99 See Chapmanv. Reynolds, 77 F. 274, 275-76 (1st Cir. 1896).
100

See Chapman, 77 F. at 275 (citing Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 658 (1896));

Nat'l Cash Register Co. v. Leland, 94 F. 502, 506 (1st Cir. 1899); see also United States v.
Brown_ Durrell & Co., 127 F. 793, 795 (1st Cir. 1903) (stating court may notice plain error when
"the disregarding of which would do substantial injustice"); Jones v. Pettingill, 245 F. 269, 274
(1st Cir. 1917) (noting First Circuit Rules 11 and 24 allow court to reach plain errors not
assigned); B.A. Carrol Stevedore Co. v. Makinda, 20 F.2d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 1927) (Anderson, J.,
dissenting) (stating plain error reach to be exercised sparingly, cautiously, and to prevent gross
injustice); Ayers v. United States, 58 F.2d 607, 609 (8th Cir. 1932) (noting plain error concept
applicable to civil and criminal matters before adoption of civil rules).
101 Makinda, 20 F.2d at 23.
102 Keliherv. United States, 193 F. 8, 10 (1st Cir. Mass. 1912).
103 Id.
104 Tuli v. Brigham & Women's Hosp., 656 F.3d 33, 46 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Trull v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 320 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 2002)); Johnson v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 595
F.2d 890, 894 (1st Cir. 1979) (stating exception only apples "in horrendous cases where a gross
miscarriage of justice would occur"); see also Jackson v. Parker, 627 F.3d 634, 640 (7th Cir.
2010) (stating plain error rarely applied in civil cases) (citing Moore ex rel. Estate of Grady v.
Tuleja, 546 F.3d 423, 430 (7th Cir. 2008))).
105 Chestnut v.Lowell, 305 F.3d 18, 20 (1st Cir. 2002); Munoz v. Sociedad Espanola De
Auxilio Mutuo y Beneficiencia, 671 F.3d 49, 59 (1st Cir. 2012) (stating requirement for plain
error was extremely demanding) (citing Chestnut, 305 F.3d at 20)); Tuli, 656 F.3d at 46
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such plain error includes doing so sua sponte.106
The Reporter's Notes to Rule 51 openly suggests that there is a
distinction between civil and criminal proceedings for purposes of plain
error. 10 7 To state the obvious, personal liberty and other constitutional
rights (such as the protection against ineffective assistance of counsel) are
rarely at stake (if not inapplicable) in civil proceedings.0 8 Further, some
suggest that the adversarial process is sufficient to protect substantial rights
in civil cases without the need for plain error review.1 9
Since Olano, First Circuit decisions have repeated the mantra that
only "blockbuster" errors are within plain error reviewio and that "[a]
party's best safeguard against judicial error [remains] a contemporaneous
objection [and that] plain error principles cannot be used as a surrogate for
the foregone objection." '
In relying upon and reciting the Olano
elements, it has also repeatedly emphasized that there must be a clear

(explaining no plain error as shear conjecture jury would have awarded more if instructed
differently); see also Hicks v. Avery Drei, LLC., 654 F.3d 739, 744 (7th Cir. 2011) (maintaining
plain error "rarely" applied in civil cases); Ayers v. United States, 58 F.2d 607, 609 ("In criminal
cases, in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice, a wider discretion to review errors not properly
saved or presented for review is recognized."); Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 194
(1909) ("In criminal cases courts are not inclined to be as exacting with reference to the specific
character of the objection made as in civil cases.").
106 See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 209 (2006) (holding discretion to consider
sua
sponte statute of limitations defense in federal habeas proceeding); Chestnut, 305 F.3d at
21(holding court's failure to recognize precedent and preclude punitive damages, clear and
obvious plain error); see also Munoz, 671 F.3d at 59-60.
107 See FED. R. Civ. P. 51 advisory committee's notes to 2003 amendments (stating "actual
application [should] take[] account of the difference[]" between civil and criminal litigation); see,
e.g., Long v. Howard Univ., 550 F.3d 21, 26 n. (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("[W]e follow the notes of the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules in recognizing that Civil Rule 51 is borrowed from Criminal
Rule 52 and should be interpreted accordingly while still, of course, taking account of the
differences between civil and criminal litigation"); Muldrow v. Re-Direct, Inc., 493 F.3d 160, 168
n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting plain error review under Rule 51 requires distinguishing civil from
criminal cases); Higbee v. Sentry Ins. Co., 440 F.3d 408, 409 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating same).
108 See Deppe v. Tripp, 863 F.2d 1356, 1361 (7th Cir. 1988); Wycoffv. Grace Cmty. Church
Assemblies of God, 251 P.3d 1260, 1269 (Colo. App. 2010) (noting in civil cases "liberty is not
at stake and there is no constitutional right to effective counsel"); see also Goldfuss v. Davidson,
679 N.E.2d 1099, 1103 (Ohio 1997) ("The plain error doctrine originated as a criminal law
concept.").
'09See Gracia v. Bittner, 900 P.2d 351, 357 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (discussing fundamental
error's limited role in civil cases and counsel's role in presentation to jury).
110 United States v. Salley, 651 F.3d 159, 164 (1st Cir. 2011); see, e.g., Munoz, 671 F.3d at
59-60; United States v. Alverio-Melendez, 640 F.3d 412, 421 (1st Cir. 2011); Bielunas v. F/V
Misty Dawn, 621 F.3d 72, 79 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Moran, 393 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir.
2004).
...United States v. Padilla, 415 F.3d 211, 221 (1st Cir. 2005) ("The plain error doctrine is
premised on the assumption that parties must take responsibility for protecting their legal rights
and, accordingly, that only the clearest and most serious of forfeited errors should be corrected on
appellate review.").
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miscarriage of justice, or the error seriously affects "the fairness, integrity
or public reputation of judicial proceedings." 112 "The 'fairness, integrity, or
reputation' plain-error standard is a flexible one and depends significantly

on the nature of the error, its context, and the facts of the case.""'
As to any discretion to address unpreserved errors or new issues on
appeal outside of the plain error rubric, early First Circuit cases generally
112

Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997); see United States v. DeSimone, 488

F.3d 561, 570 (1st Cir. 2007) (explaining ruling must be wrong and go to fairness, integrity and
public reputation of trial); Aldogan v. Aldogan, 89 Fed. App'x 285, 286 (1st Cir. 2004) (stating
same); United States v. Marder, 48 F.3d 564, 574 (1st Cir. 1995) (applying plain error found
small risk error caused miscarriage of justice); United States v. Figueroa, 818 F.2d 1020, 1026
(1st Cir. 1987) (finding trial judge's failure to make formal findings before admitting testimony
"marginal," not plain error).
...United States v. Gandia-Maysonet, 227 F. 3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing United States v.
Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16 (1985)). In Gandia-Maysonet, for instance, an un-objected to error as to
the failure of the trial court to advise under Rule 11 guilty plea colloquy as to what government
would have to prove as to intent element of carjacking charge met plain error test. Id. at 3. Error
was likely enough to have influenced the plea and may have encouraged defendant to plead
guilty. Id. at 4. Evidence as to intent was indirect and far from overwhelming and thus error
prejudicial. Id. at 5. Fairness, integrity prong met as plea undercut by error in misstatement of
intent element and evidence of intent "thin" as such "we think that the error was not merely
'harmful' but also 'plain' under Olano because it seriously affected the guilty plea's fairness and
integrity. Id. at 6; see also United States v. Hoyle, 237 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2001) (reviewing
defendant's guilty plea for plain error); Padilla, 415 F.3d at 228 (Lipez, J., dissenting)
(explaining plain error shown). In Padilla,the dissent, which agreed the error was not structural
but that plain error had been shown, contended that it was meaningless to assess the error under
the prejudice prong as no such test could be conducted given that the error was the wrongful
delegation by the court to the probation officer as to blood testing. Id. at 226. As the prejudice
test requires a determination of the probability of the same outcome even if the error had not
occurred there was no outcome to consider. Id. The dissenters further contended that the public
interest prong was met due to the ease of the correction in that appellant was not asking for new
trial or sentence only modification of supervised release condition. Id. at 228. Also, it was
argued that where the obligation of following Congress' statutory command is minimal the
obligation to make the correction is that much greater. Id. at 229-30. Congress specifically
enacted statute saying it was the responsibility of judges, not probation officers, to set number of
tests. Id. at 230. According to the dissenter "[t]he fourth step of plain-error review is designed to
safeguard the reputation of the courts. Leaving this plan error uncorrected disserves that
purpose." Id. See United States v. Kinsella, 622 F.3d 75, 83-84 (1st Cir. 2010) (determining no
error in prosecutor asking coconspirator on redirect if he remembered who sentenced him);
United States v. Carrasco, 540 F.3d 43, 53 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding un-objected trial to ruling
reversing earlier decision and admitting defendant's confession plain error). In Carrasco, the
First Circuit considered whether the district court erred by admitting prior inconsistent statement,
despite the defendant' failure to object at trial. Id. at 52-53. Nevertheless, the First Circuit
considered the issue on plain error review because "the closeness of the case and the crucial
importance of the question of the confession's admissibility" resulted in substantial rights being
affected. Id. at 53. It was held that the public interest prong was met because the error "hobbled"
the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to conduct his defense. Id. at 54. The First Circuit also
stated as to the public interest prong: "Trial judges, like appellate judges, are fallible human
beings. Errors are therefore to be expected. But allowing such an error to go uncorrected even
though it may well have meant the difference between conviction and acquittal would certainly
erode public confidence in the integrity of judicial proceedings." Id.
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stated the right with little explanation provided.
The wording or
formulation of the exception has varied. Some decisions state that the court
could notice errors not assigned "whenever in their discretion the

circumstances seem to warrant such action"' 1 4 or whenever "failure to do
so would defeat the ends of justice.""' 5

Others articulated the exception

more narrowly, such as where the new ground was "so compelling as [to]
virtually insure appellant's success, ' ' 116 or "where evidence has been newly
discovered or where counsel and the trial court has overlooked a governing
case or a crucial statute."" 7 A frequently recurring formulation among
First Circuit decisions is that the exception applies only "in horrendous
cases where a gross miscarriage ofjustice would occur."" 8
In 1982, in United States v.Krynicki, 119 the First Circuit expressly
delineated certain factors or interests that directed the discretion to consider
forfeited issues. 120 There, the United States appealed the dismissal of an
indictment found by the court to have been untimely under the Speedy
Trial Act.12 1 On appeal, the government argued that the statute's
requirement that an indictment be returned within 30 days of arrest was
inapplicable to the stolen firearms charge because no such charge was
pending at time of indictment. 12
The

First

circumstances as:

Circuit

found

the

case

presented

"exceptional"

(a) the new issue was "purely legal" with the record

fully developed, thus not depriving the appellee from an opportunity to
introduce relevant evidence; (b) the legal argument presented was "highly

persuasive ... leaving no doubt as to the proper resolution;,1

2

1

(c) the issue

Prensa InsulaDe P.R. v. People of P.R., 189 F.2d 1019, 1023 (1st Cir. 1951).
Palo Blanco Fruit Co. v. Palo Alto Orchards Co., 195 F.2d 90, 93 (1st Cir. 1952).
116 Dobb v. Baker, 505 F.2d 1041, 1044 (1st Cir. 1974) (stating while new contention not
frivolous it was likewise not "self-evident"); Johnston v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 595 F. 2d 890, 894
(1st Cir. 1979) (finding failure to consider would not cause miscarriage of justice and appeal not
insuring success); see also Palo Blanco Fruit Co., 195 F.2d at 93 (1st Cir. 1952) ("It is an
established practice for appellate courts to consider matters not raised below when failure to do so
would defeat the ends of justice. Thus we would notice a statute, or a rule of decisional law, or
perhaps some other matter clearly apparent in the record, calling for reversal, even though the
statute, or legal rule, or other matter, were not presented to the court below, or even argued to us
on appeal.").
117 Bergeronv. Mansour, 152 F. 2d 27, 32 (1st Cir.1945).
118 Johnston, 595 F.2d at 894 (quoting Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 539
114
115

F.2d 929, 932 (3d Cir. 1976)).
119 689 F.2d 289 (1st Cir. 1982).
120 See id.at 291.
121 See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. 3161(b)).
122 id.
123 Id. at 292 ("Given the compelling nature of the government's argument, preliminary
examination of this legal issue by the trial court would not benefit either the court or the parties
appreciably.").
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"is almost certain to arise in other cases"; and (d) declining to reach the
issue would result in a "miscarriage of justice.' 124 As to the "miscarriage
of justice" factor, the First Circuit stated that "[b]oth the government and
the public have a legitimate and significant interest in prosecuting
suspected criminals" and that since the Act did not bar the government
from prosecuting a defendant on a particular count, 'justice requires that
this court 5correct the lower court's error" even though not properly
2
preserved.1
The Krynicki factors were reiterated again in United States v.
LaGuardia2 6 with the First Circuit further suggesting that where the issue
is of constitutional dimension, it may also further militate toward exercise
of the discretion. 127 Subsequent decisions referenced the exception to exist
where the omitted argument is highly persuasive28and declining to reach the
issue would result in "a miscarriage ofjustice."1
In 1995, the First Circuit expanded upon the Krynicki factors in
NationalAssociation of Social Workers v. Harwood,1 2 9 which is the court's
most recent definitive statement of the criteria for "exceptional
circumstances" discretion. There, the court listed six factors: (1) whether
the failure to raise the issue deprived the lower court of "useful factfinding"; (2) whether the new issue is of "constitutional magnitude"; (3)
whether the omitted argument is "highly persuasive," particularly where
failing to address it "threatens a 'miscarriage of Justice"'; (4) whether there
is any special prejudice or inequity to the opposing party if the issue is
addressed; (5) whether the omission was inadvertent as opposed to
deliberate; and (6) whether the omitted issue "implicates matters of great
public moment. ', 13 ° The public interest factor was stated to be "perhaps
[the] most salient""13 ' with it subsequently reiterating, as with plain error,
that this "exceptional circumstances" discretion be exercised far and few
between and only if "the equities heavily preponderate in favor of such a
step. ' '132

124

Id. at 292.

id.
126902 F.2d 1010 (1st Cir. 1990).
125

127 Id. at 1013 ("[Ilf the defendants' constitutional claim has merit, it would be a rank
miscarriage of justice to allow their sentences to stand").
128 Correa v. Hosp. San Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1196 (1st Cir. 1995); Am. Auto. Mfrs.
Ass'nv. Comm'r of Mass. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 31 F.3d 18, 23-24 (1st Cir. 1994); United States
v. Slade, 980 F.2d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 1992).
12969 F.3d 622 (1st Cir. 1995).
130 Id. at 627-28.
131 Id. at 628 ("Sixth-and perhaps most salient-the omitted issue implicates matters of great

public moment").
132 Id. at 627, 629; In re Net-Velasquez, 625 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 2010) (noting criteria
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The list would not appear to be all-inclusive with the First Circuit,
in certain other cases, noting such factors as whether or not failure to
consider the issue would "prolong an already protracted litigation" or is an
issue likely to arise in other cases.' 33 In addition, the amount of resources

expended by the parties, 3 4 and whether invoking the raise or lose rule
would then force the court to address a preserved argument that is difficult
with no clear answer, have been referenced as well.' 3 5
D. MassachusettsDiscretion:SubstantialRisk of a Miscarriageof Justice
and Manifest Injustice

The power of Massachusetts appellate courts to address, in both
civil and criminal matters, errors or issues not previously raised or
preserved has long-standing roots. As early as 1833, for instance, Chief
Justice Shaw of the Supreme Judicial Court referenced the court's
13 6

discretionary authority in terms of both "plain" and "manifest" error.
There, the appellant failed to make a request for improvements to real
estate in a civil land recovery action, with the Supreme Judicial Court
allowing the contention to be addressed on appeal based on the court's
"general authority, to prevent the injurious consequences proceeding from
accident and misfortune ... we know no limit to the power of the Court so
to interpose, where the plain and manifest dictates ofjustice require it.
This sentiment was expressed somewhat differently in a 1863
decision where it was held that the general rule of raise or lose "can be
departed from only when it appears there has been a mistake or
misapprehension or misapplication of legal principles to such an extent as
clearly to show that a case has resulted in a mistrial. ,138 The Supreme
Judicial Court described the discretionary power more directly in

aiding in identifying exceptional cases); N.Y. State Dairy Foods Inc. v. Ne. Dairy Compact
Comm'n, 198 F.3d 1, 11 n. 9 (1st Cir. 1999) (stressing importance of extraordinary circumstances
to justify departure from raise or waive rule).
133 In re Two Appeals Arising Out of San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 994 F.2d 956,
961 (1st Cir. 1993).
134 Nat'l Org. for Marriage, Inc. v. McKee, 669 F.3d 34, 43 (1stCir. 2012).
135 Gencarelli v. UPS Capital Bus. Credit, 501 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007).
136 Cutler v. Rice, 31 Mass. 494, 454 (Mass. 1833); see also Noyes v. Noyes 112 N.E. 850,

853 (Mass. 1916) ("It is not necessary now to decide whether, in cases where it appears to be
necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice, a decisive or pertinent point not theretofore raised
may be acted on by this court in order to accomplish a right result in accordance with the law.");
Greene v. Cronin, 50 N.E.2d 36, 37 (Mass. 1943) (stating same); Livermore v. Boutelle, 77 Mass.
217, 221 (Mass. 1858) (finding claim made after verdict too late, despite court's discretion to
grant new trial).
137 Cutler, 31 Mass. at 495.
138 Bond

v. Bond, 89 Mass. 1, 6 (Mass. 1863).

206

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XVII

Carangiasv. Market Men's ReliefAss 'n,'3 9 in stating that, "[i]t is a general
principle that the court undertakes to prevent any miscarriage of justice so
far as permissible under the law,, 140 while also noting the court "ought not
to be burdened with the unnecessary investigation of questions of law."'14
In 1923, in Commonwealth v.Dascalakis,42 the Supreme Judicial
Court reiterated the established power to correct unpreserved errors in both
civil and criminal proceedings "in appropriate instances," and particularly,
that "the court has and will exercise the power to set aside a verdict in order
to prevent a miscarriage of justice when a decisive or pertinent point
affecting substantial rights has not been raised by exception at the trial." 43

Massachusetts does not utilize a "plain error" rule 144 but operates,
in criminal cases, under either a "substantial risk of miscarriage of justice"
standard for non-capital cases or "a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage
ofjustice46 standard" in capital cases. 145 As to capital cases, the review is by
statute.
139 199 N.E. 924 (Mass. 1936).
140
141

142

2005).
143

Id. at 925.
id.
140 N.E. 470 (1923), abrogated by Commonwealth v. Bly, 830 N.E.2d 1048 (Mass.
Id. at 476; see also Anderson v. Beacon Oil Co., 183 N.E. 152, 153 (Mass. 1932) (citing

Noyes v. Noyes, 112 N.E. 850, 853 (Mass. 1916)); O'Brien v. Shea, 95 N.E. 99, 101 (Mass.
1911) (noting Court's "possible extraordinary power ... to prevent miscarriage of justice as to
points not formally taken"); Herrick v. Waitt, 113 N.E. 205, 205 (Mass. 1916) (noting failure to
make exception to charge constituted waiver). The court stated that 'Ji]t may not be amiss to add
that an examination of the record does not disclose any error prejudicial to the substantial rights
of the defendant." Id.
144 Commonwealth v. Lemar, 492 N.E.2d 105, 106 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986) ("Our criminal
rules have no category of 'plain error."'); see Commonwealth v. Freeman, 227 N.E.2d 3, 9 (Mass.
1967) (noting test for review is whether there is substantial miscarriage of justice);
Commonwealth v. Lombardo, 313 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Mass. App. Ct. 1974) (refusing to adopt
plain error rule and reiterating substantial risk of miscarriage of justice standard); Flood v.
Southland Corp., 616 N.E.2d 1068, 1073 n.5 (Mass. 1993) (noting there might be a plain error
exception to Rule 51) (citing Smith v.Mass. Inst. of Tech., 877 F.2d 1106, 1110 (1st Cir. 1989))).
"Plain error" review does arise in other contexts in Massachusetts such as review of petitions
under MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 211, §3 (2011). See Care & Protection of Sophie, 865 N.E.2d 789,
795 (Mass. 2007) ("Absent a clear abuse of discretion or plain error of law, [the Supreme Judicial
Court] will not disturb the order of a single justice denying relief under G.L. c. 211, 3.") (quoting
Adoption of Iris, 695 N.E.2d 645, 648 (Mass. 1998))); Teele v. Boston, 42 N.E. 506, 507 (Mass.
1896) (noting appellate court will not order new trial unless "plain error"), disavowed on other
grounds, Henry v. Brown, 495 A.2d 324 (Me. 1985).
145 Commonwealthv. Bly, 830 N.E.2d 1048, 1055 (Mass. 2005).
146 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, §33E (2010). This statute requires the Supreme Judicial
Court to review all appeals of first degree murder convictions including all claimed errors
whether preserved or unpreserved. Id. The statute applies to capital cases which is defined as a
case in which the defendant was tried in an indictment for murder in the first degree and was
convicted of murder in the first or second degree. See Commonwealth v. Baker, 190 N.E.2d 555,
556-57 (Mass. 1963). Section 33E review requires the Supreme Judicial Court to "broadly
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147
For non-capital cases, review is under the Freeman standard.
This "substantial risk of miscarriage of justice" standard was initially
equated to the substantial possibility that the defendant was innocent. 148
That is, in order to show "miscarriage of justice," there had to be a
"genuine question of guilt or innocence"; the error was sufficiently
significant to have altered the result of the trial; and the failure to raise the
issue before was not a tactical decision by counsel. 49 Under this view,

"there is a substantial risk of a miscarriage ofjustice if the evidence and the
case as a whole . . . [leaves] us with a serious doubt that the defendant['s]
guilt had been fairly adjudicated." 150 As such, it was deemed (and remains
15 2
so), a "rarely used power"'' applicable only to "extraordinary cases.',
In 1999, in Commonwealth v. Alphas,'53 the Supreme Judicial
Court backed off any suggestion that Massachusetts follows a guilt-based
definition for miscarriage of justice, opting instead to looking at the effect

of the error on the verdict, i.e., an error creates a substantial risk of a
consider the whole case on the law and the facts and 'Jupon such consideration the court may, if
satisfied that the verdict was against the law or the weight of the evidence ....
or for any other
reason that justice may require" a new trial or the direction of a lesser degree of guilt.
Commonwealth v. Cole, 402 N.E.2d 55, 60 (Mass. 1980) (alterations in original) (citing MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 278, §33E))). While reversible error under Section 33 for unpreserved errors
turns on whether there is a showing of "grave prejudice or substantial likelihood that a
miscarriage of justice has occurred," the Supreme Judicial Court has noted that review is broader
than review under the substantial risk of miscarriage of justice standard. Id. "The search.., is a
more general and an obligatory one for a result that may be 'more consonant with justice." Id.
(citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Richmond, 399 N.E.2d 1069, 1073 (Mass. 1980) (stating
reversal only upon showing of grave prejudice or substantial likelihood miscarriage of justice
occurred). Section 33E "operates as a type of 'safety valve' by ensuring review as to all aspects
of cases regardless of the absence of claim of error." Commonwealth v. Brown, 380 N.E.2d 113,
120 (Mass. 1978); see also William J. Meade, The Death of ResurrectionRule, 90 MASS. L. REV.
1, 41 (discussing 33E origins and Sacco cases).
147 See Freeman, 227 N.E.2d at 8-9 (explaining review standard is substantial risk of
miscarriage of justice); see also Commonwealth v. Conroy, 133 N.E.2d 246, 250 (Mass. 1956).
148 See Commonwealth v. Amirault, 677 N.E. 2d 652, 671 (Mass. 1997); Commonwealth v.
Miranda, 490 N.E.2d 1195, 1202 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986).
149 Miranda, 490 N.E.2d at 1202; see also Jonathan P. Hunter, Note, MiscarriageofJustice:
Appellate Review of Unpreserved Constitutional Objections to the Admission of Evidence in
Massachusetts, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 525, 534-35 (2011) (discussing Miranda and Amirault
version of miscarriage of justice standard).
150 Amirault, 677 N.E. 2d at 671; see also Commonwealth v. Eason, 681 N.E.2d 863, 875
(Mass. App. Ct. 1997) (Armstrong, J., dissenting) ("[A]pplying miscarriage [of justice] analysis
to a plainly guilty defendant... cut[s] the doctrine loose completely from its historical moorings"),
rev 'd on othergrounds, 694 N.E.2d 1264 (Mass. 1998).
151 Amirault, 677 N.E.2d at 670 ("Our power to upset a completely adjudicated conviction on
this ground is an extraordinary one which should only be exercised in the most unusual
circumstances.").
152 Fogarty v. Commonwealth, 546 N.E.2d 354, 357 (Mass. 1989) (quoting Commonwealth
v. Harrington, 399 N.E.2d 475, 478 (Mass. 1980)).
153 712 N.E.2d 575 (Mass. 1999).
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miscarriage of justice unless it did not 'materially influence[ ]' the guilty
verdict." 15 4 This generated disagreement within the court with Justices
Fried and Lynch dissenting, concerned that the standard did not mark any
appreciable distinction from harmless error and undercut the rule requiring
proper preservation.155
In response, Justice Greaney, in a concurring
opinion, stated that the guilt-based approach usurped the jury's function
and that the applicable burden of proof adequately differentiated harmless

error from the substantial risk of miscarriage of justice standard, adding
further that the5 6two standards had different purposes within the criminal
justice system.
The present Massachusetts formulation for unpreserved errors thus

154 Id. at 580; Commonwealth v. Randolph, 780 N.E.2d 58, 67 (Mass. 2002) (stating the

same).
155

Alphas, 712 N.E.2d at 586-590 (Friend, J., concurring). According to Justice Fried:

When there has been such a waiver, a miscarriage of justice has only one meaning: that
there is a substantial risk that an innocent person has been convicted ....
It literally makes no sense to proclaim a doctrine of waiver-to insist, as our rules of criminal
procedure clearly do, that a defendant make his objections . . .at trial-and then to consider
whether there should be a new trial [based] on a [unpreserved error]. The rule the court proclaims
today... threatens finality and the orderly procedure that the rule of waiver is intended to enforce
....
The court's formulation makes the difference between the miscarriage of justice standard
and the harmless error standard ... one of such imperceptible degree as to provide no discipline
at all. A rational system relies not on such un-communicable and therefore arbitrary distinctions
of degree-distinctions that effectively leave trial judges and the courts that review them at sea on
an ocean of discretion-but on distinctions of kind, distinctions capable of statement, review, and
consistency .... Although the court says that, in affirming these convictions, it is asking what
effect the error had on an actual jury, this is an after-the-fact speculation about the effect on a
hypothetical jury. It is mere wordplay to suggest that such an inquiry respects the role of an
actual jury while the guilt or innocence standard usurps that role. Except for ineffable distinctions
of degree, the reviewing court's process of judgment is the same-but the guilt or innocence
standard describes that process more candidly. The court's reference to the strength of the
Commonwealth's case confirms my view.
Id.at 586-87.
156 Id.at 584-86. (Greaney, J., concurring). According to Justice Greaney:
Appellate courts do not sit as triers of fact. Any test concerning reversible
error that requires an appellate court to determine whether a defendant is
actually innocent is conceptually flawed because such a test converts the
appellate function into the jury function in violation of their different
purposes. I do not accept recent pronouncements of Federal law that may
suggest the contrary ....[The harmless error test] is quantitatively more
favorable to a defendant than the substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice
test ....It is enough to state that the tests differ in their substance, and each
serves a discrete function in the criminal justice process.
Id; see also Commonwealth v. Lewis, 960 N.E.2d 324, 330 n.14 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012)
(reiterating Justice Greaney's argument in Alphas).
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reduces to four questions:

(1) Was there error; (2) Was the defendant

prejudiced by the error; (3) Considering the error in the context of the
entire trial, would it be reasonable to conclude that the error materially
influenced the verdict; and (4) Can the appellate court infer from the record

that the failure to object or raise a claim of error at an earlier time was not a
reasonable tactical decision. 15 7 Some decisions have suggested that the
error must be "serious and obvious." 5
Further, in determining whether

the error materially influenced the verdict, the strength of the case without
the error and the nature of the error, including "whether sufficiently
significant in the context of the trial to make plausible an inference that the
jury's result might have been otherwise but for the error," are considered. 59
Similar to plain error, this standard is considered a "default"

standard with errors of this magnitude extraordinary events whereby relief
is seldom granted.
The appellate authority to rectify such error
is
1 60
discretionary and is a power of the court, not a right of the defendant.
157 Randolph, 780 N.E.2d at 677 (citations omitted); see Alphas, 712 N.E.2d at 580; (1999);

Commonwealth v. Russell, 787 N.E.2d 1039, 1043 (Mass. 2003); Commonwealth v. Randolph,
780 N.E.2d 58, 64-65 (Mass. 2002); see also Commonwealth v. Harrington, 399 N.E.2d 475, 478
(Mass. 1980) (stating when trial judge may use discretionary power to give waiver relief). The
court in Harrington stated that the discretionary power should only be "exercised only in those
extraordinary cases where, upon sober reflection, it appears that a miscarriage of justice might
otherwise result." Id.
158 Commonwealth v. Pares-Ramirez, 511 N.E.2d 344, 348 (Mass.
1987) (requiring error
under review to be "obvious" for the first time). The Court in Freeman did not mention anything
about the "error" needing to be obvious with it directing the inquiry as to the "type and
seriousness" of the error. Commonwealthv. Freeman, 227 N.E.2d 3, 9 (Mass. 1967).
159 Alphas, 712 N.E.2d at 580 (quotations omitted) (quoting Commonwealthv.
Miranda, 490
N.E.2d 1195, 1202 (Mass. 1986)). Justice John Greaney expounded on this standard in the
criminal context noting that "[e]ach case on appeal will have its own peculiar characteristics, and
no all-encompassing checklist can be developed." Alphas, 712 N.E.2d at 585 (Greaney., J.,
concurring). Such reversible error is more likely to be found where there was good reason for the
lack of objection or where the error would not have been remedied by the trial judge even if
raised. Id. Counterweights include a determination that the error could have been readily
corrected by a timely objection or where an objection may have led the government to introduce
additional evidence on the issue. Id. According to Justice Greaney: "to create a substantial risk
of a miscarriage of justice, the error must be serious when considered in terms of its injurious
effect or influence on the jury's verdict." Id. The burden is on the defendant and there must be
"substantial agreement by the appellate panel that a new trial is necessary to correct a conviction
that leaves the feeling that an injustice has occurred and to assure that trials are fundamentally
fair." Id. at 585-86.
160 Commonwealth v. Eason, 681 N.E.2d 863, 874 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997) (Armstrong, J.,
dissenting) (explaining historically discretion is right of court, not defendant), rev 'd on other
grounds, 694 N.E.2d 1264 (Mass. 1998); see Randolph, 780 N.E.2d at 66 (citing Commonwealth
v. Amirault, 677 N.E.2d 652, 674 (Mass. 1997)). Prior to 2005, Massachusetts applied a
"resurrection" rule as to unpreserved errors raised in pre-appeal post trial motion. See
Commonwealth v.Bly, 830 N.E.2d 1048, 1056-57 (Mass. 2005); Commonwealth v. Hallet, 694
N.E.2d 845, 846 (Mass. 1998), abrogated by Commonwealth v. Bly, 830 N.E.2d 1048 (Mass.
2005). Under "resurrection," a trial judge had the discretion when considering a pre-appeal
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As to civil matters, Massachusetts does not operate, at least
expressly, under the "plain error" default standard and has not otherwise
expressly held that the same "substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice"
standard for criminal appeals applies to civil cases for either unpreserved
errors or new issues on appeal.' 6' Massachusetts appellate cases have,
nonetheless, proceeded to utilize different nomenclature as to the standard
applicable to review of unpreserved error in civil cases including reference
62
to there being "no plain error which would result in manifest injustice,,1

loss of "fundamental justice,'

63

"inconsistent with substantial j

or "where injustice might otherwise result.',

iUStlCe,164

165

"Manifest injustice" has largely been referenced as the default
standard as to appellate

challenges to unpreserved jury instruction

166

Reference to reviewing an otherwise forfeited issue under the
"inconsistent with substantial justice" language has arisen in appellate

claims.

challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and/or in failing to renew

motion for new trial to "resurrect" issues that were not properly preserved at trial. See
Commonwealth v. Dascalakis, 140 N.E. 470, 476 (Mass. 1923), abrogatedby Commonwealth v.
Bly, 830 N.E.2d 1048 (Mass. 2005). The difficulty with the rule was that it ran counter to the
contemporaneous objection obligation and initially arose when there was no established review
standard for unpreserved errors. In 2005, in Commonwealth v. Bly, the Supreme Judicial Court
discarded the resurrection rule holding that it was no longer necessary given the default standards
of review for both capital and non-capital cases. Bly, 830 N.E.2d at 1056.
161 See In re Blake, 917 N.E.2d 260, 2009 WL 4110803, at *1 n.1 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2009)
(unpublished table decision) (leaving unresolved whether unpreserved objections in sexually
dangerous proceedings always, sometimes or never waived). But see Commonwealth v.
Mohamed, 929 N.E.2d 358, 2010 WL 2629870, at *2 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010) (unpublished table
decision) ("plain error may be addressed even when a claim would otherwise have been waived")
(citing Squibb v. R.M. Bradley & Co., 661 N.E.2d 1352, 1353 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996)));
Commonwealthv. Johnson, 918 N.E.2d 876, 879 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010) (stating the same), rev'd
on othergrounds 965 N.E.2d 176 (Mass. 2012).
162 Squibb, 661 N.E.2d at 1353; Michnik-Zilberman v. Gordon's Liquor. Inc., 453 N.E.2d
430, 433 (Mass. 1983); see Rotkiewcz v. Sadowsky, 730 N.E.2d 282, 287 n.3 (Mass. 2000)
(noting if claim of error about instruction not preserved, review limited to determining "manifest
injustice"); Hatton v. Meade, 502 N.E.2d 552, 555 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987); MCS Enters., Ltd. v.
Henry, 2006 Mass. App. Div. 47, 2006 WL 870733, at *2 (2006) (refusing to consider legal
arguments not raised at summary judgment). The arguments as argued would not require
reversal, and therefore, no manifest injustice. See Williams v. Birhle, 810 N.E.2d 1291, 2004 WL
1516471, at *5 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (unpublished table decision) (basing jnov appeal on new
grounds for "plain error" which without notice would miscarry justice).
163 Normand v. Dir. Of Office of Medicaid, 933 N.E.2d 658, 665 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2010)
(explaining court would address unpreserved issue due to "fundamental justice").
164 Michnik-Zilberman, 453 N.E.2d at 433; see also Normand, 933 N.E.2d at 665; White v.
White, 662 N.E.2d 230, 233(1986).
165 Cruz v. Comm'r of Pub. Welfare, 478 N.E.2d 1262, 1264 (1985); Castiglione v.
Castiglione, 866 N.E. 2d 438, 2007 WL 1437695, at *1 n.2 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (unpublished
table decision).
166 Rotkiewicz v. Sadowsky, 730 N.E.2d 282, 287 n.3 (Mass. 2000).
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motions for directed verdict. 1 67 In Michnik-Zilberman,168 for example, the

appellant failed to have properly preserved a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting the negligent verdict but had failed to renew the
motion for directed verdict at the close of its case .169 The Supreme Judicial
Court proceeded to review the claim, addressing whether there
was any
0
justice.17
substantial
with
inconsistent
was
it
if
so,
if
and,
error
The same "inconsistent with substantial justice" language has also
171
been referenced in other cases addressing unpreserved errors as well.
For instance, in White v. White, 172 the trial judge addressed the propriety of
a private interview and session with a major witness in a custody and
visitation proceeding. The trial judge conducted the private session without
any counsel for either side present, arguably preventing any effective
confrontation or cross-examination. The Massachusetts Appeals Court
found that although the issue was not preserved, 'justice weigh[ed] in favor
of our considering the issue."'7 3 The court reasoned that the raise or waive
rule should not apply, as the ultimate decision below was based "in large
part" on the testimony in the private un-objected to session. 174 The court
applied the two prong inquiry associated with miscarriage of justice
review; i.e., was there error, and if so, did the error require a finding that
the decree was "inconsistent with substantial justice.' 175 The practice was
found to be in error, and because the visitation and custody findings were
based on testimony received in the private session, the appeals court
M67
Michnik-Zilberman, 453 N.E.2d at 433; Squibb, 661 N.E.2d at 1353; see also Szalla v.
Locke, 639 N.E.2d 1096, 1099 (1994), vacated in part on other grounds 657 N.E.2d 1267 (Mass.

1995); Upper Cape Realty Corp. v. Nuovo, 800 N.E.2d 347, 2003 WL 22956963, at *1 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2003) (noting power to order new trial notwithstanding failure to renew motion to
prevent manifest injustice) (unpublished table decision) (citing Hatton v. Meade, 502 N.E.2d 552,
555 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987))); Jamgochian v. Dierker, 681 N.E.2d 1180, 1184 (1997) (noting
appellant requesting review of evidence sufficiency despite no objection complained on appeal
under Michnik-Zilberman).
16'

453 N.E.2d 430 (1983).

169 Id.at 432.
170

Id.;
Michnik-Zilberman is somewhat notable in that it cited Rule 61 harmless error in a

case which the argument was not preserved suggesting to one commentator that Rule 61 "maybe,
if not a license for working whatever might appear to be 'substantial justice' at least a nod in that
direction." J. Smith & H. Zobel, MASS PRACTICE SERIES: RULES PRACTICE, Vol. 7 §46.2, 97
(2007).
171 See, e.g., Springfield v. Dep't of Telecomm. & Cable, 931 N.E.2d 942, 950 (Mass. 2010);
Jamgochian, 681 N.E.2d at 1184; White v. White, 662 N.E.2d 230, 232 (Mass. 1996); Cruz v.

Comm'r of Pub. Welfare, 478 N.E.2d 1262, 1264 (Mass. 1985); McLeod's Case, 450 N.E.2d 612,
614 (Mass. 1983); Rafferty v. Franklin, 826 N.E.2d 794, 2005 WL 1106690, at *2 (Mass. 2005)

(unpublished table decision).
172 662 N.E.2d 230 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996).
173 Id. at 232.
174

id.

175 id.
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17 6
reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Similar to the First Circuit, although less refined, Massachusetts
decisions have found exception to the general rule of forfeiture as to new

issues on appeal to exist in certain circumstances that appear to be in
addition to any miscarriage of justice default standard. 177

Hormel's

statement that "rules of practice are designed to promote justice not defeat
them" has been cited in holding that review of unpreserved errors or new
issues or arguments is permissible in "exceptional cases or particular

circumstances."'7 8 Both the Supreme Judicial Court and the Massachusetts
Appeals Court have proceeded to allow review where the issue is one of
law, where it has been fully briefed on appeal, 1 79 and where there is no
prejudice to the opposing party as to the failure to present the issue
below.'80 In certain decisions, the Massachusetts courts have attempted to
provide a listing' 8' which has included "where injustice might otherwise
result because of a limited and imperfect opportunity to present [the issue
' 2 "when it is necessary to reach such an issue in
below], ' iS
order to provide
176Id. MASSACHUSETTS PROPOSED RULE OF EVIDENCE 103(d) limits plain error review to
criminal not civil cases. Proposed rule 103(d) Substantial Risk of a Miscarriage of Justice in
Criminal Cases provides: 'Jn]othing in this section precludes taking notice of plain errors in
criminal cases, although not brought to the attention of the trial judge, if such error constitutes a
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.
177 See Springfield v. Dep't of Telecomm. & Cable, 931 N.E.2d 942, 950 (Mass.
2010)
(stating appellate court may consider legal question not raised in exceptional cases or for
injustice). A number of Massachusetts decision have cited and referenced Hormel. See Normand
v. Dir. of Medicaid, 933 N.E.2d 658, 665 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010).
178 White v. White, 662 N.E.2d 230, 232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996).
179 Police Dept. of Bos. v. Fedorchuk, 723 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000); cf In re
Dutil, 768 N.E.2d 1055, 1066 (Mass. 2002) (explaining exercise of discretion not appropriate
where party has not fully briefed the issue).
180 See Hoffer v. Comm'r of Correction, 589 N.E.2d 1231, 1235 (Mass. 1992); Cruz v.
Comm'r of Pub. Welfare, 478 N.E.2d 1262, 1264 (Mass. 1985); Albert v. Mun. Court of City of
Bos., 446 N.E.2d 1385, 1387 (Mass. 1983) (stating authority unfairly prejudiced on rehearing
because necessity of locating witnesses years after events); Fortier v. Town of Essex, 752 N.E.2d
818, 822 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001), overruled on other grounds, Morrissey v. New Eng. Deaconess
Ass'n-Abundant Life Communities, Inc., 940 N.E.2d 391 (Mass. 2010); Kelly v. Kelly, 735
N.E.2d 1276, 2000 WL 1477107, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (unpublished table decision). In
McLeod's Case, the Supreme Judicial Court reviewed whether the beneficiary to workmen
compensation benefits was entitled to a higher rate even though not raised below as it was
determined that the issue was purely one of law, there would be no undue prejudice to the insurer,
and as the failure to address this issue would allow the lower court determination to stand and
thus deprive the claimant benefits to which she was entitled. McLeod's Case, 450 N.E.2d 612,
614 (Mass. 1983); see also Fedorchuk, 723 N.E.2d at 44 (finding although statutory based
argument raised first on appeal, court would consider as fully briefed).
181 See Gaw v. Sappett, 816 N.E.2d 1027, 1032 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004); White, 662 N.E.2d at
232.
182 Id. at 1032; see also Pryor v. Holidays Inns, Inc., 517 N.E.2d 472, 474 (Mass. 1988);
McCleod's Case, 450 N.E.2d at 614 (stating court may consider question of law not raised below
"where injustice might otherwise result"); Krock v. Robinson, 806 N.E.2d 127, 2004 WL 690979,
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guidance to the lower courts,"8
particularly where the result is
18 4
unchanged;
when an issue important
to the public interest has been
16
raised, 85 or where the issue is novel.
E. Distinction Between Massachusetts and the First Circuit
The fundamental difference between the First Circuit (plain error)
and Massachusetts (substantial risk of miscarriage of justice) for
unpreserved issues is that Massachusetts does not have the discretionary
public interest prong and otherwise does not tie the default standard to
actual innocence or guilt (i.e., miscarriage of justice). If the unpreserved
error materially influenced the verdict, it constitutes reversible error
(substantial risk of miscarriage of justice). 18 7 Under federal practice, not
only must there be error that affected the outcome, but it must either result
in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or "seriously affect the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings."'8 8 Also,
the First Circuit has held that plain error applies to civil cases (although
at *1 n.4 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (unpublished table decision).
183 Gaw, 816 N.E.2d at 1032 (citing In re R.I Grand Jury Subpoena, 605 N.E.2d 840, 845

(Mass. 1993)); see In re Adoption of Ernst, 831 N.E.2d 406, 2005 WL 1773697, at *2 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2005) (unpublished table decision) (finding no exceptional circumstances because
reviewing issue not needed to "provide assistance for other cases"); Gurry v. Bd. of Pub.
Accountancy, 474 N.E.2d 1085, 1090 (Mass. 1985) (considering claim not raised in
administrative proceeding to provide guidance to board and rule-making authorities); see also
Care & Protection of Georgette, 768 N.E.2d 549, 553 n.6 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) ("This is not
such an exceptional case . . . that in our discretion it is worthy of review to avoid injustice or
provide assistance for other cases.");
184 Mullins v. Pine Tree Manor Coll., 449 N.E. 2d 331, 341 (Mass. 1983)
(considering new
issues that were "of some public importance" where result reached unchanged); Royal Indem. Co.
v. Blakely, 360 N.E.2d 864, 866 ("the question presented has application to other persons in the
Commonwealth and the result we reach is not changed by our consideration of the point... ").
185 Gaw, 816 N.E.2d at 1032 (citing McLeod's Case, 450 N.E.2d 612,
615 (Mass. 1983)); see
also Fillipone v. Mayor of Newton, 467 N.E. 2d 182 (Mass. 1984) (considering validity of home
rule ordinance, an issue only raised on appeal for public interest); Wellesley Coll. v. Attorney
Gen., 49 N.E. 2d 220, 226 (Mass. 1943) (considering issue because of public interest and
uncertainty of laws for educational and charitable institutions); Maslab Liquidation Trust v.
Commonwealth, 806 N.E.2d 947, 948 n.1 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004); Palmer v. Murphy, 677 N.E.2d
247, 251-52 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997) (noting general rule exceptions if issue jurisdictional, public
interest, or injustice would result if not addressed).
186 McCallum v. Sherillo, 806 N.E.2d 969, 2004 WL 895787, *2 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2004)
(unpublished table decision).
187 Commonwealthv. Alphas, 712 N.E. 2d 575, 580 (Mass. 1999) (citing Commonwealth v.
Freeman, 227 N.E.2d 3, 9 (Mass. 1967)); see also Commonwealth v. Miranda, 490 N.E.2d 1195,
1202 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986) (requiring error "sufficiently significant" in trial "to make plausible"
inference result otherwise but for error).
188 United States v. Gandia-Maysonet, 227 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing United States v.
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)).
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"sparingly" found), with Massachusetts so far silent as to expressly stating
a default standard akin to substantial risk of miscarriage of justice
applicable to all unpreserved claims of error in civil matters.'8 9
As a result, the First Circuit or federal practice, at least as to the
articulation of the respective standards of review, results in a greater
distinction between preserved and unpreserved errors or claims. Federal
harmless error' 90 and plain error is distinguished by not only the burden of

189

See Iverson v. Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 103 (1st Cir. 2006); Wynn & Wynn P.C. v. Mass.

Comm'n Against Discrimination, 729 N.E.2d 1068, 1083-84 (Mass. 2000), overruled on other
grounds by Stonehill Coll. V. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 808 N.E.2d 205 (Mass.
2004).
190 See 28 U.S.C. 2111 (2006); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Harmless ConstitutionalError and the
Institutional Significance of the Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 2027, 2033 (2008); The harmless
error rule emanates from common law as well as statute and is found in the governing rules of
both criminal and civil procedure. Id. As to federal practice, the harmless error first emerged by
statute in 1919 in response to concerns that courts were too frequently and easily overturning
verdicts for even the most trivial of errors. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Harmless Error and
ConstitutionalRemedies, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 20 (1994); ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF
HARMLESS ERROR 13-14 (1970); see also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946)
(explaining statute "grew out of widespread and deep conviction" appellate courts "'impregnable
citadels of technicality"') (citation omitted); Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 294 (1939)
("[The Act of 1919] was intended to prevent matters concerned with the mere etiquette of trials
and with the formalities and minutiae of procedure from touching the merits of a verdict."). The
statute was implemented through the criminal rules of procedure, particularly Rule 52(a) in 1946
which provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial
rights must be disregarded." FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). At its core, the harmless error rule is intended
to prevent appellate courts from becoming "'impregnable citadels of technicality"' and thus
enhance the public's confidence in the fair and effective operation of the judicial system.
Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 759; Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999). The federal harmless
error statute makes no distinction between civil and criminal practice. See O'Neal v. McAnincl
513 U.S. 432, 441 (1995); Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 248 (2008). On the civil
side, the nearly identical rule is found in Rule 61 of the civil rules. See FED. R. Civ. P. 61.
Moreover, as to federal evidentiary matters, the rule is found at Rule 103(a) of the Federal Rules
of Evidence which provides that "[a] party may claim error in a ruling to admit or exclude
evidence only if the error affects a substantial right of the party." FED. R. EviD. 103(a). See
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22-24 (1967) (providing a history of harmless error
concept); Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief 72 J. CRIM. L &
CRIMINOLOGY 421, 422-25 (1980) (discussing origins of non-constitutional harmless error).
Under First Circuit jurisprudence, the standard in criminal cases has been stated to reduce to
whether or not it can be said "with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without
stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by
the error." United States v. Walker, 665 F.3d 212, 231 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Kotteakos, 328
U.S. at 765)). The harmless error issue is to be determined based on the circumstances with no
definite rule of law governing this finding but rather it requiring an examination of the materiality
and prejudicial character of the specific error as revealed from its relationship to the entire case
and its specific circumstances. See United States v. Casas, 356 F.3d 104, 121 (1st Cir. 2004)
(quoting United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1182 (1st Cir. 1993)); Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at
1182 ("There is no bright-line rule .... a harmlessness determination demands a panoramic,
case-specific inquiry"); United States v. Rodriquez-Marrero, 390 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2004). The
inquiry is not suppose to be whether a reasonable jury could have looked at the evidence and
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proof but the need to show not only that the error was outcome
determinative, but that it impacted the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of the judicial proceeding.
Under Massachusetts practice, 19 1 the burden of proof shifts as in
federal practice, 92 but there is no such added public interest element. The
reasonably found guilt but rather whether it was highly probable that the error did not influence
the verdict. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1182. The First Circuit articulation in both criminal and civil
cases is whether it is "highly probable that the error did not influence the verdict." Casas, 356
F.3d at 121. See, e.g., United States v. Dancy, 640 F.3d 455, 463 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v.
Flores-De-Jesus, 569 F.3d 8, 27 (1st Cir. 2009); Fortini v. Murphy, 257 F.3d 39, 43 (1st Cir.
2001); Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi-Cola of P.R. Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77, 87 (1st Cir. 1998). The
government, in criminal cases, bears the burden of demonstrating harmlessness as well as the risk
of doubt when any exists as to the error being non-prejudicial. See generally United States v.
Sanabria, 645 F.3d 505, 516 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Pridgen, 518 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir.
2008); Casas, 356 F.3d at 121 (citing United States v. Rose, 104 F.3d 1408, 1414 (1st Cir.
1997)). Such review is to take into account "the centrality of the tainted material, its uniqueness,
its prejudicial impact, the uses to which it was put during the trial, the relative strengths of the
parties' cases, and any telltales that furnish clues to the likelihood that the error affected the factfinder's resolution of a material issue." Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1182. In civil cases, it is the party
who "seeks to have a judgment set aside because of an erroneous ruling [that] carries the burden
of showing that prejudice resulted." Palmerv. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 116 (1943).
191 See MASS. R. Civ. P. 61. Under Massachusetts practice, there is no criminal rule of
procedure as to harmless error but on the civil side the rule (Rule 61) is nearly identical to its
federal counterpart and expressed in terms of errors "affect[ing] the substantial rights of the
parties." MASS.R. Civ. P. 61. It is, likewise, a matter of both common law and statute. Runshaw
v. Bernstein, 198 N.E.2d 293, 295 (1964); Chapter 231, section 119 of the Massachusetts General
Laws provides:
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or
defect in any ruling or order or anything done or omitted by the trial court or
by any of the parties is ground for modifying or otherwise disturbing a
judgment or order unless the appeals court or the supreme judicial court
deems that the error complained of has injuriously affected the substantial
rights of the parties. If either court finds that the error complained of affects
only one or some of the issues or parties involved it may affirm the
judgment as to those issues or parties unaffected and may modify or reverse
the judgment as to those affected.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 119 (2010); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 132 (2010)
(refusing new trial because of improperly admitted or excluded evidence unless error affected
substantial rights).
192 See Grant v. Lewis/Boyle, Inc., 557 N.E.2d 1136, 1139-40 (Mass. 1990). The
cases speak
of the proponent of the error being required to make a "plausible showing" of or their being a
reasonable possibility that the error "might have" made a difference. Carrell v. Nat'l Cord &
Braid Corp., 852 N.E.2d 100, 115 (Mass. 2006); Grant, 557 N.E.2d at 1139-40; DeJesus v.
Yogel, 533 N.E.2d 1318, 1321 (Mass. 1989); see Commonwealth v. Aguiar, 936 N.E.2d 16, 26
(Mass. App. Ct. 2010) (considering whether reasonable possibility error might have contributed
to jury's verdict); see also In re Adoption of Sherry, 757 N.E.2d 1097, 1102 (Mass. 2001)
(explaining exclusion of expert opinion only prejudicial if it would have changed outcome);
Peterson v. Foley, 931 N.E.2d 478, 484-85 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010) (stating the same); Coady v.
Wellfleet Marine Corp., 816 N.E.2d 124, 128-29 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (finding evidence
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difference between appellate review for unpreserved (substantial risk of
miscarriage of justice) versus preserved (harmless error) under
Massachusetts is thus seemingly very subtle, at least in articulation.
Reversal of unpreserved error turns on whether the error "materially
influenced" the verdict (i.e., whether the error is sufficiently significant in
the context of trial to make plausible an inference that the result might have

been otherwise but for the error), 193 while reversal for preserved error turns
on "whether the conviction is1 94sure that the error did not influence the jury,
or had but very slight effect."
As to the "exceptional circumstances" discretion, both First Circuit
and Massachusetts practice is similar. Both have identified similar

circumstances as justifying review of new or unpreserved issues apart from
admitted injuriously affects substantial rights where jury might have concluded differently if

excluded).

193 See Commonwealth v. Russell, 787 N.E.2d 1039, 1043 (Mass. 2003).

The defendant is

entitled to relief only "if [appellate court] has a serious doubt whether the result of the trial might
have been different had the error[s] not been made." Id. at 1043 (quoting Commonwealth v.
LeFave, 714 N.E.2d 805, 809 (Mass. 1999)). See Commonwealth v. Randolph, 780 N.E.2d 58
(Mass. 2002) ("Errors of this magnitude are extraordinary events and relief is seldom granted.");
see also Carrel, 852 N.E.2d atil 15 (requiring sufficient prejudice to require new trial); DeJesus,
533 N.E.2d at 1322 (stating error not prejudicial if appellate court substantially confident no
material difference with error); Cohen v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 673 N.E.2d 84, 87 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1996) (deciding whether plausible showing trial judge might not find violation had he not
excluded evidence). Informative, non-inclusive factors to be considered in the harmless calculus
in criminal cases include the importance of the evidence to the prosecution's case; the
relationship of the evidence to the thrust of the defense; who introduced the issue at trial; the
frequency of the reference; whether the erroneously admitted evidence was cumulative; the
availability of or effect of cumulative instructions, and the weight or quantum of evidence as to
guilt. Commonwealth v. Dagraca, 854 N.E.2d 1249, 1255 (Mass. 2006); Commonwealth v.
Galicia, 857 N.E.2d 463, 471-72 (Mass. 2006) (finding error harmless beyond reasonable doubt
where improperly admitted statements cumulative of properly admitted evidence); or was
irrelevant to the contested issue, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pena, 913 N.E.2d 815, 827 (Mass.
2009) (stating error harmless beyond reasonable doubt where erroneously admitted evidence not
relevant to issue); or, as that term is correctly understood, that the evidence of guilt was
"overwhelming" in the sense that it was so powerful as to "nullify any effect [the illegally
obtained evidence] might have had on the jury or the verdict ....
Dagraca,854 N.E.2d at 1256;
Commonwealth v. DePace, 742 N.E.2d 1054, 1060-61 (Mass. 2001) (explaining to overcome
presumption of harm, Commonwealth's admissible evidence must be "truly overwhelming"),
abrogatedon othergrounds, Commonwealth v. Carlino, 865 N.E.2d 767 (Mass. 2007).
194 See Commonwealth v. Alphas, 712 N.E.2d 575, 580 n.7 (Mass. 1999) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 630 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Mass. 1994), overruled on other grounds,
Commonwealth v. King, 834 N.E.2d 1175 (Mass. 2005)). In addition to the "only slight effect"
formulation, the harmless error test in Massachusetts includes "[b]ut if one cannot say, with fair
assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the
whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude
that substantial rights were not affected." Flebotte, 630 N.E. 2d at 268 (quoting Commonwealth
v. Peruzzi, 446 N.E.2d 117, 122 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983)); see also Commonwealth v. Linton 924
N.E.2d 722, 744 n.19 (Mass. 2010) (explaining prejudicial error employs more generous standard
to defendant than substantial likelihood of miscarrying justice).
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their respective default standard. Both have also identified the public
significance of the issue as significantly favoring review.
F. OtherJurisdictions
i. Federal Practice
The federal circuits all apply the Olano plain error rule in both
criminal and civil cases, 195 with the caveat that noticing such error is
exceedingly rare in civil cases. 196 Hormel/Singleton's "exceptional
circumstances" discretion is also followed in all circuits although varying
in formulation. Certain circuits utilize the Singleton "resolution is beyond

195

Stewart v. Hall, 770 F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir. 1985) (refusing to consider new issues on

appeal unless error plain or refusal denies fundamental justice); see In re Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d
619, 631 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding correction of forfeited error required showing error plain and
affected substantial rights); Muth v. United States, 1 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating the
same); Plain error is only available in civil cases if a party can demonstrate that: (1) exceptional
circumstances exist; (2) substantial rights are affected; and (3) a miscarriage of justice will occur
if plain error review is not applied. Johnson v. Ashby, 808 F.2d 676, 679 n.3 (8th Cir. 1987). See
Hunter v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 1230 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining plain error
applies to civil cases); Bath Junkie Branson_ L.L.C. v. Bath Junkie, Inc., 528 F.3d 556, 561 (8th
Cir. 2008) (citing Champagne v. United States, 40 F.3d 946, 947 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying plain
error in a civil case)); see also S.E.C. v. DiBella, 587 F.3d 553, 569 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding
claims of instruction error review only appropriate for "fundamental error"). "Fundamental
error" is more stringent than the "plain error" standard applicable to criminal appeals. Id. In
order for charging error "to be fundamental, it must be so serious and flagrant that it goes to the
very integrity of the trial." (internal quotation marks omitted).
196 Celotex, 124 F.3d at 630; see Brimer v. Life Ins. Co., of Am., No. 11-5032,
2012 WL
414386, at * (10th Cir. 2012) (refusing to consider issue not passed upon in lower court except
where plain error); Hicks v. Avery Drei, LLC., 654 F.3d 739, 744 (7th Cir. 2011) (applying plain
error "rarely" and only where "exceptional circumstances or . . . miscarriage of justice could
occur"); Ledford v. Peeples, 657 F.3d 1222, 1257 (11th Cir. 2011) (announcing plain error in
civil cases rarely found); In re Lett, 632 F.3d 1216, 1227 n.22 (1lth Cir. 2011) (stating the same);
Richison v. Ernst Group, Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1130 (10th Cir. 2011) (explaining plain error in
civil cases presents "extraordinary, nearly insurmountable burden") (citing Emp'rs Reinsurance
Corp. v. Mid- Continent Cas. Co., 358 F.3d 757, 770 (10th Cir. 2004))); Russian Media Grp.,
LLC v. Cable Am., Inc., 598 F.3d 302, 308 (7th Cir. 2010) ("it will be a 'rare case in which
failure to present a ground to the district court has caused no one not the district judge, not us,
not the appellee-any harm of which the law ought to take note."') (quoting Amcast Indus. Corp.
v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 749-50 (7th Cir. 1993))); Wilsonv. Brinker Int'l, Inc., 382 F.3d 765,
771 (8th Cir. 2004) ("[S]tringently limited standard of review"); Bath Junkie Branson, L.L.C.,
528 F.3d at 561 (evaluating plain error through effects on substantial rights, fairness, integrity or
judicial proceeding's public reputation); Castellano v. Fragozo, 311 F.3d 689, 705 n.50 (5th Cir.
2002) (noting plain error not "run of the mill remedy" and only occurs in exceptional
circumstances), vacated, 321 F.3d 1203 (5th Cir. 2003); Crawford v. Falcon Drilling Co., 131
F.3d 1120, 1133 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating the same); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Fernandez, 741
F.2d 355, 360-61 (11th Cir. 1984) (explaining plain error does apply to civil matters but should
be applied with extreme caution).
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any doubt', 197 and/or "injustice might otherwise result"'198 language, with
others utilizing "manifest injustice,"199 "interests of Justice, 2 00 or
"miscarriage of justice, 20 ' terminology. Full briefing and lack of prejudice
is regularly referenced20 2 with many, if not most, of the federal circuits also
routinely referencing issue of law,20 3 no additional fact-finding,20 4 in the

197

Walker v. Page, 2003 WL 1120232, 59 F. App'x 896, 900 (7th Cir. 2003) (articulating

discretion can be used where "proper resolution is beyond any doubt"); AAR Int'l, Inc. v.
Nimelias Enters. S.A., 250 F.3d 510, 523 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating same); Tarsney v. O'Keefe, 225
F.3d 929, 939 (8th Cir. 2000) ("[W]here the proper resolution is beyond any doubt ... or when
the argument involves a purely legal issue in which no additional evidence or argument would
affect the outcome of the case.") (internal citations and quotations omitted) (quoting Universal
Title Ins. Co. v. United States, 942 F.2d 1311, 1314-15 (8th Cir. 1991))); Sanders v. Clemco
Indus., 823 F.2d 214, 217 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating the same); United States v. Brown, 739 F.2d
1136, 1145 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding discretion proper where parties briefed issue and court
hearing minimal benefit with clear resolution).
198 Syverson v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 601 F.3d 793, 803 (8th Cir. 2010) (considering review
of new issue if one of law and injustice might otherwise result).
199 New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 140 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting
Patterson v. Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104, 112 (2d Cir. 2006)). The court has discretion to consider
unpreserved issue "where the issue is purely legal and there is no need for additional fact-finding
or where consideration of the issue is necessary to avoid manifest injustice." Id. at 140 (quoting
Patterson, 440 F.3d at 112)); Ridinger v. Dow Jones & Co. Inc., 651 F.3d 309, 316 (2d Cir. 2011)
(explaining court may consider unpreserved issue to prevent manifest injustice); Readco, Inc. v.
Marine Midland Bank, 81 F.3d 295, 302 (2d Cir.1996); see also Homeless Patrol v. Joseph Volpe
Family, 2011 WL 2580329, 425 F. App'x 60, 61 (2d Cir. 2011) ("[T]he Court may, in its
discretion, disregard the general rule when necessary to remedy manifest or obvious injustice.");
Greene v. United States, 13 F.3d 577, 586 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating the same).
200 Duffield v. Jackson 545 F.3d 1234, 1237-38 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting
"interests of justice
exception" to waiver is "elusive concept").
201 Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp., 667 F.3d 1318, 1322 (9th
Cir. 2012) (exercising
discretion where "exceptional" case and review necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice);
Mentor v. Hillside Bd. of Educ., 2011 WL 1957698, 428 F. App'x. 221, 224 n.5 (3d Cir. 2011)
(noting appellate review permissible for new or unpreserved issues to prevent "gross miscarriage
of justice"); Snapt Inc. v. Ellipse Commc'ns, Inc., 2011 WL 2496686, 430 F. App'x. 346, 351
(5th Cir. 2011) (stating exception to waiver/forfeiture where exception circumstances would
result in miscarriage of justice); Romain v. Shear, 799 F.2d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating
the same) (citing Bolker v. Comm'r, 760 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir.1985))); Pinney Dock &
Transp. Co. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 838 F.2d 1445, 1461 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding exceptional
circumstances or "plain miscarriage of justice" permit deviations from raise or lose rule).
202 See Barefoot Architect, Inc., v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 834-35 (3d Cir.
2011) ("The waiver
rule serves two purposes: ensuring that the necessary evidentiary development occurs in the trial
court, and preventing surprise to the parties when a case is decided on some basis on which they
have not presented argument."); Weitzenkamp v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 661 F.3d 323, 331
(7th Cir. 2011) (finding where full appellate briefing provided and resolution clear discretionary
exception applies).
203 See BarefootArchitect, Inc., 632 F.3d at 834-35 (explaining court may
consider whether a
question of law); Baker v. Dorfman, 239 F.3d 415, 421 (2d Cir. 2000) (addressing allegedly
forfeited claim where it raises "a pure question of law"); Krumie v. Westpoint Stevens Inc., 238
F.3d 133, 141 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating the same); Aguirre v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 901
F.2d 1256, 1258 (5th Cir. 1990) (reviewing new issues on appeal purely of law and resulting in
miscarriage of justice); HENRY D. GABRIEL & SIDNEY POWELL, FED. APP. PRAC. GUIDE -- FIFTH
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"public interest, ' , 2 05 as well as to "materially advance" the purposes of
litigation factors or considerations 206
Additional factors noted by federal courts include an exception for
20 7
arguments as to the illegality of contracts based on public policy;
intervening change in the law; 20 8 whether reaching the issue is necessary to
the resolution of other issues before the court; 209 novelty; 2 10 whether or not
Cm. § 1:2 (1999) (collecting cases); see also Creel v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 385, 390 n.3 (5th Cir.
1998) (citing Dennerline, supra note 2, at 999) (noting pure legal issue is distinct from plain error
inquiry)); Dennerline, supra note 2, at 999 (explaining how characterizing issue as one of "pure
law," differs from characterizing as "plain error,"). Characterizing an issue as "plain error,"
alleges trial error to which there was no objection but could be clearly resolved. Id. See In re
Lett, 632 F.3d 1216, 1227 n.22 (11 th Cir. 2011) (noting Eleventh circuit "embraced" civil
plain
error rule to review questions of law); Syverson, 601 F.3d at 809 (8th Cir. 2010) (narrowing
exception for questions of law to must be addressed if injustice might result); Roofing & Sheet
Metal Servs., Inc. v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 689 F.2d 982, 990 (11th Cir.1982)
("Specifically, we will consider an issue not raised in the district court if it involves a pure
question of law, and if refusal to consider it would result in a miscarriage of justice.") (citing
Martinez v. Mathews, 544 F.2d 1233, 1237 (5th Cir. 1976))).
204 Diesel v. Town of Lewisboro, 232 F.3d 92, 108 (2d Cir. 2000) (refusing to exercise
discretion "where the argument requires new evidence or factual findings") (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); see Jackson v. Parker, 627 F.3d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding no
exceptional circumstances in undeveloped record and no effort to brief plain error applicability)
(citing Moore ex rel Estate of Grady v. Tuleja, 546 F.3d 423, 430 (7th Cir. 2008))); Universal
Title Ins. Co. v. United States, 942 F.2d 1311, 1315 (8th Cir. 1991) ("[N]o additional evidence or
argument would affect the outcome of the case"); Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 823 F.2d 214, 217
(8th Cir. 1987) (stating the same); see also ); Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp., 667 F.3d 1318,
1322 (9th Cir. 2012) (exercising discretion where "the issue is purely one of law" and necessary
facts fully developed); Mayer v. Countrywide Home Loans, 647 F.3d 789, 794 (8th Cir. 2011)
(restating same discretionary standard); Romain v. Shear, 799 F.2d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir. 1996)
(stating same) (citing Bolker v. Comm'r, 760 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1985))).
205 Ninestar Tech. Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n., 667 F.3d 1373, 1382 (Fed.
Cir. 2012)
(explaining forfeiture rule inapplicable to significant questions of general import or of great
public concern); United States v. Anthony Dell'Aquilla, Enters., 150 F.3d 329, 335 (3rd Cir.
1998) (stating review of forfeited issue permitted when "public interest requires" or "manifest
injustice" would result); see also Lomando v. United States, 667 F.3d 363, 381 n.19 (3rd Cir.
2011) (explaining waiver rule one of discretion and can be relaxed whenever in the public
interest).
206 Amos v. Md. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 178 F.3d 212, 215 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999)
(considering new issue presenting purely legal question, parties briefed issue and resolution
advances litigation's progress), vacated, (Dec. 28, 1999).
207 See Seymour v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 988 F.2d 1020, 1023 (10th Cir. 1993).
208 Ruiz, 667 F.3d at 1322 (explaining discretion exercised where new issue arises while
appeal pending because of change in law); Baccei v. United States, 632 F.3d 1140, 1149 (9th Cir.
2011) (stating the same); Romain, 799 F.2d at 1419 (stating the same) (citing Bolker, 760 F.2d at
1042)); see also United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d 196, 202 n.4 (3rd Cir. 2010) ("Since [the
court has] not yet addressed issue ... there is an institutional consideration that can be viewed as
an exceptional circumstances.") (internal quotations omitted).
209 Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Kolstad
v.
Am. Dental Ass'n., 527 U.S. 526, 540 (1999) (noting practice to consider waived issues
"integral" to decision and "fairly subsumed" by question presented) (internal quotations omitted).
210 Bowie v. Maddox, 642 F.3d 1122, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (stating novel legal question can
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"the matter upon which relief is sought was not known and could not
reasonably ... be raised at trial"; 211 whether the parties right to have issues
in their suit considered by both the district court judge and appellate
court; 2 12 whether addressing the issue will "materially advance" the
progress of already protracted litigation; 21 and whether, if full briefing is
present, the benefit of the district
court hearing is "minimal because proper
2 14
clear."
is
issue
the
of
resolution
The identified factors or considerations are not uniform with the
Fifth Circuit frankly stating that "when an appellate court should consider

an issue not properly presented is a question with no certain answer.,,215
The Tenth Circuit has rejected the assertion that pure legal issues may be
reviewed on appeal or that public policy arguments merit exception. 216 At
least two circuits have suggested that the discretion should not be exercised
simply to correct a wrong result, 217 with at least one decision stating either

that review of unpreserved error or new argument is appropriate where the
standard of review is de novo and not requiring any deference to the trial
218
th
219
court , 2 or where the issue is a "threshold" one.
The Sixth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits, in turn,
similar to the First Circuit and the Krynicki-Harwood decisions, have set
forth a master list of the governing considerations. According to the Sixth
Circuit, the discretionary criteria includes whether new issue is a question
of law or there is a need for determination of facts; where proper resolution
is beyond any doubt; whether failure to take up the issue will result in a
miscarriage of justice or denial of substantial justice; and "the parties'

be reached despite lack of preservation).
211 Essinger v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 534 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing and
discussing Martineau, supra note 2, at 1060). Professor Martineau suggested that a rule akin to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) be applied on appeal if the error is the kind for which
relief from a final judgment could be obtained in the trial court, that would be a good reason for
allowing it on appeal. Essinger, 543 F.3d at 453.
212 AAR Int'l Inc. v. Nimelias Enters. S.A., 250 F.3d 510, 523 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Otto
v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 814 F.2d 1127, 1137-38 (7th Cir. 1986)).
213
Carrier Corp. v. Outokumpu Oyj, 673 F.3d 430, 446 (6th Cir. 2012).
214 United States v. Brown, 739 F.2d 1136, 1145 (7th Cir. 1984).
215 Essinger, 534 F.3d at 453 ("General rules and occasional exceptions should
not be
haphazardly applied.").
216 Richisonv. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1128-29 (10th Cir. 2011).
217 Fairlane Car Wash, Inc. v. Knight Enters. Inc., 2010 WL 3724604, 396 F. App'x. 281,
286 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating discretion to address issue exercised where "it would serve an
overriding purpose").
218
Sellers v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 627 F.3d 627, 632 n.1 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting reason to
address new argument where review de novo because no lower court deference).
219 Greenberg v.Nat. Geographic Soc'y., 533 F.3d 1244, 1272 n.28 (1ith Cir. 2008) ("Courts
have generally been amenable to exercising their inherent power to consider un-briefed threshold
issues when they arise.").
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right[s] under our judicial system to have the issues in their suit considered
by both district court and appellate court., 220 The Eleventh Circuit's list is
similar, i.e., the issue must be one of law and refusal to consider it would
result in a miscarriage of justice; appellant had no opportunity to raise
objection below; the issue involves an "interest of substantial justice; the
issue is one where the proper resolution is beyond any doubt; or the issue
presents a significant question of "general impact or of great public
concern. 221 Also notable, and discussed in more detail below, certain
courts, particularly the Tenth Circuit, have
limited discretion as to new
222
arguments on appeal to plain error review.
220

Scotsdale Ins. Co. v. Flowers, 513 F.3d 546, 552 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Friendly Fanms v.

Reliance Ins. Co., 79 F.3d 541, 545 (6th Cir. 1996)).
221 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Fernandez, 741 F.2d 355, 360-61 (11th Cir. 1984); see
Princeton Homes, Inc. v. Virone, 612 F.3d 1324, 1329 n.2 (11th Cir. 2010) (applying Dean
factors and exercising discretion given question of law and resolution beyond any doubt); Belize
Telecomm, Ltd. v. Gov't of Belize, 528 F.3d 1298, 1304 n.7 (11th Cir. 2008) ("Because the
existence of a foreign judgment and the potential for conflicting judgments implicate concerns
beyond those of the parties to this dispute, we choose to exercise our discretion in this case to
consider whether comity should be extended to the Belizean judgment."). Another relatively
similar list has also been declared by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. See HTC Corp. v.
IPCom GmbH & Co., KG., 667 F.3d 1270, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (explaining exceptional
circumstances when appellate court has discretion to consider issue for first time). Exceptional
circumstances include where the issue involves a pure question of law and refusal to consider it
would amount to a miscarriage of justice, the proper resolution is beyond any doubt; appellant no
opportunity to raise objection; the issue presents significant questions of general impact or of
great public concern or the interests of justice are at stake. Id.; see also Doe v. Exxon Mobil
Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ("[Appellate courts] have a fair measure of discretion to
determine what questions to consider and resolve for the first time on appeal.") (citing Roosevelt
v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416, 419 n. 5 (D.C. Cir. 1992))).
222 Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1128-29 (10th Cir. 2011) ("Linguistic
packaging aside, the substantive analysis under either articulation of the standard is similar, and
the litigant's burden is the same: establishing a clear legal error that implicates a miscarriage of
justice.") (internal citations omitted). According to the court inRichison:
Neither, as it turns out, have they always been so precise about applying the
plain error/manifest injustice standard to newly raised legal theories. But,
despite this imprecision, no case in this circuit has held that we may reverse
based on "purely legal" arguments in the absence of plain error. And the fact
that this court has sometimes reversed on the basis of a new legal argument
without indicating the burden the appellant must carry to obtain reversal
cannot ensconce binding precedent requiring or allowing us to ignore the
longstanding requirement that new legal arguments overcome plain error.
What's more, even if the silence of Haugen, Geddes, and Jarvis could be
understood as a deliberate relaxing of the miscarriage of justice/plain error
requirement, our older and so controlling cases (Petrini, Bartlett Collins,
Stahmann, Hicks, and Titan Court) all discuss appellate intervention only in
the presence of legal error and manifest injustice, as the plain error standard
requires. So it is that our precedent does nothing to preclude-and instead
does a great deal more to affirm-our conclusion that plain error review
should pertain in these circumstances.
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ii. State Practice

Virtually all of the states have adopted a plain error type default
standard for unpreserved contentions at least in criminal cases with only
about eight (8) states refusing to adopt such an exception or otherwise

limiting any plain error review to death penalty cases or erroneous jury
instruction claims. 223 The majority of the states adopting a plain error type
of default standard utilize the terms "plain error,, 224 while others refer to

Id. at 1128-29 (internal citations omitted); see also Wiser v. Wayne Fanms, 411 F.3d 923, 926-27
(8th Cir. 2005) (noting Olano 's stringent plain error formulation for correction of unpreserved
errors in civil context).
223 Alabama (ALA. R. App. P. 45A; Rice v. English, 835 So.2d 157, 166
(Ala. 2002); see
Whatley v. State, CR-08-0696, 2011 WL 6278296, at *3 (Ala. Crim. App. December 16, 2011)
(holding failure to object will weigh heavily against any claim of plain error); Phillips v. State, 65
So.3d 971, 986 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010); Williams v. State, 601 So.2d 1062, 1066 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1991)). Arkansas (ARK. R. CRwI. P. 10; Morton Gitelman, The Plain Error Rule in
Arkansas Plainly Time for a Change, 53 ARK. L. REV. 205, 216 (2006)). California (People v.
McKinnon, 259 P.3d 1186, 1211 (Cal. 2011); People v. Benavides, 35 Cal. 4th 69, 115 (Cal.
2005); People v. Redd, 229 P.3d 101, 135 (Cal. 2010); In re Marriage of Stonier, No. D055547,
2010 WL 3212734, *2 (Cal. Ct. App. August 16, 2010)). Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-58
(2008); State v. Kelley, 718 S.E.2d 232, 235 (Ga. 2011) (resolving issue and definitively holding
plain error applies to any jury instruction claim); Brook v. State, 640 S.E.2d 280, 284 (Ga. 2007)
(stating plain error rule limited to death penalty cases and instruction errors in criminal cases)).
Iowa (Steele v. State, 808 N.W.2d 756, 2011 WL 5877029, *2 n.2 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011)
(unpublished table decision) (citing State v. McCright, 569 N.W.2d 605, 607 (Iowa 1997))); State
v. Escobedo, 573 N.W.2d 271, 277 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997)). North Carolina (State v. Lawrence,
723 S.E.2d 326, 333 (N.C. 2012) (stating plain error review normally limited to instructional and
evidentiary error). Pennsylvania (Schmidt v. Boardman Co., 11 A.3d 924, 942 (Pa. 2011)
(confirming Pennsylvania does not follow plain error rule); Commonwealth v. Freeman, 827
A.2d 385, 392 (Pa. 2003) (abandoning relaxed waiver rule for capital cases); Dilliplaine v. Lehigh
Valley Trust Co., 322 A.2d 114, 116-17 (Pa. 1974)). Rhode Island (State v. Hallenbeck, 878
A.2d 992, 1018 (R.I. 2005) (reiterating no plain error in civil or criminal proceedings)). South
Carolina (State v. Sheppard, 706 S.E.2d 16, 19 (S.C. 2011) (recognizing South Carolina
appellate courts have consistently refused to apply the plain error rule); Jackson v. Speed, 486
S.E.2d 750, 759 (S.C. 1997)).
224 See Alaska (Adams v. State, 261 P.3d 758, 764 (Alaska 2011)). Connecticut
(CONN.
PRACTICE BOOK ch. 60, § 60-5 (stating court may notice plain error in interest of justice)).
Colorado (People v. Greer, 262 P.3d 920, 924 (Colo. App. 2011) (We recognize as plain error
those obvious and substantial errors that 'so undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial
itself ...
as to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment."') (quoting in part People v.
Miller, 113 P.3d 743, 749-50 (Colo. 2005))). Delaware (Wright v. State, 980 A.2d 1020, 1023
(Del. 2009) ("Generally, the failure to raise a contemporaneous objection to allegedly
inadmissible evidence constitutes a waiver of a defendant's right to raise that issue on appeal,
unless the error is plain"); (Stansbury v. State, 591 A.2d 188, 191 (Del. 1991), superseded by
statute, Mills v. State, 732 A.2d 845 (Del. 1999); Jenkins v. State, 305 A.2d 610, 613 (Del.
1973)). Georgia (Puckett v. State, 712 S.E.2d 579, 582 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Putnam v.
State, 498 S.E.2d 340 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)); Sanchez v. State, 508 S.E.2d 185, 187 (Ga. Ct. App.
1998) ("This court has also applied the plain error rule in cases presenting 'exceptional
circumstances') (quoting Putnam, 498 S.E.2d at 343)))). Hawaii (State v. Miller, 223 P.3d 157,
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"clear,
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"fundamental,,
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165 (Haw. 2010); State v. Nichols, 141 P.3d 974, 982 (Haw. 2006); Kobashigawa v. Silva, 266

P.3d 470, 473 (Haw. Ct. App. 2011) (stating plain error in civil cases)). Illinois (Wilbourne v.
Cavalenes, 923 N.E.2d 937, 955 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (applying plain error in civil cases) (citing
Palanti v. Dillon Enters., Ltd., 707 N.E.2d 695, 701 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)))). Maryland (Morris v.
State, 837 A.2d 248, 264 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (stating error must be plain and it must be
material); Angulo-Gil v. State, 16 A.3d 283, 297 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (noting do not
exercise plain error review where area of law fully explicated)). Michigan (People v. Carines
597 N.W.2d 130, 138 (Mich. 1999)). Mississippi (Neal v. State, 15 So.3d 388, 403 (Miss.
2009)). Missouri (Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 84.13(c); Rouse v. Cuvelier, No. WD 73653, 2012 WL
912755, at * 8 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2012) (explaining plain error evident, obvious, clear error,
resulting in manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice)). Montana (State v. Norman, 244 P.3d
737, 742 (Mont. 2010)); Nebraska (Cesar C. v. Alicia L., 800 N.W.2d 249, 254 (Neb. 2011);
State v. Barfield, 723 N.W.2d 303, 311 (Neb. 2006), disapproved of on other grounds, State v.
McCulloch, 742 N.W.2d 727 (Neb. 2007)). New Jersey (N.J. CT.R. 2:10-2; State v. Perez, Nos.
A-5803008T3, A-6017-08T3, 2012 WL 570182 at *1, *5,*8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 23,
2012); Baker v. Nat'l State Bank, 736 A.2d 462, 465 (1999)). Nevada (NEV. SUP. CT. RULE
178.602; Ochs v. State, No. 55618, 2011 WL 5146036, at *1-2 (Nev. Oct. 27, 2011). New
Hampshire (N.H. Sup. CT. RULE 16-A; State v. Hebert, 965 A.2d 1059, 1065 (N.H. 2009)).
Oklahoma (Barnett v. State, 271 P.3d 80, 82 (Okla. Crim. App. 2012; Simpsonv. State, 876 P.2d
690, 700-01 (Okal. Crim. App. 1994)). South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-44-15
(2004) ("Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be notices although they were not
brought to the attention of a court.")). Utah (Meadow Valley Contractors, Inc. v. State Dep't of
Transp., 266 P.3d 671, 677 (Utah 2011); Seamons v. Brandley, 268 P.3d 195, 197 (Utah 2011)
(citing State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346, 350 (Utah 2000)); Terry v. Bacon 269 P.3d 188, 195 (Utah
Ct. App. 2011)). West Virginia (Cartwright v. McComas, 672 S.E.2d 297, 300-01 (W. Va.
2008); State v. Miller, 459 S.E.2d 114, 128-29 (W. Va. 1995); Page v. Columbia Natural Res,
Inc., 480 S.E.2d 817, 828 (W. Va. 1996)). Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. § 901.03 (2000); State v.
Lammers, 773 N.W.2d 463, 467 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009)).
225
Kentucky (KY. R. Civ. P. 61.02; Kerr v. Com., No. 2011-CA-000351-MR, 2012 WL

246454, at *1, *3 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2012) (opinion not final)). North Carolina (State v.
Stokes, 718 S.E.2d 174, 178-79 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011)). North Dakota (State v. Hernandez, 707
N.W.2d 449, 455 (N.D. 2005)). Ohio (State v. Barnes, 759 N.E.2d 1240, 1247 (Ohio 2002)).
Oklahoma (Barnett, 271 P.3d at 82; Simpson, 876 P.2d at 700 701). South Dakota (State v.
Thomas, 796 N.W. 2d 706, 711 n.3 (S.D. 2011); First Premier Bank v. Kolcraft Enters., Inc., 686
N.W.2d 430, 442 (S.D. 2004), superseded on other grounds, In re Estate of Duebendorfer, 721
N.W.2d 438 (S.D. 2006)).
226 See Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3414(3) (2007) (concerning failure to object to

instructions); State v. Daniels, 91 P.3d 1147, 1153 (Kan. 2004); State v. Davis, 61 P.3d 701, 707
(Kan. 2003) ("Instructions are clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court is firmly convinced
there is a real possibility that the jury would have rendered a different verdict if the error had not
occurred.")). Minnesota (State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998)). New
Hampshire (Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 20 A.3d 977, 983 (N.H. 2011)
(discussing N.H. Sup. CT. R. 16-A). "A plain error that affects substantial rights may be
considered even though it was not brought to the attention of the trial court or the supreme court."
N.H. Sup. CT. R. 16-A).

227 Arizona (State v. Maldonado, 223 P.3d 653, 657 (Ariz. 2010) (en banc); State
v. Bible,
858 P.2d 1152, 1175 (Ariz. 1993) (in banc); State v. King, 763 P.2d 239, 244 n. 4 (Ariz. 1988)
("[A] harmless error is not fundamental."); State v. Hunter, 688 P.2d 980, 982 (Ariz. 1984)

("[F]undamental error [is] error going to the foundation of the case, error that takes from the

defendant a right essential to his defense, and error of such magnitude that the defendant could
not possibly have received a fair trial.")). Florida (F.B. v. State, 852 So.2d 226, 229 (Fla. 2003)
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a
,,229
obvious, ,28 or patent
error. Many states have adopted the default
standard by rule or statute .23

("The sole exception to the contemporaneous objection rule applies where the error is
fundamental."); Grau v. Branham, 761 So.2d 375, 378 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); State v.
Hunton, 699 So.2d 320, 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) ("Except in cases of fundamental error,
appellate courts will not consider an issue that has not been presented to the lower court in a
manner that specifically addresses the contentions asserted") (internal quotations omitted)
(quoting Nevels v. State, 685 So.2d 856, 857 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)))). Idaho (State v. Perry,
245 P.3d 961, 980 (Idaho 2010); Hoppe v. McDonald, 644 P.2d 355, 357 (Idaho 1982) (applying
fundamental error to civil case); State v. Reid, 253 P.3d 754, 757 58 (Idaho Ct. App. 2011)).
Indiana (Johnson v. Wait, 947 N.E.2d 951, 958 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); S.M. v. Elkhart Cnty.
Office of Family & Children, 706 N.E.2d 596, 599 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (listing handful of
case fundamental error applied to civil
cases)). New Mexico (N.M. R. APP. P. 12-216 (reviewing
unpreserved jurisdictional issues, or in discretion, general public interest, fundamental error or
rights questions); State v. Ortega, 817 P.2d 1196, 1208 (N.M. 1991), abrogation on other
grounds recognized, Kersey v. Hatch, 237 P.3d 683 (N.M. 2010)). New York (Santos v. Nat'l
Retail Transp., Inc., 87 A.D.3d 418, 418 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (stating since error
"fundamental" discretion to review unpreserved issue in interests of justice)). Texas (See
McCauley v. Consol. Underwriters, 304 S.W.2d 265, 266 (Tex. 1957); Ramsey v. Dunlop, 205
S.W.2d 979, 982 (Tex. 1947); see also MCDONALD & CARLSON, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 47:4,
at 1201-02 (2d ed. 1998) (recognizing fundamental error as exception to general rule of
preservation); W. James Kronzer, Laying the Foundation for Appellate Review, APPELLATE
PROCEDURE IN TEXAS (State Bar of Texas, 2d ed. 1979), § 9.2, at 204-06 (stating same); see also
Jones v. Black, 1 Tex. 527, 529-30 (1846) ("[T]he record being silent as to any judicial action
either sought or had upon the issues of law, they will be considered as waived and will not be
made the subject of revision here [except that] "if the foundation of the action has manifestly
failed, we cannot, without shocking the common sense of justice, allow a recovery to stand."')
(quoting in part Palmer v. Lorillard, 16 Johnson 343, 353-54 (N.Y. Ch. 1819))).
228 See Maine (State v. Pabon, 28 A.3d 1147, 1151-52 (Me. 2011) (discussing
ME. R. CRIM.
P. 52(b) providing "[o]bvious errors or defects affecting substantial rights" addressed on appeal)).
229 Louisiana (State v. Gordon, No. 11-898, 2012 WL 555146, at *1 (La. Ct. App.
Feb, 22,
2012) (explaining all errors reviewed under LA. CODE CRI. PROC. ANN. art. 920 as whether
"patent on their face"); see LA. CODE CRIM\. PROC. ANN. art. 920 (2008) ("The following matters
and no others shall be considered on appeal: (1) An error designated in the assignment of errors;
and (2) An error that is discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings and
without inspection of the evidence."); see also State v. Rector, No. 08-211, 2008 WL 5169837, at
*1,*5 (La. Ct. App. 2008) ("new legal arguments cannot be made for the first time on appeal.").
230 Alaska (ALASKA R. CRwI. P. 47 (stating rules for harmless and plain error)).
Connecticut (CONN. PRAC. BOOK ch. 60, § 60-5 (explaining court may notice plain error in the
interest of justice)). Delaware (DEL. SUP. CT. R. 8 (reviewing issues not raised below only for
plain error)); Hawaii (HAw.
R. APP. P. 28(b)(4)(D) ("Points not presented in accordance with this
section will be disregarded, except that the appellate court, at its option, may notice a plain error
not presented."); (HAW. R. PENAL P. 52 (stating plain and harmless error rule)). Illinois (ILL.
SUP. CT. R. 615(a) (explaining plain error may be noticed on appeal even if not raised)).
Kentucky (KY. R. CIV. P. 61.02 ("A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party
may be considered by the court on motion for a new trial or by an appellate court on appeal, even
though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be granted upon a
determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the error.")). Louisiana (Gordon, 2012
WL 555146, at *1 (reviewing all errors as whether "patent on their face" under LA. CODE CRIM.
P. art. 920)). (Mississippi (MIss. R. APP. P. 28(a)(3) (allowing appellate court to notice plain
error not identified or specified); Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v. Peacock, 972 So.2d 619, 637 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2006) (defining plain error in civil cases)). Missouri (MO. R. CIV. P. 84.13 ("Plain
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Approximately eight (8) states apply plain error to criminal cases
but not civil matters,23 ' while twenty (20) states utilize the Olano
formulation, including the public interest prong discretionary element.232
errors affecting substantial rights may be considered on appeal, in the discretion of the court,
though not raised or preserved, when the court finds that manifest injustice or miscarriage of
justice has resulted therefrom."); (MO R. CRIM. P. 30.20 (stating rule for plain error in criminal
cases); MO. Sup. CT. R. 30.20 (permitting appellate court to consider plain error even if not
raised); MB Town Ctr., LP v. Clayton Forsyth Foods, Inc., No. ED 96551, 2012 WL 70574, at
*1, *5-6 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012); Lyon Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Harris Cab Co., Inc., 303 S.W.3d 589, 590
(Mo. Ct. App. 2010); Carroll v. Kelsey, 234 S.W.3d 559, 565 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007)). New
Hampshire (N.H. Sup. CT. R. 16-A; State v. Herbert, 965 A.2d 1059, 1065 (N.H. 2009)). New
Jersey (N.J. CT. R. 2:10-c). Nevada (NEv. REV. STAT. §178.602 (2011) ("Plain errors or defects
affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the
court.")). Oregon (OR. R. App. P. 5.45(1) (referring to "plain error" in appellate rule governing
power to review unpreserved issues). According to the rule, in order to qualify as plain, an error
must be one "of law"; must be "apparent," i.e., the point must be obvious, not reasonably in
dispute; and must appear on the face of the record, i.e., the reviewing court must not need to go
outside the record to identify the error or choose between competing inferences, and the facts
constituting the error must be irrefutable. See id.). South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A44-15 (2004); ("Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they
were not brought to the attention of a court."); §19-9-6 (2004); Thomas, 796 N.W. 2d at 711 n.3;
FirstPremierBank, 686 N.W.2d at 442).
231 Georgia (Puckett v. State, 712 S.E.2d 579, 582 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Putnam v.
State, 498 S.E. 2d 340, 343-44 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)); Dasher v. Dasher, 658 S.E.2d 571, 572 (Ga.
2008) (stating plain error does not apply to civil cases)). Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60 261
(2005); Gilley v. Kan. Gas Serv. Co., 169 P.3d 1064, 2067 (Kan. 2007) ("The failure to object to
a jury instruction invokes a clearly erroneous review standard, whereby we must be able to
declare a real possibility existed that the jury would have returned a different verdict if the trial
error had not occurred.")). Louisiana (Setliffv. Slayter, 38 So.3d 1230, 1232 n.4 (La. Ct. App.
2010) (applying patent error review to criminal cases, but not civil)). Maryland (Gittin v.
Haught-Bingham, 716 A.2d 1063, 1065 (Md. 1998) (doubting plain error applied in civil cases
beyond jury instructions as provided for by MD. R. Civ. P. CIR. CT. R. 4-325 (e)). Michigan
(Souden v. Souden Nos. 297676, 297677, 29678, 2011 WL 4375097, at *1, *5 (Mich. Ct. App.
Sept. 20, 2011) (suggesting no plain error review in civil cases)). Minnesota (MIN. R. Civ. P.
51.04(b) (stating plain error applies in civil jury instructions); see also Frazier v Burlington N.
Santa Fe Corp., 788 N.W.2d 770, 780 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010), rev'dNos. A09 2212, A092213,
A09 2214, A09 2215, 2012 WL 102175, at *1 (Minn. March 28, 2012) (stating civil plain error
rule "suited to correcting obvious instances of injustice or misapplied law") (citing Newport v.
Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 256 (1981))). New Mexico (State v. Alingog, 877 P.2d 562,
566-67 (N.M. 1994), rev 'd, 877 P.2d 562 (N.M. 1994); N.M. State Bd. of Psychologist Exam'rs
v. Land, 62 P.3d 1244, 1251 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002); Gracia v. Bittner, 900 P.2d 351, 354 58
(N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (discussing fundamental error's limited civil case role and counsel's role
presenting jury facts and issues)). North Carolina (N.C. R. APP. P. 10(a)(4) ("In order to
preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely
request, objection, or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling the party desired the court
to make if the specific grounds were not apparent from the context. It is also necessary for the
complaining party to obtain a ruling upon the party's request, objection, or motion."); Durham v.
Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 317 S.E.2d 372, 377 (N.C. 1984) ("[T]he application of the plain error
doctrine [is limited] to appeals in criminal cases and [does not apply to] appeals in civil cases.");
see Dogwood Dev. & Mgmt. Co., LLC v. White Oak Transp. Co., 657 S.E.2d 361, 364 (N.C.
2008)).
232 Connecticut (State v. Fagan, 905 A.2d 1101, 1113 (Conn. 2006) (explaining plain error
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doctrine reserved for extraordinary situations). Extraordinary situations occur where the
existence of the error is so obvious that it affects fairness, integrity, and public confidence in the
judicial proceedings. Id.; Conn. Steel Co. v. Nat'l. Amusements, Inc., 348 A.2d 658, 663 (Conn.
1974) (stating same)). Delaware (Robertsonv. State, 596 A.2d 1345, 1356 (Del. 1991) (applying
plain error to civil and criminal appeals and requiring error to be prejudicial) (citing Dutton v.
State, 452 A.2d 127, 146 (Del. 1982))). "The error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial
to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process. Id.; see
Duphily v. Del. Elec. Coop., Inc., 662 A.2d 821, 827 (Del. 1995) (applying the "clearly
prejudicial" requirement cited in Robertson); Riggins v. Mauriello, 603 A.2d 827, 830 (Del.
1992) (stating same)). Georgia (Guajardo v. State, 718 S.E.2d 292, 295 (Ga. 2011) (considering
errors for criminal cases, death penalty and jury instructions); Puckett v. State, 712 S.E.2d 579,
581 ("In exceptional circumstances ... appellate courts, in the public interest, may, of their own
motion, notice errors to which no exception has been taken, if the errors are obvious, or if they
otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.")).
Illinois (Wilbourne v. Cavalenes, 923 N.E.2d 937, 955 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (explaining plain error
applies in civil cases where error egregiously deprives party of fair trial) (citing Palanti v. Dillon
Enters., Ltd., 707 N.E.2d 695, 701 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999))); In re Marriage of Saheb, 880 N.E.2d

537, 546 (Ill App. Ct. 2007) (stating limited application of plain error to civil cases); see Gillespie
v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 553 N.E.2d 291, 297 (Ill. 1990) (applying plain error doctrine more
often in criminal cases); Dowell v. Bitner, 652 N.E.2d 1372, 1380 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (stressing
plain error in civil cases must amount to "an affront to the judicial process")). Indiana (Addison
v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1202, 1213 (Ind. 2012) (applying fundamental error only when harm or
harm potential substantial and denies defendant due process) (citing Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d
126, 131 (Ind. 2009) & Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind.2006))); Clark, 915 N.E.2d
at 131 ("Fundamental error is an error that makes a fair trial impossible or constitutes clearly
blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable and
substantial potential for harm.") (citing Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 755 (Ind. 2002))).
Kentucky (Commonwealth v. Jones, 283 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Ky. 2009) ("[Manifest injustice for
palpable error is error that] so seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the
proceeding as to be 'shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable."') (quoting Martin v.
Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ky. 2006)))). Maine (Pabon, 28 A.3d at 1153-54; State v.
Burdick, 782 A.2d 319, 324 n.9 (Me. 2001); Mason v. Torrey, 714 A.2d 790 (Me. 1998)
("[Obvious error can apply in civil cases 'only if the error was of the exceptional kind that
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings."') (quoting
Harris v. PT Petro Corp., 650 A.2d 1346, 1349 (Me. 1994)))). Maryland (Yates v. State, 33
A.3d 1071, 1083 (Md. App. 2011) (citing State v. Rich, 3 A.2d 1201, 1216 (Md. 2010)), cert.
granted, (Md. April 20, 2012). Michigan (See People v. Brown, No. 299459, 2012 WL 593135,

at *1, *34 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2012) (citing People v. Carines 597 N.W.2d 130, 138-39
(Mich. 1999))). Minnesota (State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1998)); Mississippi
(Neal v. State, 15 So.3d 388, 403 (Miss. 2009)). Montana (State v. Taylor, 231 P.3d 79, 83
(Mont. 2010) (holding plain error requires appellate court convinced no review result in manifest
miscarriage of justice); see also State v. Finley, 915 P.2d 208, 215 (Mont. 1996), abrogated, State
v. Gallagher, 19 P.3d 817 (Mont. 2001)). Nebraska (State v. Barfield, 723 N.W.2d 303, 311
(Neb 2006), disapprovedof on other grounds, State v. McCulloch, 742 N.W.2d 727 (Neb. 2007);

Cesar C. v. Alicia L., 800 N.W.2d 249, 254 (Neb. 2011)). New Hampshire (Progressive N. Ins.
Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 20 A.3d 977, 983 (N.H. 2011); Clark & Lavey Benefits Solutions v.
Educ. Dev. Ctr., 949 A.2d 133, 138 (N.H. 2008) ("For [plain error to apply]: (1) there must be an
error; (2) the error must be plain; (3) the error must affect substantial rights; and (4) the error
must seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.") (quoting
Cloutier v. Berlin, 907 A.2d 955, 966 (N.H. 2006)))). Ohio (State v. Barnes, 759 N.E.2d 1240,
1247 (Ohio 2002)). Oklahoma (Barnett v. State, 271 P.3d 80, 82 (Okla. Crim. App. 2012);
Simpson v. State, 876 P.2d 690, 700-01 (Okal. Crim. App. 1994)). South Dakota (S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-44-15 (2004) ("Plain error or defects affecting substantial rights may be
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There are generally three groups of plain error type of review among the
state courts:
the Olano-public interest approach,233 the outcome
determinative only approach, 234 and hybrids of both or either. 235 In certain

noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court."); State v. Thomas, 796
N.W.2d 706, 711 n.3 (S.D. 2011); First Premier Bank v. Kolcraft Enters., Inc., 686 N.W.2d 430,
442 (S.D. 2004), superseded on other grounds, In re Estate of Duebendorfer, 721 N.W.2d 438
(S.D. 2006)). Vermont (State v. Brochu, 949 A.2d 1035, 1055 (Vt. 2008) ("Plain error exists
only in exceptional circumstances where a failure to recognize an error would result in a
miscarriage of justice, or where there is a glaring error so grave and serious that it strikes at the
very heart of the defendant's constitutional rights.") (citing State v. Carpenter, 749 A.2d 1137,
1139-40 (Vt. 2000))); State v. Yoh, 910 A.2d 853, 872 (Vt. 2006) (using Olano standard as "a
guide for applying our own plain-error standard")). West Virginia (Cartwright v. McComas, 672
S.E.2d 297, 300 (W. Va. 2008); State v. Miller, 459 S.E.2d 114, 129-30 (W. Va. 1995); Page v.
Columbia Natural Res., Inc., 480 S.E.2d 817, 828 (W. Va. 1996)).
233 See supra note 232 (listing states utilizing public interest prong).
234 Hawaii (State v. Miller, 223 P.3d 157, 193 (Haw. 2010) (expressly rejecting fourth prong
under Olano test)). Kansas (State v. Davis, 61 P.3d 701, 707 (Kan. 2003) ("[Clear error occurs
if] reviewing court is firmly convinced there is a real possibility that the jury would have rendered
a different verdict if the error had not occurred.")). Ohio (State v. Schlosser, No. 14-10-30, 2011
WL 3658382, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2011) (requiring obvious error and but for error
outcome would be different)).
235 Alaska (Adams v. State, 261 P.3d 758, 773 (Alaska 2011) (interpreting criminal
procedure rule for plain error requirements). Plain error requires that:
(1) there must be error, and the error must not have been the result of an
intelligent waiver or a tactical decision not to object; (2) the error must be
obvious, meaning that it should have been apparent to any competent judge
or lawyer; (3) the error must affect substantial rights, meaning that it must
pertain to the fundamental fairness of the proceeding; and (4) the error must
be prejudicial. A constitutional violation will always affect substantial rights
and will be prejudicial unless the State proves that it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. An error that is not constitutional in nature will be
prejudicial if the defendant proves that there is a reasonable probability that
it affected the outcome of the proceeding.
Id. Harris v. Keys, 948 P.2d 460, 465-66 (Alaska 1997) (evaluating error for Alaskan civil cases
where obvious mistake made creates high likelihood injustice resulted); Miller v. Sears, 636 P.2d
1183, 1189 (Alaska 1981) (stating same); Holiday Inns of Am., Inc. v. Peck, 520 P.2d 87, 90
(Alaska 1974) (stating same)). Arizona (State v. Hunter, 688 P.2d 980, 982 (Ariz. 1984) (en
banc) ("Fundamental error [is] error going to the foundation of the case, error that takes from the
defendant a right essential to his defense, and error of such magnitude that the defendant could
not possibly have received a fair trial.")). Colorado (People v. Greer, 262 P.3d 920, 924 (Colo.
App. 2011); see People v. Sepulveda, 65 P.3d 1002, 1006 (Colo. 2003) (en banc) ("Plain error is
error that] so undermined the fundamental fairness of the proceeding as to cast serious doubt on
the reliability of the judgment.") (quoting Walker v. People, 932 P.2d 303, 311 (Colo. 1997) (en
banc)))). Delaware (Stansbury v. State, 591 A.2d 188, 191 (Del. 1991), superseded by statute,
Mills v. State, 732 A.2d 845 (Del. 1999)). Florida (Grau v. Branham, 761 So.2d 375, 378 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Hunton, 699 So.2d 320, 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). Florida
follows fundamental error rule which requires appellate review where the error is "extreme" and
"so damaged the fairness of the trial that the public's interest in our system of justice justifies a
new trial. Murphy v. Int'l Robotics Sys., 710 So.2d 587, 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). See J.B.
v. State, 705 So.2d 1376, 1378 (Fla. 1998) ("[Fundamental error] goes to the foundation of the
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case or the merits of the cause of action and is equivalent to a denial of due process."); State v.
Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1993) ("[F]or an error to be so fundamental that it can be raised for
the first time on appeal, the error must be basic to the judicial decision under review and
equivalent to a denial of due process.")). Hawaii (Miller, 223 P.3d at 193 (rejecting four part
Olano test for plain error) (citing State v. Nichols, 141 P.3d 974, 982 (Haw. 2006)))). Illinois
(Wilbourne, 923 N.E.2d at 955 (citing Palanti,707 N.E.2d at 701)); In re Marriage of Saheb, 880
N.E.2d at 546; see Gillespie, 553 N.E.2d at 297; Dowell, 652 N.E.2d at 1380)). Indiana
(Addison, 962 N.E.2d at 1213; Clark, 915 N.E.2d at 131)). Idaho (State v. Perry, 245 P.3d 961,
980 (Idaho 2010) ("Error that is fundamental must be such error as goes to the foundation or basis
of a defendant's rights or must go to the foundation of the case or take from the defendant a right
which was essential to his defense and which no court could or ought to permit him to waive.")
(quoting Smith v. State, 491 P.2d 733, 739 n.13 (Idaho 1971), abrogated, Perry, 245 P.3d 961
(Idaho 2010)))). Louisiana (State v. Bland, 558 So.2d 719, 727 (La. Ct. App. 1990) ("[I1f an
error is so fundamental that it calls into question the reliability of the fact finding process, the
contemporaneous objection rule has not been applied.")). Missouri (State v. Woods, 357 S.W.3d
249, 254 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012)). Montana (Emmerson v. Walker, 236 P.3d 598, 605 (Mont.
2010) (requiring showing of possibility of manifest injustice or issue with fundamental fairness of
trial)). Nevada (Valdez v. State, 196 P.3d 465, 477 (Nev. 2008) (requiring plain error and affects
substantial rights by causing actual prejudice or miscarriage of justice)). New Jersey (State v.
Perez, Nos. A-5803-08T3, A-6017-08T3, 2012 WL 570182, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
Feb. 23, 2012) ("[E]rror was 'clearly capable of producing an unjust result,' that is ... 'sufficient
to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not
have reached."') (quoting State v. Taffaro, 950 A.2d 860, 867 (N.J. 2008)))). New Mexico (N.M.
R. App. P. 12-216; State v. Ortega, 817 P.2d 1196, 1208 (N.M. 1991) (defining fundamental error
when guilt doubtful it shocks court's conscience or to avoid miscarrying justice), abrogation on
other grounds recognized, Kersey v.Hatch- 237 P.3d 683 (N.M.2010)). New York (Peguero v.
601 Realty Corp., 873 N.Y.S.2d 17, 25 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) ("[W]here [an] error is so
fundamental as to preclude consideration of the central issue upon which the claim of liability is
founded, the court may, in the interests of justice, proceed to review the issue even in the absence
of objection or request [to charge].") (quoting Pivar v. Graduate Sch. of Figurative Art, 735
N.Y.S.2d 522, 524 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)))). North Carolina (State v. Stokes, 718 S.E.2d 174,
178-79 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (explaining application of plain error rule) (citing State v. Odom,
300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (N.C. 1983))). The court in Stokes explained that:
The plain error rule is always to be applied cautiously and only in the
exceptional case where, after reviewing the entire record, it can be said the
claimed error is a fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so
lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done, or where the error
is grave error which amounts to a denial of a fundamental right of the
accused, or the error has resulted in a miscarriage of justice or in the denial
to appellant of a fair trial or where the error is such as to seriously affect the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings or where it can
be fairly said the instructional mistake had a probable impact on the jury's
finding that the defendant was guilty.
718 S.E.2d 174, 178-79. North Dakota (State v. Hernandez, 707 N.W.2d 449, 455 (N.D. 2005)).
Oregon (OR. R. App. P. 5.45(1)). Rhode Island (State v. Hallenbeck, 878 A.2d 992, 1018 (R.I.
2005) (noting exception to raise or waive rule). The court in Hallenbeck explained that:
An exception to Rhode Island's 'raise or waive' rule does exist. To qualify
as an exception to the rule, the error complained of must be more than
harmless error, the record must be sufficient to permit a determination of the
issue, the issue must be of constitutional dimension, and counsel's failure to
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states, the "plain error" type exception for civil cases is framed differently
than that applicable to criminal cases.2 3 6

raise the issue must be attributed to a novel rule of law that counsel could
not reasonably have known during trial.
Id. (quoting State v. Rupert, 649 A.2d 1013, 1016 (R.I. 1994)). Utah (State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). The establishment of plain error requires that the appellant must
show ... (i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the
error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined.
Id.). Virginia (VA. SuP. CT. R. 5A:18 ("No ruling of the trial court.., will be considered as a
basis for reversal unless the objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of ruling,
except for good cause shown or to enable the Court of Appeals to attain the ends of justice.");
Gheorghiu v. Commonwealth, 701 S.E.2d 407, 413 (Va. 2010) ("Whether the ends of justice
provision should be applied involves two questions: (1) whether there is error as contended by
the appellant; and (2) whether the failure to apply the ends of justice provision would result in a
grave injustice.") (citing Charles v. Commonwealth, 613 S.E.2d 432, 433 (Va. 2005), abrogated,
Rawls v. Commonwealth, 683 S.E.2d 544 (Va. 2009))); Perry v. Commonwealth, 712 S.E.2d
765, 771 (Va. Ct. App. 2011) (construing Rule 5A: 18 to constitute two exceptions "good cause"
and "ends of justice"), abrogatedby, Rawls v. Commonwealth, 683 S.E.2d 544 (Va. 2009);
Bazemore v. Commonwealth, 590 S.E.2d 602, 609 (Va. Ct. App. 2004) (en banc); Mounce v.
Commonwealth, 357 S.E.2d 742, 744 (Va. Ct. App. 1987) ("[T]he 'ends of justice' provision may
be used when the record affirmatively shows that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, not when
it merely shows that a miscarriage might have occurred.")). Washington (State v. Bertrand, 267
P.3d 511, 521 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). The court adopted the "manifest error" terminology when
promulgating RAP 2.5(a)(3), rather than the more common "plain error" standard, in an effort to
limit appellate review of unpreserved error to instances where an appellant's constitutional rights
were in jeopardy, and deliberately chose the well-understood and long-standing "manifest error"
language to avoid confusion with the more expansive "plain error" standard); Bertrand, 2011 WL
6097718 ("A plaintiff must establish that a "manifest error" occurred and, that the error affected a
constitutional right); State v. Harris, 224 P.3d 830, 833 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (requiring
"manifest" error have "practical and identifiable consequences in the trial of the case"); State v.
Speaks, 829 P.2d 1096, (1992) (stating courts should determine whether burden of showing
manifest error met before addressing constitutional claims)). Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. 901.03
(2000); State v. Lammers, 773 N.W.2d 463, 467 (Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (requiring clear or obvious
error and one likely depriving defendant of basic constitutional rights)). Wyoming (Walker v.
State, 267 P.3d 1107, 1110 (Wyo. 2012) (listing requirements for plain error). Plain error
requires (1) record is clear about incident as to alleged error; 2) there is transgression of a clear
and unequivocal rule of law; and (3) the party claiming error was denied a substantial right which
resulted in material prejudice. Id.).
236 See Colorado (Compare Sepulveda, 65 P.3d at 1006 ("[Plain error review] is required
only when an error so undermined the fundamental fairness of the proceeding as to cast serious
doubt on the reliability of the judgment."), with Harris Group Inc. v. Robinson, 209 P.3d 1189,
1195 (Colo. App. 2009) (applying civil plain error in "unusual and special cases" and "to avert
manifest injustice")). Hawaii (Compare Miller, 223 P.3d at 193, with Montalvo v. Lapez, 884
P.2d 345, 353 (Haw. 1994) (considering three factors to find plain error in civil cases). "We
[consider] three factors ...to notice plain error in civil cases: (1) whether consideration of the
issue not raised at trial requires additional facts; (2) whether its resolution will affect the integrity
of the trial court's findings of fact; and (3) whether the issue is of great public import." Id.;
Kobashigawa v. Silva, 266 P.3d 470, 473 (stating same)). Michigan (Compare People v.
Carines, 597 N.W.2d 130, 139 (Mich. 1999) (following Olano plain error test in criminal cases),
with Smith v. Foerster-Bolser Const., 711 N.W.2d 421, 423 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006) ("Court may
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Approximately seventeen (17) states have cited to or referenced
Hormel and/or Singleton as to "exceptional circumstance"

discretion.237 Some states have a rule or statute providing for exception to
overlook preservation requirements if the failure to consider the issue would result in manifest
injunction, if consideration is necessary for a proper determination of the case, of if the issues
involves a question of law and the facts necessary for its resolution have been presented."), and
Souden v. Souden, No. 297676, 2011 WL 4375097, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2011)
(suggesting no plain error review in civil cases)). New Mexico (N.M. State Bd. of Psychologist
Exam'rs v. Land, 62 P.3d 1244, 1251 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003) ("[T]he fundamental error doctrine
does not apply to civil cases except in the most extraordinary circumstances."); Gracia v. Bittner,
900 P.2d 351, 354-58 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (discussing the very limited role of fundamental error
in civil cases); Morfin v. Villalobos, No. 30,782, 2011 WL 2040809, at *4 (N.M. Ct. App. Apr.
26, 2011) (stating same)). Ohio (Compare Schlosser, 2011 WL 3658382, at *3 (stating obvious
error affecting substantial rights applicable in criminal case), and Barnes, 759 N.E.2d at 1247
(stating same), with Goldfuss v. Davidson, 679 N.E.2d 1099, 1104 (Ohio 1997) ("[I]n appeals of
civil cases, the plain error doctrine ... may be applied only ... where error ... seriously affects
the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the
legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself."); Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Lomaz, No.
2008-P-0007, 2010 WL 702439, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010) (stating same)). South Dakota
(FirstPremier Bank, 686 N.W.2d at 442 (stating civil plain error only applicable "ludicrous
result" ridicules entire judicial system) (superseded on other grounds in In re Estate of
Duebendorfer, 721 N.W.2d 438 (S.D. 2006)). Vermont (Compare Brochu, 949 A.2d at 1055
(noting Olano plain error test for criminal cases in Vermont), with Follo v. Florindo, 970 A.2d
1230, 1237 (Vt. 2009) ("Court considers plain error in civil cases only . . . when an appellant
raises a claim of deprivation of fundamental rights, or when a liberty interest is at stake in a quasicriminal or hybrid civil-criminal probation hearing.") (internal citations omitted)).
237 Alaska (Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n v. Byayuk, 684 P.2d 114, 122-23 (Alaska
1984)). Arizona (Bohonus v. Amerco, 602 P.2d 469, 471 (Ariz. 1979) (in banc)). California
(Greenblatt v. Munro, 326 P.2d 929,935 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958)). Connecticut (Conn. Steel
Co. v. Nat'l Amusements Inc., 348 A.2d 658, 663 (Conn. 1974); State v. Evans, 327 A.2d 576,
581 (Conn. 1973); State v. Narvaez, 485 A.2d 1351, 1353 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985)). Florida
(Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 200 (Fla. 2003) (citing and
discussing Hormel but concluding there was no "patent injustice" present); In Interest of R.W.,
481 So. 2d 548, 549 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (considering waived argument as the
unconstitutionality of statute was patent)). Hawaii (Fujioka v. Kam, 514 P.2d 568, 570 (Haw.
1973) (stating general rule "not inflexible" and appellate court may hear new arguments as justice
requires)). Idaho (Ochoa v. State Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 794 P.2d 1127, 1134 (Idaho
1990)). Illinois (Wadlington v. Mindes, 259 N.E. 2d 257, 261 (Ill. 1970)). Iowa (Berhow v.
Kroack, 195 N.W.2d 379, 390 (Iowa 1972)). Maine (Teel v. Colson, 396 A.2d 529, 535 (Me.
1979), disavowed on othergrounds, Henry v. Brown, 495 A.2d 324 (Me. 1985) ("We do concede
that exceptional circumstances may exist where the application of the general rule of practice
under which appellate courts will not entertain issues or theories raised for the first time on appeal
would obviously result in a plain miscarriage of justice, and that under such circumstances the
court will consider the belated issue or theory to promote the ends of justice."); see also Hixon v.
Mathieu, 377 A.2d 112, 115 (Me. 1977) (notwithstanding unobjected critical erroneous
instructions justice demanded new trial; otherwise deprivation of fundamental trial right); Smith
v. Tonge, 377 A.2d 109, 111 (Me. 1977) (finding no right to disturb judgment unless after
examination, court convinced appellant substantially prejudiced)). Missouri (Clark v. Bd. of
Dirs. of Kansas City, 915 S.W.2d 766, 772 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)). New Mexico (State v.
Alingog, 866 P.2d 378, 383 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd, 877 P.2d 562 (N.M. 1994)). North
Dakota (Johnsonv. Elkin, 263 N.W.2d 123, 133 (N.D. 1978)). Oregon (Lane Council of Gov'ts.
v. Lane Counsel of Gov't Emps., 552 P.2d 600, 602 (Or. Ct. App. 1976), rev'd 561 P.2d 1012
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preservation or the usual bar to presenting new issues on appeal.238 Other
states have no separate exceptional circumstances discretion beyond plain

error. 239
(Or. 1977)). Rhode Island (Harvey Realty v. Killingly Manor Condo. Ass'n, 787 A.2d 465, 467
(R.I. 2001) (Reiterating rule precedent only supports deviation from general forfeiture rule
concerning basic constitutional)). South Dakota (State v. Gard, 742 N.W.2d 257, 261 (S.D.
2007); see In re J.D.M.C., 739 N.W.2d 796, 805 (S.D. 2007)). West Virginia (State v. Greene,
473 S.E.2d 921, 927 (W. Va. 1996); State v. Crabtree, 482 S.E.2d 605, 613 (W.Va. 1996)
(deviating from invited error doctrine permitted where rule's application would result in manifest
injustice)).
238 Colorado (COLO. App. P. R. 1(d) (stating appellate court "may in its discretion notice any
error appearing of record")). Kansas (KAN. SUP. CT. R. 6.02(e) (directing appellant to "explain
why" issues not raised below on appeal); State v. Atteberry, 239 P.3d 857, 867 (Kan. Ct. App.
2010)). Louisiana (LA UNIFORM R. 1-3 ("The Courts of Appeal will review only issues which
were submitted to the trial court and which are contained in specifications or assignments of
error, unless the interest of justice clearly requires otherwise.")). Maryland (MD. R. 8-131
("[T]he Court may decide [an unraised issue]"if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or
to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal.")). New Mexico (N.M. R. App. P.12-216
(stating scope of review for unpreserved issues)). North Carolina (N.C. R. App. P. 2
(suspending rules when necessary to prevent manifest injustice or to expedite decision in public
interest); J.T. Russell & Sons, Inc v. Silver Birch Pond L.L.C., 721 S.E.2d 699, 704 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2011)). Tennessee (TENN. R. APP. P. 36(b) ("When necessary to do substantial justice, an
appellate court may consider an error that has affected the substantial rights of a party at any time,
even though the error was not raised in the motion for a new trial or assigned as error on
appeal."); TENN. R. APP. P. 13(b) ("The appellate court ... may in its discretion consider other
issues in order, among other reasons: (1) to prevent needless litigation, (2) to prevent injury to the
interests of the public, and (3) to prevent prejudice to the judicial process."). According to the
Advisory Commission Comment to subdivision (b) of Rule 13:
This subdivision deals with the very difficult question of when an appellate
court should consider an issue not raised by the parties. Generally speaking,
control over the issues should reside in the parties, not in the court.
Accordingly, this subdivision provides that review will typically extend only
to the issues set forth in the briefs. Only the absence of subject-matter
jurisdiction, whether at the trial or appellate level, must be considered by the
appellate court regardless of whether it is presented for review. Cases
appealed to the wrong appellate court must be transferred pursuant to Rule
17 of these rules. In all the other situations described in this subdivision, the
appellate court has discretion to decide whether it will consider a matter not
raised by the parties. It is intended that this discretion be sparingly
exercised.
R. APP. P. 13 advisory committee's comment; see also Malco Theaters, Inc. v. Roberts,
No. W2010-004640-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 1598884, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2011)
(noting it would review issue because issue had been briefed by both parties); Waters v. Farr, 291
S.W.3d 873, 919 n.22 (Tenn. 2009) (Koch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Weaver
v. Deverell, No. W2011-00563-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 5069418, at *34 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct.
26, 2011)). Virginia (VA. SuP. CT. R. 5A:8, 5A:18). Washington (WASH. R. APP. P. 2.5(a)
(permitting exception where no jurisdiction; insufficient facts to grant relief and constitutional
right manifest error)). Wisconsin (WIs. STAT. § 901.03 (2001)).
239 Delaware (Brownv. State, 36 A.3d 321, 323 (Del. 2012) (appearing to equate
plain error
with "interest of justice" and citing DEL. SUP. CT. R. 8)). Georgia (OVIP, Inc. v. Blockbuster
TENN.
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The formulations as to "exceptional circumstances" separate from
plain error review are variable and difficult to pigeon hole into categories.
240
under the "interest of justice,",,
Some generically state the• exception
,,241
242

"injustice might otherwise result,,
justice so requires,
"when
"miscarriage of justice, 243 "manifest inj stice,,244 "substantial rights

Textiles, LLC., 656 S.E.2d 907, 909 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) ("Issues presented for the first time on
appeal furnish nothing for [appellate court] to review[.]") (internal citations omitted)).
Minnesota (MINN. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04 ("[A]ppellate courts may review any order affecting
the order from which the appeal is taken and on appeal from a judgment may review any order
involving the merits or affecting the judgment ....
[and] any other matter as the interest of justice
may require.")). Montana (Andersenv. Monforton, 125 P.3d 614, 620 (Mont. 2005) ("Since this
argument is raised for the first time on appeal, we do not address it."); In re T.E., 54 P.3d 38, 42
(Mont. 2002) (holding consistently no consideration of issues raised for the first time on appeal);
Spencer v. Robertson, 445 P.2d 48, 50 (Mont. 1968) (considering for review only those questions
raised in trial court); contra Day v. Payne, 929 P.2d 864, 866 (Mont. 1996) (noting limited
exception where an allege error affects substantial rights)). Nebraska (In re Estate of Rosso, 701
N.W.2d 355, 363 (Neb. 2005) (refusing review for unpreserved error unless plain error)).
Nevada (Nutraceutical Dev. Corp. v. Summers, No. 53565, 2011 WL 2623749 at *1 n.1 (Nev.
July 1, 2011); Bradley v. Romeo, 716 P.2d 227, 228 (Nev. 1986); Emmons v. State, 807 P.2d
718, 722 (Nev. 1991) (considering plain error and constitutional issues only), overruled on other
grounds, Harte v. State, 13 P.2d 718 (1991)). New Hampshire (Doyle v. Comm'r, N.H. Dep't of
Econ. Dev., 37 A.3d 343, 348 (N.H. 2012)). Texas (In re D.T.M., 932 S.W.2d 647, 652( Tex.
App. 1996) (reviewing new issue on appeal where trial court lacked jurisdiction or public interest
adversely affected)).
240 MINN. R. Civ. App. P. 103.04 ("[Appellate courts may review] any
other matter as the
interest of justice may require."); Smith v.State, 521 So.2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1988) ("[T]he doctrine
of fundamental error should be applied only in rare cases where a jurisdictional error appears or
where the interests of justice present a compelling demand for its application."); Joyner v. State,
41 So.3d 306, 307 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) ("[O]nly in the rare cases where a jurisdictional
error appears or the interest of justice present a compelling demand for its application.") (quoting
Nesbitt v. State, 889 So.2d 801, 803 (Fla. 2004))); People v. Foster, 927 N.Y.S.2d 92, 96 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2011) (stating court has discretion to address unpreserved claim in the "interests of
justice").
241 Fupioka, 514 P.2d at 570 (stating appellate court may hear new arguments
when justice
requires); Kobashigawa v. Silva, 266 P.3d 470, 473 (Haw. Ct. App. 2011) ("[A]n appellate court
should invoke plain error doctrine in civil cases only when justice so requires."); People v.
Hermiz, 611 N.W.2d 783, 785 (Mich. 2000) (reviewing issue not raised by parties in limited
circumstances where justice so requires); Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Miskinis, 344 N.W.2d 788,
799 (Mich. 1984) (stating appellate court has right to address where justice so requires).
242 Wadlington v. Mindes, 259 N.E.2d 257, 261 (Ill. 1970) ("[T]he general rule that an
appellate court should confine itself to issues raised in earlier proceedings is not a rigid or
inflexible one, and, where injustice might otherwise result, a reviewing court may consider
questions of law .

. . .");

Sekerez v. Rush Univ. Med. Ctr., 954 N.E.2d 383, 397 (Ill. App. Ct.

2011) ("The doctrine of waiver ... is a limitation on the parties and not on this court [and]
[d]espite waiver, this court may address an issue in order to carry out its responsibility to reach a
just result.").
243 Maine (Butler v. Killoran, 714 A.2d 129, 134 n.9 (Me. 1998) (noting exception as when
general rule would obviously result in plain miscarriage of justice); Teel v. Colson, 396 A.2d 529,
534 (Me. 1979) (conceding exception to general review for appellate review of newly raised
issues), disavowed on other grounds, Henry v. Brown, 495 A.2d 324 (Me. 1985). The court
stated:
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"ends of justce, "246or other 247 terminology. At least eleven

We do concede that exceptional circumstances may exist where the
application of the general rule of practice under which appellate courts will
not entertain issues or theories raised for the first time on appeal would
obviously result in a plain miscarriage of justice, and that under such
circumstances the court will consider the belated issue or theory to promote
the ends of justice.
Id. Mississippi (State Highway Comm'n v. McDonald's Corp., 509 So.2d 856, 863 (Miss.1987)
(en banc) ("[T]hough a party may in fact have waived its right to assert error, this Court has
inherent power to notice it to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice."); see Johnson v. Fargo,
604 So.2d. 306, 311 (Miss. 1992); see also Johnsonv. State, 452 So.2d 850, 853 (Miss. 1984)).
244 Colorado (Harris Group, Inc. v. Robinson, 209 P.3d 1188, 1189 (Colo. App. 2009)).
Florida (Smith, 521 So.2d at 108 (equating "interest of justice" discretion with fundamental
error); Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Omnipoint Holdings, Inc., 863 So.2d 195, 200 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2003) (concluding no "patent injustice" present); In re R.W., 481 So.2d 548, 549 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986)). Michigan (General Motors Corp. v. Dep't. of Treasury, 803 N.W.2d 698, 717
(Mich. Ct. App. 2010) (utilizing manifest injustice terminology)). North Carolina (Dogwood
Dev. & Mgmt. Co. v. White Oak Transp. Co., 657 S.E.2d 361, 364 (N.C. 2008) ("[A]ppellate
courts may review] when necessary to prevent manifest injustice to a party or to expedite decision
in the public interest.") (internal citations omitted)). Utah (State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920,
923 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("[E]xception to [general] rule . . . is catch-all device requiring
exceptional or unusual circumstances . . . . [as] a safety device to make certain that manifest
injustice does not result from the failure to consider an issue on appeal.")).
245 InTown Lessee Assocs., LLC v. Howard, 67 So.3d 711, 718 (Miss. 2011) (explaining
unless substantial rights affected, issues not presented to trial judge procedurally barred from
appeal); Mathis v. ERA Franchise Sys., Inc., 25 So.3d 298, 303 (Miss. 2009) (stating absent
extraordinary circumstances, Supreme Court will not consider issues raised first time on appeal).
246 See VA. SUP. CT.R. 5A: 18 ("No ruling of the trial court... will be considered as a basis
for reversal unless the objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling,
except for good cause shown or to enable the Court of Appeals to attain the ends of justice.");
Bazemore v. Commonwealth, 590 S.E.2d 602, 610 (Va. Ct. App. 2004) (invoking ends of justice
requires showing no miscarriage of justice and miscarriage might have occurred).
247 Gittin v. Haught-Bingham, 716 A.2d 1063, 1066 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) ("Whatever
limited discretion an appellate court may have to consider unpreserved errors... such discretion
should be exercised only in extraordinary circumstances and within the bounds of fairness to both
parties and to the court, not just as to the party seeking the exercise of that discretion."); Schmidt
v. Boardman Co., 11 A.3d 924, 942 (Pa. 2011) (confirming Pennsylvania does not recognize
plain error but "extraordinary circumstances" may justify reaching unpreserved issue); see
Patterson v. Patterson, 266 P.3d 828, 832 (Utah 2011) ("Our preservation requirement is selfimposed and is therefore one of prudence rather than jurisdiction ....we exercise wide discretion
when deciding whether to entertain or reject matters that are first raised on appeal."); State v.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 n. 3 (Utah 1993) (noting exception deemed "ill-defined" and applying
"primarily to rare procedural anomalies"); see also Elizabethton v. Carter Ctny., 321 S.W.2d 822,
827 (Tenn. 1958) (explaining discretionary powers of appellate courts). The court stated:
[W]hile it is true that the rules of this Court provide that all questions
presented to this Court shall have been raised in the trial Court and relied on
in the assignments of error, this limitation is not binding upon this Court,
acting on its own motion, when the constitutionality of statutes are involved,
or when this Court conceives that equitable considerations, apparent on the

234

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XVII

(11) states have adopted either a separate constitutional issue exception to
the raise or lose rule or have otherwise specifically identified it as a factor
favoring discretionary exception.24 8 Many states include exception for
questions of law and where the appellate record (including appellate
briefing) is adequate either as stand-alone exceptions249 or in combination

face of the record, forbid a complainant from maintaining a suit. In every
such case the Court will assert, on its own motion, its obligation to deny the
use of the Court. These principles are fundamental. Appellate Courts have
broad discretionary powers in such matters of practice.
Elizabethton, 321 S.W.2d at 827 (quoting Frazier v. Elmore, 173 S.W.2d 563, 566 (Tenn. 1943).
248 Arizona (Aldrich & Steinberger v. Martin, 837 P.2d 1180, 1182 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)).
California (People v. Partida, 122 P.3d 765, 770 (Cal. 2005) (holding exception includes where
error has legal consequence of violating due process rights)). Connecticut (State v. Golding, 567
A.2d 823, 827 (Conn.1989) (stating conditions for constitution error review). The constitutional
error exception requires that a defendant meet all of the following conditions:
(1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim
is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right;
(3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the
defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the
state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional
violation beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id.). Idaho (State v. Perry, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (Idaho 2010); State v. Carter, No. 38038, 2012 WL
386591, at *3 (Idaho Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2012)). Iowa (State v. Heacock, 521 N.W.2d 707, 710
(Iowa 1994); State v. Clark, 351 N.W.2d 532, 535 (Iowa 1984) (allowing review if failure to
preserve error results from due process right to effective representation), superseded by statute,
State v. Spoonemore, 598 N.W.2d 311 (Iowa 1999)). Montana (Day v. Payne, 929 P.2d 864,
866 (Mont. 1996) (noting limited exception error alleged affects substantial rights); In re A.S.F.,
199 P.3d 808, 809 (Mont. 2008) (considering unpreserved issues where constitutional or
substantial rights concerned)). Nevada (Grey v. State, 178 P.3d 154, 161 (Nev. 2008) ("Failure
to object below generally precludes review by this court; however, we may address plain error
and constitutional error sua sponte."); Emmons v. State, 807 P.2d 718, 722 (stating same),
overruled on other grounds, Harte v. State, 13 P.2d 718 (1991)). Ohio (Hyle v. Porter, 868
N.E.2d 1047, 1050 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (declining to address new legal argument unless
claimed denial of constitutional rights), rev 'd on other grounds, 882 N.E.2d 899 (Ohio 2008)).
Rhode Island (R.I. Depositors Econ. Protection Corp. v. Rignanese, 714 A.2d 1190, 1196-97
(R.I. 1998) ("It is well settled that this Court will not consider on appeal an issue that was not
raised before the trial court. An exception to the raise-or-waive rule is that this Court will review
allegations of violations of basic constitutional rights but even then only in very narrow
circumstances.")). Utah (Pratt v. City Council of Riverton 639 P.2d 172, 173-74 (Utah 1981)
(noting court has considered unpreserved constitutional arguments where a person's liberty is at
stake)). Washington (State v. Garner, No. 63664-2-I, 2011 WL 61849, at * 5 (Wash. Ct. App.
Jan. 10, 2011) (To raise a new issue on appeal, a defendant bears the burden of identifying a
manifest constitutional error and showing how it prejudiced his defense."), see State v. Walsh, 17
P.3d 591, 594 (Wash. 2001) (en banc) (discussing constitutional magnitude of error); State v.
MacDonald, 981 P.2d 443, 450 (Wash. 1999) (discussing error analysis in terms of "manifest
error affecting constitutional right")).
249 Arizona (S. Tucsonv. Bd. Of Sup's of Pima Cnty., 84 P.2d 581, 584 (Ariz. 1938); Tempe
v. Fleming, 815 P.2d 1, 3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991)). Idaho (Ochoa v. State, Indus. Special Idem.
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with other factors, such as constitutional or significant public interest
issues. 250 State courts have generally identified either a limited or a mix of
Fund, 794 P.2d 1127, 1134 (Idaho 1990) (recognizing discretion to consider issue raised first on
appeal involving legal question and uncontroverted facts); State v. Paz, 798 P.2d 1, 10 (Idaho
1990) (stating same), overruled on other grounds, State v. Card, 825 P.2d 1081 (Idaho 1991)).
Kansas (Fisher v. DeCarvalho, 260 P.3d 1218, 1224 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011) (applying exception
as to question of law)). Maine (Scott v. Lipman & Katz, P.A., 648 A.2d 969, 974 (Me. 1994)
(reviewing unpreserved issue because no fact finding necessary and error apparent on face of
record)). Michigan (Smith v. Foerster-Bolser Constr., Inc., 711 N.W.2d 421, 423 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2006); see Charlevoix Golf & Country Club LLC, v. Troszak, No. 300892, 2012 WL
205840, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2012)). Contra Montana (Unified Indust., Inc v. Easley,
961 P.2d 100, 103 (Mont. 1998) (rejecting California cases stating the exception for review). The
Court in Easley stated:

Adopting the California exception would effectively swallow our general
rule against addressing new issues or changes in legal theory on appeal.
Furthermore, it is our view that the California exception is not fair to trial
courts who ruled on the legal issues presented to them and who could then
find themselves held in error on an issue or theory they had no opportunity
to address.
Id.). Nevada (Nev. Power Co. v. Haggerty, 989 P.2d 870, 878 n.9 (Nev. 1999) (noting issue
from amicus brief reviewable because legal question, judicial economy interests and
uncontroverted facts)). New York (Fish King Enters. v. Countrywide Ins. Co., 930 N.Y.2d 256,
259 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (reviewing issues of questions of law on adequate record)). South
Dakota (State v. Gard, 742 N.W.2d 257, 261 (S.D. 2007) (applying exception where issue
potentially arising again, affects public interest, and fully briefed by parties); see In re J.D.M.C.,
739 N.W.2d 796, 805 (S.D. 2007)). Tennessee (Heatherly v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 43
S.W.3d 911, 916 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (explaining appellate courts may grant complete relief if
parties given fair notice and hearing opportunity)).
250 Arizona (Rubens v. Costello, 251 P.2d 306, 308 (Ariz. 1952); Reganv.
First Nat'l Bank,
101 P.2d 214, 218 (Ariz. 1940); Bd. of Supervisors of Pima Cnty., 84 P.2d at 584; State v.
Campos, 250 P.3d 201, 205 n.5 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (stating exception exists for issue of
statewide importance); Aldrich & Steinberger v. Martin, 837 P.2d 1180, 1182 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1992)). Colorado (Roberts v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 144 P.3d 546, 549 (Colo. 2006)
("Particularly with regard to matters having broad impact or directing affecting the validity of
judgments, such as constitutionality of statutes and related issues, [the court has] at times found it
appropriate to address even claims that were never presented to the trial courts."); Harris Grp.,
Inc. v. Robinson, 209 P.3d 1188, 1195 (stating same)). California (Avalos v. Perez, 127
Cal.Rptr.3d 106, 108 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) ("[Ilt is within this court's discretion to make an
exception to [the general] rule when the issue on appeal relates to a question of law only, or
where the public interest or public policy is involved."); Henderson v. Pac. Gas and Elec. Co.,
113 Cal. Rptr.3d 692, 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (stating discretion to consider new issue involving
question of law applied to undisputed facts); Cevallos v. Rowley, No. G044191, 2012 WL
137376, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2012) (noting discretion to review issue); In re A.B., No.
H036810, 2011 WL 5080639, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App Oct. 26, 2011) ("[C]onstitutional challenges
not presenting pure questions of law are subject to the traditional objection and forfeiture
principles ..... "); Pannar v. Bd. of Equalization, 126 Cal. Rptr.3d 405, 415 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)

(stating same)). Maine (In re Christopher H., 12 A.3d 64, 68-69 (Me. 2011); (applying
discretionary exception to legally significant unpreserved issue affecting fundamental liberty
interest)). New Jersey (Jacobsonv. United States, 29 A.3d 1103, 1107 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2011); see also State v. Daquino, 152 A.2d 377, 379 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959)
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or factors governing

the

("[P]resentation [of new issues on appeal] is repugnant to the spirit of our practice which
contemplates that, except in extraordinary situations, as where public policy or jurisdiction are
involved, a party shall make his points in the court of first instance before urging them as grounds
on appeal.")). New Mexico (Morfin v. Villalobos, No. 30,782, 2011 WL 2040809, at *2 (N.M.
Ct. App. 2011) (stating same); State v. Pacheo, 517 P.2d 1304, 1305 (N.M Ct. App. 1973) (noting
preservation exception for questions of "general public nature affecting the interest of the
state.")). New York (Matarrese v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 668 N.Y.S.2d 686, 687
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (stating general rule exception applies only to legal issues appearing on
face of record); contra Will of Alpert, 651 N.Y.S.2d 451, 452 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (stating
issue first raised on appeal considered only to extent no question of fact raised)). North
Carolina (J.T. Russell & Sons, Inc. v. Silver Birch Pond L.L.C., 721 S.E.2d 699, 704 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2011) (noting exceptional circumstances warranting review of unpreserved issue for
preventing manifest injustice or public interest)). Oklahoma (In re Estate of Hodges, 247 P.3d
755, 758 n.5 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010) (recognizing limited preservation rule exception for
"questions of public policy or widespread public interest")). Oregon (State ex rel Columbia
Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 13 v. Columbia Cnty., 674 P.2d 608, 616 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (considering
unpreserved because of questions of public importance)). Rhode Island (State v. Smith, 766
A.2d 913, 919 (R.I. 2001) (listing circumstances requiring appellate review of novel issues not
raised at trial); Shoucair v. Brown Uni., 917 A.2d 418, 428 (R.I. 2007) (declining review because
protected activity mixed legal/fact question and no application of novel legal rule)). South
Dakota (Gard, 742 N.W.2d at 261 (stating general rule exception for issues potentially arising
again, affect public interest and fully briefed); In re J.D.M.C., 739 N.W.2d at 805 (stating same
exception)). Texas (In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 293 (Tex. 2002) (listing two guiding principles
for determination of fundamental-error review). The Court listed the two guiding principles for
determining whether fundamental-error review should apply to a matter of public interest: that
"(1) the error complained of must implicate a significant public interest or policy of the state,
articulated by our statutes, constitution, or case law; and (2) the nature of the error must be such
that it impacts a truly general public interest, and not solely that of private litigants." Id.
251 Alaska (Erkins v. Alaska Trustee, LLC., 265 P.3d 292, 298 n.5 (Alaska 2011); Sea
Lion
Corp. v. Air Logistics of Alaska, Inc., 787 P.2d 109, 115 (Alaska 1990); State v. Nw. Const., Inc.,
741 P.2d 235, 239 (Alaska 1987)). In Erkins, the court notes that an appellate court may reach
unpreserved or new issues "if the issue is 1) not dependent on any new or controverted facts; 2)
closely related to the appellant's trial court arguments; and 3) could have been gleaned from the
pleadings, or if failure to address the issue would propagate plain error." Id. (internal quotations
omitted)). Arizona (Aldrich, 837 P.2d at 1182 (limiting exception to constitutional issue; issue of
statewide importance; or issue that will dispose case)). Arkansas (The Arkansas exception
include issues as to jurisdiction; a trial court in death penalty case's failure to bring to the jury's
attention a matter essential to its consideration of the death penalty itself; where a trial court errs
at a time when defense counsel has no knowledge of the error and thus no opportunity to object;
there is a "serious error" requiring the trial court to admonish the jury or order a dismissal; and
the exclusion or admission of evidence affects a defendant's substantial rights or the error is
evidentiary permitting appellate court to review for an alleged error affecting substantial rights.
ARK. R. EVID. 103(d) ("Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of errors affecting substantial
rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court."); Clarendon Am. Ins. Co. v.
Hickok, 257 S.W.3d 43, 45 (Ark. 2007) (explaining subject matter jurisdiction can be addressed
sua sponte); Thomas v. State, 257 S.W.3d 92, 96 (Ark. 2007); Springs v. State, 244 S.W.3d 683,
686 (Ark. 2006) (confirming exception "is a mere possibility, for it has not yet occurred in any
case") (quoting Wicks v. State, 606 S.W.2d 366, 369 (Ark. 1980))); Vanderpool v. Fid. & Cas.
Ins. Co., 939 S.W.2d 280, 286 (Ark. 1997); Donat, supra note 50, at 843; Gitelman, supra note
223, at 228-29; see Buckley v. State, 76 S.W.3d 825, 836 (Ark. 2002) (noting 103(d) imposes no
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New Mexico has expressly adopted the Krynicki factors and
approach, with other states setting out similar or other factors informing the
discretionary exception.252 The factors generally identified by state courts,
in addition to "public interest," run the gambit, including whether the issue
is closely related to preserved arguments or issues;
whether the issue is
outcome determinative;2 54 whether the issue affects the validity of the

affirmative duty and applies at most to admitting or excluding evidence); Alexander v. State, 983
S.W.2d 110, 112 (Ark. 1998) (stating same); Hunt v. State, No. CA CR 02-1204, 2003 WL
21350739, at *2-3 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003)). Maryland (McMillan v. State, 956 A.2d 716, 752
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) ("An appellate court's discretion to notice plain error is properly
invoked only when the circumstances are 'compelling, extraordinary, exceptional or fundamental
to assure the defendant a fair trial."')
(quoting State v.Hutchinson, 411 A.2d 1035, 1038 (Md.
1980))). Informing factors include "the opportunity to use an unpreserved contention as vehicle
for illuminating an area of law; the egregiousness of the trial court's error; the impact of the error
on the defendant; and the degree of lawyer dereliction. McMillan, 956 A.2d at 752.). Minnesota
(Kunza v. St. Mary's Reg'l Health Ctr., 747 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008 ("Factors
favoring review include: the issue is a novel legal issue of first impression; the issue was raised
prominently in briefing; the issue was implicit in or closely akin to the arguments below; and the
issue is not dependent on any new or controverted facts.") (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Watson v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n 566 N.W.2d 683, 687-88 (Minn. 1997)))). New Mexico
(State v. Alingog, 866 P.2d 378, 383 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd, 877 P.2d 562 (N.M. 1994)).
Oregon (State v. S.J.F., 269 P.3d 83, 86 (2011 Or. Ct. App. 2011) (listing Supreme Court factors
for exercising discretion to unpreserved error) (quoting Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 823 P.2d
956, 959 (Or. 1991) (enbanc))). The court in S.J.F stated that the factors to consider include:
the competing interests of the parties; the nature of the case; the gravity of
the error; the ends of justice in the particular case; how the error came to the
court's attention; and whether the policies behind the general rule requiring
preservation of error have been served in the case in another way, i.e.,
whether the trial court was, in some manner, presented with both sides of the
issue and given an opportunity to correct any error.
Id. Rhode Island (Shoucair, 917 A.2d at 428 (quoting Smith, 766 A.2d at 919). Rhode Island
requires party seeking exception to demonstrate the following factors: (1) the error complained of
must consist of more than harmless error; (2) the record must be sufficient to permit a
determination of the issue; and (3) counsel's failure to raise the issue at trial must be due to the
fact that the issue is based upon a novel rule of law which counsel could not reasonably have
known at the time of trial. Id.). Tennessee (TENN. R. App. P. 36(b); 13(b); Waters v. Farr, 291
S.W.3d 873, 919 & n.22 (Tenn. 2009) ("TENN. R. App. P. 13(b) [signals that appellate courts
should limit their discretion to issues] (1) to prevent needless litigation, (2) to prevent injury to
the interests of the public, and (3) to prevent prejudice to the judicial process.")). Utah (Provo
City v. Ivie, 191 P.3d 841, 843 (Utah Ct. App. 2008) (listing situations allowing application of
exceptional circumstances doctrine). The exceptional circumstances doctrine should be applied
sparingly, with rare procedural irregularities and truly exceptional situations, and in situations
where a change in law or settled legal interpretation affects the failure to raise the issue at trial.
Id.).
252 Alingog, 866 P.2d at 383 (determining Kyrnicki's fundamental error doctrine applicable).
253 Watson, 566 N.W.2d at 687-88; Perl v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 345 N.W.2d 209,
215 n.6 (Minn. 1984); McNulty Constr. Co. v.Deephaven No. A09-1625, 2010 WL 2899142, at
*3 (Minn. Ct. App 2010).
254 See Watson, 566 N.W.2d at 687-88 (allowing appellate review where issue plainly
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judgment; whether the issue is novel;255 whether guidance to trial courts2 5 6
or the public is needed; whether the issue is jurisdictional; 257 whether the

issue needs addressing to correct incorrect applications of the law;258
whether the issue concerns a statute 2 59 or compliance with the procedural
requirements of the statute; 26 0 whether the issue concerns compliance with

decisive of entire controversy); Hart v. Bell, 23 N.W.2d 375, 378-79 (Minn. 1946) (stating same);
Twp. of Piscataway v. S. Wash. Ave., LLC, 947 A.2d 663, 667-68 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2008)
("It is quite appropriate for an appellate court to raise a new issue of law 'where upon the total
scene it is manifest that justice requires consideration of an issue central to a correct resolution of
the controversy and the lateness of the hour is not itself a source of countervailing prejudice
....

') (quoting In re Appeal of Howard D. Johnson Co., 177 A.2d 756, 758 (N.J. 1962))); see

also Klooster v. Charlevoix, 795 N.W.2d 578, 583-84 (Mich. 2011) (considering statutory
interpretation de novo because outcome determinative).
255 Burch v. State, 696 A.2d 443, 461 (Md. 1997) (considering issue
because novel and
important); Frazier v Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp, 788 N.W.2d 770, (Minn. Ct. App. 2010)
(explaining review appropriate to correct misapplied law) (citing Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,
453 U.S. 247, 256 (1981))), rev'd by Frazier, No. A09 2212, A09 2213, A09 2214, A09 2215,
2012 WL 1020175 (Minn. Mar. 28, 2012).
256 See Burch, 696 A.2d at 461 (considering sentencing issue despite unpreserved objection
to provide guidance for trial courts); contra Angulo-Gil v. State, 16 A.3d 283, 297 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2011) (noting no exercise of plain error review where area of law has been fully explicated).
See Tierco Md., Inc. v. Williams, 849 A.2d 504, 532 (Md. 2004) (noting guidance to trial court or
avoidance of expense of delay reasons for appellate review); Governor v. Wash. Post,759 A.2d
249, 256 n.5 (Md. 2000) (considering whether statute applicable to Governor's office properly
reviewable to guide trial courts); see, e.g., Gindes v. Khan, 695 A.2d 163, 167 (Md. 1997);
Burden v. Burden, 945 A.2d 656, 661 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008); Morris v. State, 837 A.2d 248,
263-64 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003).
257 See Jacobson v. United States, 29 A.3d 1103, 1107 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2011)
(stating exception for review of jurisdictional and public interest issues); State v. Gentry, 610
S.E.2d 494, 499 (S.C. 2005) (explaining defendant may raise issue of trial court's jurisdiction for
first time on appeal); Waters v. Farr, 291 S.W.3d 873, 919 (Tenn. 2009) (listing interest of public
reason to review issue raised for first time on appeal); Weaver v. Deverell, No. W2011-00563COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 5069418, at *4 n.8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2011) (noting consideration
for jurisdiction); Bruce v. Maurais, 684 P.2d 1243, 1245 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (explaining where
issue one of trial court's jurisdiction, appellate court must consider newly raised issue).
258 See D.G.L. Trading Corp. v. Reis, 732 N.W.2d 393, 395 (N.D. 2007)
(discussing proper
application of law). The North Dakota Supreme Court would consider and apply the correct
statutes in diamond supplier's action against re-seller regarding shipment of diamond and cash
back from re-seller to supplier which disappeared in transit, even if the statutes were not
presented to the district court in the first instance, because the Supreme Court would not affirm
erroneous or incomplete applications of law in favor of judicial expediency. Id.
259 State v. Burke, 438 A.2d 93, 94 (Conn. 1980) (explaining under
state rule failure to
follow mandatory provisions of statute plain error reviewable court); Campbell v. Rockefeller, 59
A.2d 524, 526 (Conn. 1948) (identifying exception for appellate review of unpreserved issue
when "pertinent statute" overlooked); Bradley v. Romeo, 716 P.2d 227, 228 (Nev. 1986) (stating
sua sponte consideration of issues where statute clearly controlling not applied by trial court);
see also In re Adoption of E.N.R., 42 S.W.3d 26, 32-33 (Tenn. 2001) (refusing to review
unpreserved questions including constitutionality of statute unless statute obviously
unconstitutional).
260 In re Charles K., 943 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (stating review appropriate where
alleged failure to comply with statutory procedural requirements).
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appellate rules; 261 whether addressing the issue is necessary to "maintain a
uniform body of precedent" 262 or to "foster an orderly development of the
law ,, ;263 whether the issue's importance goes beyond the parties; 22 64 whether

the issue establishes that the lower court was right, but for the wrong
reason; 261 whether the issue escapes appellate review because of its
fleeting or indeterminate nature; 266 whether the issue is necessary to a
proper determination of the case or26plainly decisive; 267 whether the
opposing party will suffer no prejudice; whether the issue arose due to a
2611

261 In re Peirano, 930 A.2d 1165, 1172 (N.H. 2007) (considering unpreserved issue on
appeal
if matter of compliance with rules regarding appeals).
262 See Daniels v. Indust. Comm'n, 775 N.E.2d 936, 943 (Ill. 2002) ("It has
long been
recognized that the waiver rule may be relaxed in order to maintain a uniform body of precedent
or may be relaxed where the interests of justice so require."); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v.
Pappas, 950 N.E.2d 1136, 1145-46 (Ill. 2011) (noting forfeit overlooked in order to provide
uniform body of case law); People v. Givens, 934 N.E.2d 470, 479 (Ill. 2010) ( "[W]e conclude
that the appellate court stepped over the line from neutral jurist to that of an advocate for
defendant to raise and rule on issues that were neither controlled by clear precedent nor dictated
by an interest in a just result.").
261 Messiha v. State, 583 N.W.2d 385, 390 n.2 (N.D. 1998) (reviewing claims "to foster an
orderly development of the law"); see Berg v. Ullman ex rel. Ullman, 576 N.W.2d 218, 223 n.3
(N.D. 1998) ("We should apply the right rule of law even if it was not properly presented to the
trial court or to this court."); see also State v. Holecek, 545 N.W.2d 800, 803 (N.D. 1996)
("[W]here a pertinent statute has been overlooked by both counsel and the court, resulting in plain
error in a matter that is of public concern, this court will consider the error even though it is not
brought to our attention by either of the parties.") (quoting Le Pire v. Workmen's Comp. Bureau,
111 N.W.2d 355, 359 (N.D. 1961))); Freed v. Geisinger Med. Ctr., 5 A.3d 212, 215 (Pa. 2010)
("[lit is this Court's function and responsibility to consider the broader picture, including the
impact of precedent beyond the facts of an individual case, and the interplay between established
precedent in varying areas of the law.").
264 See Evans v. State, 349 A.2d 300, 309 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975) (stating exercise of
discretion prudent in view of importance of issue beyond confines of appeal).
265 See Nelsonv. QHG of South Carolina Inc., 580 S.E.2d 171, 185-86 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003)

(allowing review of issue where it established lower court right for wrong reason), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 608 S.E.2d 855 (S.C. 2005); Field v. Bowen, 131 Cal. Rptr.3d 721, 728 n.3 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2011) ("[W]e are obliged to consider points of law not raised by the parties if they
would support the trial court's decision.").
266 In re Guardianship of Willa L., 808 N.W.2d 155, 161-62 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011) (holding
issues forfeited because despite somewhat relating to issue raise below); see also State v. Rogers,
539 N.W.2d 897, 901 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (stating forfeiture rule "is based on a policy of
judicial efficiency").
267 Watson v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 566 N.W.2d 683, 687 (Minn. 1997) (recognizing
review of issue raised first time on appeal where plainly decisive of entire controversy); see also
Hart v. Bell, 23 N.W.2d 375, 378-79 (Minn. 1946) (holding court has duty to consider issue of
contract's illegality if decisive of entire controversy).
268 See Smith v. Tonge, 377 A.2d 109, 111 (Me. 1977) ("We have no right... to disturb this
judgment unless after examination of the record in its entirety... appellant has been substantially
prejudiced."); Woodhall v. State, 738 N.W.2d 357, 363 n.6 (Minn. 2007) (stating issue properly
reviewable because consideration does not prejudice party); Watson, 566 N.W. at 687 (noting
necessary no possible advantage or disadvantage to either party before review of new issue).
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intervening change in the law; 26 9 whether the issue involves a public policy
challenge to contract; 270 whether the issue is needed to prevent needless
litigation, 27 1 injury to the interests to the public, and/or prejudice to the
273
judicial process; 272 whether the issue raises a "rare procedural anomaly",;
and whether the interests of minors are involved.2 74
Some states have seemingly merged plain error with exceptional
circumstances.2 75 Oregon, for instance, allows for appellate review of new
issues or unpreserved errors under an appellate rule allowing for such
276

review "where an error of law [is] apparent on the face of the record. ,

This provision allows for consideration of "rare errors of law" which are
"obvious" and "not reasonably in dispute., 277 In deciding whether to

269 Holland v. Big River Minerals Corp., 181 F.3d 597, 605-06 (4th Cir. 1999) (concluding
no "strong precedent" where precise issue case "remained an open question" in precedent)
(quoting Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 143 (1967))); Cleveland v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 690 A.2d 1146, 1151 (Pa. 1997) (explaining fundamental intervening change in law
merited exception from general rule), disagreedwith, Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S.
135 (2003); Brundridge v. Fluor Fed. Servs., Inc., 191 P.3d 879, 886 (Wash. 2009) (enbanc).
270 See Baughv. Novak, 340 S.W.3d 372, 381 (Tenn. 2011) (A challenge to the validity
of a
contract based on public policy grounds is one such exception [to raise or waive rule]."); see
Reaves Lumber Co. v. Cain-Hurley Lumber Co., 279 S.W. 257, 258 (Tenn. 1926) ("[T]he courts
will deny any relief upon any illegal contract ... whenever the illegality is made to appear.")
(quoting Cary-Lombard Lumber Co. v. Thomas, 22 S.W. 743, 745 (Tenn. 1893))); see also Berge
v. Berge, 8 N.E.2d 623, 624 (Ill. 1937); Curry v. Dahlberg, 110 S.W.2d 742, 749 (Mo. 1937).
271 Waters v. Farr, 291 S.W.3d 873, 919 (Tenn. 2009); Weaver v. Deverell, No.
W201100563-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 5069418, at *3-4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2011).
272 See Waters, 291 S.W.3d at 881 n. 10 (stating review proper to prevent prejudice to judicial

process).
273 Hill v. Estate of Allred, 216 P.3d 929, 936 (Utah 2009) ("Exceptional circumstances ... is
used infrequently and usually requires 'rare procedural anomalies."') (quoting State v. Dunn, 850
P.2d 1201, 1209 n.3 (Utah 1993))).
274 See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Roe, 639 S.E.2d 165, 172 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006) ("An
exception to the rule that an unpreserved issue will not be considered on appeal exists where the
interests of minors or incompetents are involved."); In re J.E.G., 476 A.2d 130, 133 (Vt. 1984)
(addressing unpreserved issue due to "protected nature of juvenile hearings").
27' Hawaii (Alvarez Family Trust v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Kaanapali Ali, 221 P.3d
452, 468 (Haw. 2009) (citing Montalvo v. Lapez, 884 P.2d 345, 353 (Haw. 1994)))). Maryland
(McMillanv. State, 956 A.2d 716, 752 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008); Danna v. State, 605 A.2d 150,
154 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992)). Oregon (Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 823 P.2d 956, 959
n.6 (Or. 1991) (en banc)). Texas (In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 293 (Tex. 2002)).
276 OR. R. App. P. 5.45(1).
277 Ailes, 823 P.2d at 959 n.6. According to the Court inAiles:
Even if the error meets that test, however, the appellate court must exercise
its discretion to consider or not to consider the error, and if the court
chooses to consider the error, the court must articulate its reasons for
doing so. This is not a requirement of mere form. A court's decision to
recognize unpreserved or unraised error in this manner should be made with
utmost caution. Such an action is contrary to the strong policies requiring
preservation and raising of error. It also undercuts the established manner in
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exercise its discretion to consider an unpreserved error of law apparent on
the face of the record, an appellate court may consider, among other
factors, the following: the competing interests of the parties; the nature of
the case; the gravity of the error; the ends of justice in the particular case;
how the error came to the court's attention; and whether the policies behind
the general rule requiring preservation of error have been served in the case
in another way, such as whether the trial court was, in some manner,
presented with both sides of the issue and given an opportunity to correct
any error. 278
Both Hawaii and Texas similarly follow a merged standard. Under
Hawaii's formulation, three factors inform the "discretionary power" to
notice plain error in civil cases: "(1) whether consideration of the issue not
raised at trial requires additional facts; (2) whether its resolution will affect
the integrity of the trial court's findings of fact; and (3) whether the issue is
of great public import." 279 Texas, in turn, follows fundamental error, which
includes "public-interest-based fundamental error., 280
This has been
defined to be "rare" and "implicated only when [the] most significant state
public interests are at stake. ' '28i
Wisconsin has adopted a dual standard of discretionary exception
depending if the unpreserved or new issue is presented to the intermediary
or supreme court of the state. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has the sole
discretionary power to review waived or forfeited issues for purposes of
"integrity of fact finding process consonant with its law developing
function., 2 2 By statute, the intermediary appellate courts of Wisconsin, in

which an appellate court ordinarily considers an issue, i.e., through
competing arguments of adversary parties with an opportunity to submit
both written and oral arguments to the court. Moreover, by expressly
following the prescribed method of recognizing unpreserved or unraised
error, much greater efficiency in the review process between appellate courts
is facilitated by giving this court the benefit of the recognizing court's
reasoning.
Id. at 959 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Cler v. Providence Health Sys.-Or., 245 P.3d
642, 654 (Or. 2010) (en banc) (noting plain error application to civil cases); State v. Godines, 236
P.3d 824, 827 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
278 See In re S.J.F., 269 P.3d 83, 86 (Or. Ct. App. 2011) (finding plain error review
in civil

commitment hearing proper given serious consequences).

279 Alvarez Family Trust v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Kaanapali Ali, 221 P.3d
452, 468
(Haw. 2009) (citing Montalvo v. Lapez, 884 P.2d 345, 353 (Haw. 1994)).
280 In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 292.
281 Id. at 293.
282 Vollmer v. Luety, 456 N.W.2d 797, 800 n.2, 803 (Wis. 1990). According to the Court in

VollmerWhen we review waived error, as in Schumacher, we are not institutionally
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turn, can address matters involving forfeited issue if "it appears from the
record that the real controversy has not been fully tried, or that it is
probable that justice has for any reason miscarried." 283
This dual
discretionary review is deemed to fulfill the intermediate appellate court's
function of error correcting284 and the state supreme court's law declaring
function.285

concerned with achieving justice in the particular case. The court of appeals
performs that function admirably and there is no reason to believe that this
court can do better in that respect. When we review error we do so not
merely to correct error or to examine alleged error; instead we do so because
the alleged error in issue has some substantial significance in our
institutional law-making responsibility as set forth in the statute and
constitution and as reflected in our rules for accepting cases on petition for
review. Institutionally, we are more concerned with developing and
clarifying the law. This court has relied on the "integrity of the fact-finding"
test on numerous occasions in order to review an un-objected-to error and
reach the conclusion that there was no error. Under this common-law power
we may in our discretion review an error that was technically waived and
affirm.
Id. at 803; see also State v. Baldwin, 304 N.W.2d 742, 746 (Wis. 1981) (finding appellate claim
implicated "integrity of the fact-finding process' as jury instructions implicated constitutional
concerns").
283 WIS. STAT. § 752.35 (2001); Marsh, supra note 5, at 777 (explaining statutory
exception
to waiver rule).
284 See Burns v. Detroit, 660 N.W.2d 85, 90 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (highlighting function
of
Michigan Court of Appeals to act as error correcting court); Mich. Up & Out of Poverty v.
Michigan, 533 N.W.2d 339, 343 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) ("We are also mindful that this Court
functions as a court of review that is principally charged with the duty of correcting errors."); St.
Aubin v. Burke, 434 N.W.2d 282, 284 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (recognizing role of appeals court
as primarily decisional and error correcting and no precedents). See Irving v. U.S., 162 F.3d 154,
161 (1st. Cir. 1998) ("The authority to overrule the decision of a prior panel in the same case
flows logically from the error-correcting function of the full court."); Beal v. Lowell & D. St. Ry.
Co., 32 N.E. 653, 654 (Mass. 1892) ("General criticisms of a charge are always discountenanced
by an appellate court. Its functions are limited to correcting errors of law."); see, e.g., Clay v.
Equifax, Inc., 762 F.2d 952, 957 (11th Cir. 1985) (stressing importance of appellate function to
perform error correcting function); Kentucky Farmers Bank v. Nutter, No. 85-CA-2279-MR,
1987 WL 194726, at *6 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987) (explaining intermediary court specifically designed
and functions as error correcting court); State v. Castillo, 57 So.3d 1012, 1017 (La. 2011) (noting
error correcting function of appellate court); Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn.
1988) (identifying error correcting appellate function); In re Civil Commitment of Travis, 767
N.W.2d 52, 67 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (noting error correcting function precludes review of
unpreserved error).
285 See Marsh, supra note 5, at 777.
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IV. PRINCIPLED APPLICATION OF INFORMED DISCRETION
A. JudicialDiscretion and ErrorCorrection
Judicial discretion has long been difficult to define and this
remains so in the appellate preservation context. At its core, judicial
discretion means choice.286 Beyond this fundamental premise, "discretion"
drifts along a scale depending on the issue, with the definition of an "abuse
of discretion" ranging anywhere from an "arbitrary determination,
288
capricious disposition, or whimsical thinking,

28 7

to simply legal error.

The commentary and case law primarily address discretion at the
trial and not appellate level. As to trial level discretion, there is no one
standard for all issues. 289 For instance, those trial court decisions where
direct observation and contact in the litigation are at issue, a high degree of
deference is afforded (e.g., scheduling, jury note taking, special verdicts,
admission of evidence, discovery) 290 while other issues (e.g., motions for

286 See Davis v. Bos. Elevated Ry. Co., 126 N.E. 841, 843-45 (Mass. 1920) (discussing
meaning of judicial discretion); Lonergan-Gillen v. Gillen, 785 N.E.2d 1285, 1288 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2003) ("The proper exercise of judicial discretion involves making a circumstantially fair and
reasonable choice within a range of permitted options."); see also Patrick Brennan, Standards of
Appellate Review, 33 DEF. L. J. 377, 412-14 (1984) ("[T]he meaning of discretion can be
narrowed to a single word: Choice.").
287 Davis, 126 N.E. at 843 -44. The Court in Davis continued:

An exhibition of ungoverned will, or a manifestation of unbridled power is
not the use of discretion. The word imports the exercise of discriminating
judgment within the bounds of reason. Discretion in this connection means a
sound judicial discretion, enlightened by intelligence and learning,
controlled by sound principles of law, of firm courage combined with the
calmness of a cool mind, free from partiality, not swayed by sympathy nor
warped by prejudice nor moved by any kind of influence save alone the
overwhelming passion to do that which is just. It may be assumed that
conduct manifesting abuse of judicial discretion will be reviewed and some
relief afforded.
Id. at 844.
288 See Long v. Wickett, 737 N.E.2d 885, 894 n.8 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (discussing differing
definitions for "abuse of discretion"); see also Cooler & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384,
385 (1990) (arguing abuse of discretion if ruling based on erroneous law view or assessment of
evidence); U.S. v. One Urban Lot, 885 F.2d 994, 997 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating an abuse of
discretion does not need to be glaring to justify reversal) (citing Keegel v. Key W. & Caribbean
Trading Co., 627 F.2d 372, 373-74 (D.C. Cir. 1980))).
289 See Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion about Discretion, 31 EMORY L. J. 747, 783-84 (1982).
290 See Osorio v. One World Techs., Inc., 659 F.3d 81, 91 n.6 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting special
deference given trial judges for on the spot judgment calls regarding evidentiary rulings);
Commonwealthv. Gilchrest, 303 N.E.2d 331, 333 (Mass. 1973) (stating trial judge's discretion as
to continuances not disturbed on appeal unless arbitrary).
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preliminary injunction or to dismiss for forum non covenienes) 29' are
subject to less leeway.
The abuse of discretion standard represents a compromise between
providing authority and flexibility while at the same time seeking to
minimize arbitrary decisions. The question upon review becomes not so
much the ultimate outcome of the decision, but whether the court resorted
and relied upon the proper considerations, whether generic or specific.
Discretion is deemed "abused" when there has been no evidence of
independent judgment; no record of the reasoning behind such discretion;
no acknowledgment of the discretionary power; incorrect identification of
the informing
criteria; and the wrong application of the governing criteria
292
to the facts.

The fundamental advantage of the discretionary approach is that it
allows for escape from generalizations toward the more direct tailoring of a
ruling to the specific facts of the case. As to trial level discretion, it serves
judicial economy, comity, and finality.293 It becomes further justified due
to the understanding that it is not unlimited and subject to judicial review.
As to appellate discretionary decision making, both appellate rules
and practice afford broad discretion to an appellate court regarding various
matters, such as argument, briefing, and appellate record. This broad based
discretion, in turn, has spilled over to an appellate court's determination of
whether the appellate record and argument has been sufficiently presented
to the appeals court for it to make an informed decision. After all, if the
appellate record and argument is not sufficient, then the ability of the
appellate court to perform its function is obstructed. Like those first hand
and direct contact matters in which trial courts are afforded broad
discretion, sufficiency of briefing or the adequacy of the record issues are
the same for the appellate court justifying a broad discretionary power.
Exception to forfeiture, however, is manifestly different. The
decision whether to reach the merits of a forfeited issue transcends these
types of discretionary matters. It is a substantive determination of
substantial ramifications. It dictates the specific issues to be addressed
which, in turn, can make the difference between reversal, remand or
affirmance, as well as the substance of the appellate court's law declaring
291

See Doe v. Superintendent of Schs. of Weston- 959 N.E.2d 403, 407 (Mass. 2011)

(finding abuse of discretion as to ruling on preliminary injunction).
292 See Long, 737 N.E.2d at 894 n.8 ("[Abuse of discretion] signifies only that the decision
making process was not completely conducted within the established framework of relevant
standards and did not take into account all of the proper factors . . . necessary to inform the
discretionary exercise."); see Doe, 959 N.E.2d at 407 (stating abuse of discretion measured by
legal standards and stating reasonable support for factual evaluation).
293 See Brennan, supra note 286, at 412.
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function. An appellate court must be sensitive to its limitations and
function.
No matter how attractive judicial discretion may be, it has its
drawbacks. There is certainly a loss of predictability and the ability of
citizens and litigants to know what the law proscribes. It can be antithetical
to the rule of law and accountability particularly in the absence of a higher
review of the discretion. Even when an appellate court adopts and applies
a discretionary approach informed by various factors or circumstances, it is
not so much announcing a rule of law, but engaging in a form of fact
finding. While there may be identified factors and considerations, there is
lacking any meaningful guidance or discussion as to the weight being given
to one consideration versus another. It remains very difficult to predict
with any certainty when an issue will be deemed waived or not under the
discretionary conferring approach as presently practiced by many appellate
courts. Moreover, it is the presence of available review that patrols the
edges and provides litigant and public legitimacy and acceptance of the
discretionary decision.
Unlike a trial court's discretionary powers,
however, appellate discretion is not subject to meaningful review, as any
such review is rarely afforded or is otherwise non-existent.
A necessary limiting principle to this appellate discretion is the
fundamental error correcting function of appellate courts. 294 The very

justification for permitting review of new issues or unpreserved claims of
error is so that procedural failing does not deprive the appellate court of the
ability to remedy a clearly unjust and unacceptable result. 295 The "review
for correctness serves to reinforce the dignity, authority and acceptability of
the trial. 296 The error correcting or dispute resolution function of appellate
courts likewise not only seeks to ensure that the lower proceeding or result
was not the result of power exercised arbitrarily, but also serves the value
of finality and economy and enhances both the appearance and reality of
fairness and accountability. It serves to inform the appellate discretion by
centering upon the specific litigants and the resolution of the dispute before
the court. It also is more consistent with the important value of equal
treatment serving to enhance public legitimacy and acceptance. While the

294

See supra note 284 (discussing and identifying error correcting function of appellate

courts);

see also JUDITH A. MCKENNA , FED. JUDICIAL CTR., STRUCTURAL AND OTHER
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL: REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS AND THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES

7-10 (1994) (discussing both the error correcting

and law declaring function).
295

296

See Honnel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941).
See Patrick David Hansen, Stacking Appellate Dissents: Due Process in the Appellate

Arena, 18 VAL. U. L. REV. 141, 143-45 (1983) (recognizing error correction is "vital part of
appellate process"); PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 7-12 (West 1976).
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law declaring or clarifying appellate function is more visible and the
appellate function to which judges may tend to gravitate, 297 it is removed
from the justiciable premise of the adversary system only further blurring
any meaningful and uniform confines of discretionary review of new or
unpreserved issues on appeal.
At the very least, appellate courts must hold themselves to the
obligation imposed on trial courts: express statement of the discretionary
standard and clear articulation and application of the established criteria to
the facts of the case. This is particularly necessary if it follows and is
relying upon the discretion outside of plain error, including such criteria as
significant public interest. Such articulation results in more open and
principled decision-making, particularly as to its fundamental error

correcting function.
B. ArticulationofDiscretionaryChoice
Failure to apply the raise or lose rule based on a poorly developed
"discretionary" exception can reasonably be perceived by the litigants and
the public as a vehicle to serve 2the
personal and irrelevant predilections of a
98
majority of the appellate court.
This is exacerbated when little to no discussion is provided as to
why the exception applied (or did not apply). 99 Many decisions provide
no or little analysis either as to why an issue not raised below is being
considered, or why the discretion to do so is not being exercised. 00 Many

297
298

See Chad M. Oldfather, ErrorCorrection, 85 IND. L. J. 49, 49-50 (2010)
See Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 322 A.2d 114, 116 (Pa. 1974) ("[T]he theory

[for an argued exception to the raise or waive rule] has never developed into a principled test, but
has remained essentially a vehicle for reversal when the predilections of a majority of an appellate
court are offended.").
299 See Carrington_ supra note 296, at 10-11 ("[T]he obligation to give reasons
is vital ....
[w]hen reasons are announced and can be weighed, the public can have assurance that the
correcting process is working ....[a]n unreasoned decision has very little claim to acceptance by
the defeated party, and is difficult or impossible to accept as an act reflecting systematic
application of legal principles.").
'ooSee, e.g., Walker v. Holder, 589 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2009) (asserting discretion to relax
the raise or waive rule and thus decide on the merits); Keating v. Chater, 187 F.3d 622, 1998 WL
1085760, at *1 (1st Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (recognizing appellant who fails to
raise issue below ordinarily cannot raise issue on appeal); Springfield v. Dep't of Telecomm. &
Cable, 931 N.E.2d 942, 950 (Mass. 2010) (acknowledging exceptional cases where appellate
court may consider issues not raised below); Dart v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 691 N.E.2d
526, 536 n.29 (Mass. 1998) (noting exercising discretion to consider unpreserved new issue on
appeal); Attorney General v. Brown, 511 N.E.2d 1103, 1105 n.5 (Mass. 1987) (stating exercise of
discretion as issue could be dispositive and "one of significant public importance"), superseded
by statute as stated, DiLiddo v. Oxford St. Realty, Inc., 876 N.E.2d 412 (Mass. 2007); Adoption
of Ynez, No. 09-P-559, 2009 WL 3644107, at *2 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 5, 2009) ("Although
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decisions remain mostly cursory, simply stating that the court has opted to
address the issue, or conversely, that the issue was forfeited and that
"exceptional circumstances" did not exist. Where the discretion has been
exercised, some courts summarily
state that it has the right to do so "when
,,301,,302
necessary," 01 that it is taking "the opportunity to do so in this case,
and
that it is doing so "in the interests of justice." Courts have, in fact,
relegated one line "analysis" in a footnote,30 3 yet, in other cases,
admonished litigants that argument contained in a footnote does not rise to
the level of acceptable appellate argument.30 4 Other decisions have
provided slightly more insight by stating that addressing the issue or
contention was proper, as it was one of law and/or one on which it could
take judicial notice,30 5 or otherwise listing the purported factors informing
the discretion.30 6 Such cases include those in which a regulation or statute
not raised was found controlling.30 7 Other cases summarily note that

[appellant's] waiver constitutes a valid ground for dismissal of the appeal, we choose to assess the
merits .... "); Blessing v. Blessing, No. 08-P-1102, 2009 WL 435630, at *4 (Mass. App. Ct. Feb.
24, 2009) (stating summarily no "exceptional circumstances justifying departure from general
rule apply); Commonwealthv. Torres, 886 N.E.2d 732, 744 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008) (noting waiver
but "given the circumstances, we prefer to address the issue on the merits"); Mately v. Minkoff,
859 N.E.2d 887, 890 n.8 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (noting appellate court has power to reach
otherwise waived issues); Rinaldi v. State Bldg. Code Appeals Bd., 779 N.E.2d 688, 689 n.2
(Mass. App. Ct. 2002) ("We take the opportunity to [address an issue not raised by parties] in this
case."); Commerce Bank & Trust Co. v. Hayeck, 709 N.E.2d 1122, 1130 n.2 (Mass. App. Ct.
1999) (stating simply appellate discretion to consider issue); Vaughan v. Easter Edison Co., 719
N.E.2d 520, 524 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) ("Although this issue appears not to have been raised
below ... we exercise our discretion to consider it."); see also Dwyer v. Young Mgmt. Grp., Inc,
No. 09-P-751, 2010 WL 2998674, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. Aug. 3, 2010) ("[A]rguments are either
unpreserved, insufficiently argued or unpersuasive. They 'have not been overlooked. We find
nothing in them that requires discussion."') (citing Dept. of Rev. v. Ryan R., 816 N.E.2d 1020,
1027 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004))).
301 Commonwealthv. Elder, 452 N.E.2d 1104, 1107 n.6 (Mass. 1983) (stating MASS. R. App.
P. 16(a)(4) does not prohibit reaching issues "when necessary"); see Foley v. Lowell Sun Publ'g
Co., 533 N.E.2d 196, 197 (Mass. 1989).
3u2 P.R. Tel. Co., Inc. v. T-Mobile P.R., LLC, No. 11-1504, 2012 WL 1522008, at *6 n.3 (1st
Cir. May 2, 2012); Rinaldi, 779 N.E.2d at 689 n.2; see Walker, 589 F.3d at 18; Torres, 886
N.E.2d at 744.
303 See, e.g., Kennie v. Natural Res. Dep't of Dennis, 889 N.E.2d 936, 941 n.12 (Mass.
2008); Sweenie v. A.L. Prime Energy Consultants, 887 N.E.2d 238, 243 n.12 (Mass. 2008);
Mately, 859 N.E.2d at 890 n.8.
'04 Commonwealth v. Vick, 910 N.E.2d 339, 353 n.15 (Mass. 2009) (noting arguments
relegated to footnote do not raise argument to appellate level); Commonwealth v. Benson, 899
N.E.2d 820, 828 n.6 (Mass. 2008) (stating same); Commonwealth v. Lydon, 597 N.E.2d 36, 4142 (Mass. 1992) (stating same); Rate Setting Comm'n v. Faulkner Hosp., 584 N.E.2d 1133, 1137
(Mass. 1992) (stating same).
305 See AT&T v. Automatic Sprinkler Appeal Bd., 750 N.E.2d 505, 508 (Mass. App. Ct.
2001) (addressing regulation despite failure to raise because issue subject to judicial notice).
106 See United States v. La Guardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1013 (1st Cir.
1990).
307 Automatic Sprinklers, 750 N.E.2d at 508 (considering regulation); Pontremoli v.
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although not raised on appeal, the argument or issue was otherwise
"squarely presented" by the record below and on appeal,30 8 or raised an
30 9
issue of significant public interest.
The summary formulation or reference by an appellate court as to
its "discretion" on the issue of forfeiture strongly cuts against the integrity
of the decision. Why a court has opted to address or not address a forfeited
issue is a fundamental component of the appeal and decision. It is
necessary for acceptance and legitimacy. An appellate court should hold
itself to the same standard it holds the lower court in its review of
discretionary rulings:
express acknowledgment of the discretion and
3 10
disclosure of the application of the facts to the guiding legal principles.
This is especially so given the discretionary component of plain error
("integrity or fairness of the proceeding"), the various un-weighted factors
or interests underlying "exceptional circumstances," including "in the
public interest," and the likely unavailability of any review of the appellate
discretion. As Professor Rosenberg stated well 37 years ago:
[D]iscretion is an unruly concept in a judicial system
dedicated to the rule of law but it can be useful if it is
domesticated, understood, and explained. To tame the
concept requires no less than to force ourselves to say why
it is accorded or withheld, and to say so in a manner that
provides assurance for today's case and some guidance for
tomorrow' s.

Spaulding Rehab. Hosp., 747 N.E.2d 1261, 1265 n.4 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (considering statute);
Ourfalian v. Aro Mfg. Co., 577 N.E.2d 6, 9 n.5 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (considering statute).
308 Watros v. Greater Lynn Mental Health & Retardation Ass'n., 642 N.E.2d 599, 602 n. 6
(Mass. App. Ct. 1994).
309 See Brownv. Guerrier, 457 N.E.2d 630, 632-33 (Mass. 1983) (detailing courts exercise of
discretion).
310 See Long v. Wickett, 737 N.E.2d 885, 904 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (noting need for trial
court in discretionary decision-making to make "specific findings"). The trial court should
enumerate all of the facts relied upon and ground a decision that "distinguish[es] between wellreasoned conclusions arrived at after a comprehensive consideration of all relevant factors, and
mere boiler-plate ... phrased in appropriate language but unsupported by evaluation of the facts
or analysis of law." Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Protective Comm. v. Anderson,
390 U.S. 414, 434 (1968)).
311 See Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 28. Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit expressed
the sentiment similarly:
Legal rules committing decisions to judicial discretion suppose that the court
will have, and give, sound reasons for proceeding one way rather than
another. 'We must not invite the exercise of judicial impressionism.
Discretion there may be, but methodized by analogy, disciplined by system.
Discretion without criterion for its exercise is authorization of arbitrariness.'
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C. Respect and Needfor Advocate Input and Direct Response
The integrity of appellate discretionary decision making is perhaps
most undercut where the court eschews any input or presentation by the

advocates.312

Appellate courts continue, at times, to proceed to reach

issues, including the issue of waiver, which were never addressed or

briefed by the parties.313
While the courts espouse the importance of the party presentation
principle behind waiver, they equally declare that the court is not bound to
accept or address the issues presented by the parties and can consider and
frame issues on their own. Yet, the failure to provide advocate input even
on the issue of waiver is unjustified and undercuts the legitimacy of the
appellate determination. For instance, in Mately v. Minkoff,3 14 the trial
court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict in a malpractice trial on
a legal ground that was raised late but was otherwise fully briefed posttrial.315 Although not raised in the motion for directed verdict, the plaintiff
never argued waiver either before the trial court or on appeal. The appeals
court, nonetheless, found the matter waived, reiterating the adage that
arguments not raised in a motion for directed verdict cannot be raised in the
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.3 16 It did so, however,
otherwise ignoring the well-established rule that the failure to raise
"waiver" at the time of the motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, never mind on appeal, is itself a waiver.3 17 Most offensive was that

York Ctr. Park Distrib. v. Krilich, 40 F.3d 205, 209 (7th Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted).
312

See DANIEL JOHN MEADOR ET AL., APPELLATE COURTS: STRUCTURES, FUNCTIONS,

PROCESSES, AND PERSONNEL 28 (Lexis 2d ed. 2006) ("[A]dversarial presentation contributes

significantly to the quality of the court's performance of the institutional function and is essential
to the correctness function.") (citing Carrington, supra note 296, at 7). See Golchin v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 950 N.E.2d 853, 865 n.9 (Mass. 2011) ("We are loath to approach such a
complicated and close question [sua sponte] without the benefit of briefing from the parties.").
313 See Matley v. Minkoff, 859 N.E.2d 887, 891 n.8 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (noting neither

party addressed issue in brief); In re Pet Food, 629 F.3d 333, 361 (Weis, J., concurring and
dissenting) ("I have no reservations about discussing the fee award even though the parties have
not briefed the matter.").
314 859 N.E.2d 887 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007).
315 Id. at 888. The legal contention was that the plaintiff was an incompetent minor and
therefore the defendant physician could not be liable for not obtaining her informed consent as
such consent must be subject of judicial hearing and determination. Id.
316 Id. at 890-91.
117 Fox v. F & J Gattozzi Corp., 672 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1996) ("[I]f the
nonmoving party fails to object to the [trial] judge's consideration of new grounds in deciding
whether to grant the [jnov] motion, then the non-moving party is said to have waived the right to
object on appeal."); S. Mass. Broadcasters, Inc. v. Duchaine, 529 N.E.2d 887, 889 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1988) (stating same); see Goldbaum v. Weiss, 738 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 n.5 (Mass. App. Ct.
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the court found waiver under this circumstance sua sponte and reversed the
judgment without ever seeking appellate argument from the advocates on

the issue.318
The concern is the loss of advocate presentation and the resulting
loss of litigant and public acceptance. Due process concerns are, in fact,
implicated where an appellate court decides an issue not raised or briefed,
as the parties have been deprived of notice and an opportunity to be
heard.3 19 This includes not just the substantive underlying legal issue, but
the decision to find or not find waiver. If the appealing party has not
properly preserved the issue and has failed to make a proper and sufficient
argument on appeal as to the applicability of any exceptions, a strong case
exists for having the general rule control.320
Fundamental to our adversary system is the right of advocacy by
the interested parties.3 2'
If an appellate court deems certain legal

principles, a statute, a regulation, or another legal source controlling, but
which was not raised, it should give the advocate the opportunity to address
that contention. There is nothing more frustrating to an advocate and

devastating to the appellate process for the interested litigants to not have
2000) (discussing effect of failure to object to directed verdict); see also Williams v. Runyon 130
F.3d 568, 572 (3rd Cir. 1997) ("[W]here a party did not object to a movant's Rule 50(b) motion
specifically on the grounds that the issue was waived by an inadequate rule 50(a) motion the
party's right to object on that basis is itself waived."); Collins v. Illinois, 830 F.2d 692, 698 (7th
Cir. 1987) (stating same); Cox v. Freeman, 321 F.2d 887, 891 (8th Cir. 1963) (stating plaintiff
precluded from raising issue because failed to raise when trial court directed verdict).
318 Matley, 859 N.E.2d at 890-91. It did so noting that the appellant never
raised or briefed
the issue and simply saying in a footnote that the court had the power to consider the issue. Id. at
890 n.8; see also Wood v. Milyard, 132 S. Ct. 1826, 1834 (2012) ("[R]estraint is all the more
appropriate when the appellate court itself spots an issue the parties did not air below, and
therefore would not have anticipated in developing their arguments on appeal.").
319 See Paul D. Carrington A CriticalAssessment of the Cultural and Institutional
Roles of
Appellate Courts, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 101, 106 (2008) (reviewing THOMAS E. BAKER &
JOAN E. STEINMAN, APPELLATE COURTS: STRUCTURES, FUNCTIONS, PROCESSES AND
PERSONNEL (2006) ("If American law is to play the traditional and expected role of holding
together a vast, diverse, and conflicted population by assuring adequately shared trust in law and
its institutions, litigants must perceive that they are getting the personal attention of judges that is
the heart of the Due Process guaranteed by state and federal constitutions."); Miller, supra note 3
at 1260 ("The fundamental core of due process is that a party should have notice and a
meaningful opportunity to be heard before a claim is decided.").
320 See Bruno v. Bd. of Appeals of Wrentham, 818 N.E.2d 199, 203 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004)
(applying general rule because party failed to raise circumstances justifying departure from
fundamental principle).
321 FRANK M.

COFFIN,

THE WAY

OF A

JUDGE:

REFLECTIONS

FROM THE

FEDERAL

APPELLATE BENCH

52 (Houghton-Mifflin 1980) (discussing how central to judicial system is
reliance on structured advocacy by adversaries); KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION: DECIDING APPEAL

29-30 (Little Brown & Co. 1960) ("[O]ut of the hammer-and-

anvil confrontation of opposing advocates, each of who seeks only victory, both a true view of
facts and informed view of the law will emerge.").
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an opportunity to present argument both as to the merits and as to whether
the court should consider the forfeited issue. Such an advocate should not
be left with only the petition for rehearing avenue to first address the legal
contention or grounds. Equally offensive is the failure of the court to
address the material contentions. Appellate courts must be directly
responsive to the contentions made .322 The symbiotic relationship between
the court and the advocates and litigants dictates such a practice. It is
fundamental to the integrity of the appellate process.323
D. A Uniform DiscretionaryStandard
Principled decision making as to the exercise of discretion not only
requires advocate input and meaningful court disclosure but also demands
clarity of the considerations informing the discretion. The myriad of
criteria or factors that have crept into the discretionary exception to the
general rule of raise or lose, together with the existence of two seemingly
disparate lines of discretion, undercut the interests of equal treatment and
principled decision-making.324

322 Paul D.

Carrington, Justice on Appeal in Criminal Cases: A Twentieth-Century

Perspective, 93 MARQ. L. REv. 459, 461 (2009). As Professor Carrington has stated:
Appellate justice should be a model for the government's dealings with
citizens. Appellate courts are the most dignified and receptive authorities to
which individuals can turn to express their legal dissatisfactions in a pointed
way, with assurance of a direct response. If these courts do not deal directly
with litigants, we cannot expect agencies or bureaucracies of lesser
sensitivity to legal rights to do so. It is therefore important that justice on
appeal be visible to all.
Id. (quoting JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 296 at v).
323 See Oldfather, supra note 297, at 82.
[Advocate] [p]articipation is . . . critical to legitimacy. In part, this
legitimacy is tied to the instrumental value of participation ....[t]he reason
is simply that courts resolving cases without being sufficiently responsive to
the parties are not resolving the parties' dispute, but instead some more or
less rough facsimile of it. Relatedly, research has demonstrated that litigants
are more satisfied with processes in which they feel their voices have been
heard and their positions given meaningful consideration even if they end up
losing.

'a.
324

See JUSTICE ON APPEAL supra note 296, at 11 ("[U]niform and coherent enunciation and

application of the law" is systematic imperative for appellate court).
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i. Exceptional Circumstances Discretion: Unruly
Beyond the Hormel statement that forfeiture will be excused "in
exceptional cases in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice," the glosses
upon the wording of this standard can differ markedly among courts. The

case law includes references to "manifest injustice," "miscarriage of
justice," "substantial miscarriage of justice," "gross miscarriage of justice,"
"the public interest," or "the interests of justice." The First Circuit, for
instance, has stated, in some cases, that the exception applies only "in
horrendous cases where a gross miscarriage of justice would occur" and
that the new ground must be "so compelling as virtually to insure
appellant's success. 32 5 How, for instance, that the term "gross" adds
anything to the analysis or understanding is hard to see with the "virtually
assuring success" equally incomplete in meaning.3 26 Such generality only
fuels the perception of un-principled or ad hoc decision-making. Further,
any formulation of the governing criteria must be consistent with the

underlying purposes for both the general rule of forfeiture and the need for
exception in particular circumstances.
Even where courts, like the First Circuit, have more fully and
admirably explored and declared the contours of the discretion, there
remains inconsistent application, including the development of seemingly

contradictory considerations.

For instance, it has been noted that

constitutional issues, like any other issue, can be waived,327 yet the

constitutional status of an issue has been stated to also favor exception to
the raise or waive rule.328
325

Similarly, waiver has been found to be

Johnston v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 595 F.2d 890, 894 (1st Cir. 1979); see also Wartski v.

Bedford, 926 F.2d 11, 21 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating Johnston rule); Hernandez-Hernandez v. United
States, 904 F.2d 758, 763 (1st Cir. 1990) (reiterating principle discussed in Johnston); Langton v.
Berman, 667 F.2d 231, 233 (1st Cir. 1981) (stating same).
326 See Mentor v. Hillside Bd. of Educ., 2011 WL 1957698, 428 F. App'x. 221, 224 n.5 (3d
Cir. 2011) (noting exception to waiver "where a gross miscarriage of justice would occur") (citing
Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 539 F.2d 929, 932 (3d Cir. 1976))).
3'27 See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944) ("No procedural principle is
more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right may be forfeited in criminal as well as
civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction
to determine it."); Daigle v. Me. Med. Ctr., Inc., 14 F.3d 684, 688 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating raise or
lose rule applies with full force to constitutional challenges); Curtis v. Sch. Comm. of Falmouth,
652 N.E.2d 580, 582 n.4 (Mass. 1995) (denying to review unpreserved constitutional claim);
Seagram Distillers Co. v. Alcohol Beverages Control Comm'n, 519 N.E.2d 276, 283 (Mass.
1988) (stating same); N.Y & Mass. Motor Serv. Inc. v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination,
517 N.E.2d 1270, 1278 (Mass. 1988) (stating same); In re Adoption of Donald, 750 N.E.2d 1025,
1026 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (stating court will not consider issue first time on appeal particularly
if constitutional).
328 See Nat'l Org. for Marriage, Inc. v. McKee, 669 F.3d 34, 43 (1stCir. 2012) (citing Nat'l
Ass'n of Soc. Workers v. Harwood)); Nat'l Ass'n of Soc. Workers v. Harwood, 69 F.3d 622, 628
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particularly appropriate where the party is seeking adoption of a new legal
principle while, at the same time, the legal nature of an otherwise waived
issue favors exercise of discretionary review. Additionally, if the issue that
is waived is deemed to be strong or decisive, then exception to waiver is
favored, leaving the waiver issue to whether or not the otherwise waived
argument was a winner. This seems contradictory to the recurring
statement that "objections, issues or claims-however meritorious that
have not been raised in the trial court are deemed waived, 3 29 or that
"[c]ourts typically invoke [the raise or lose] rule to avoid resolving a case
based on an unaired argument, even if the argument could change the
outcome." 3
Also, it is stated that a court need not sit idly by where the
parties have not raised or addressed applicable law yet must also not ignore
the theories upon which the underlying matter was tried.33
In addition to conflicting considerations, courts have, collectively,
identified no less than thirty (30) factors, considerations, or separate
singular exceptions to the raise or lose general rule. It is hard to find even
two jurisdictions that consider the very same factors as controlling,
although there are certainly similarities. The lack of consensus and
multitude of factors creates fertile ground for unbridled discretion.
There is, likewise, difficulty in weighing the factors in any given
case. The diversity of factors and the substantial removal of many from the
error correcting function render it virtually impossible to devise any
workable scale or means of measure as to value any one "factor" versus
another.
Equal treatment and principled decision-making is thus
threatened.
In a recent Third Circuit case, for example, the court affirmed the
trial court's determination that a state's Prevailing Wage Regulations
improperly discriminated against out of state contractors in violation of the
Commerce Clause.332 In holding that exceptional circumstances existed
(1st Cir. 1995); see also Ninestar Tech. Co., Ltd. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 667 F.3d 1373, 1382
(Fed. Cir. 2012) ("Although we agree that these issues ware tardily raised, constitutional
challenges should not be deemed waived when they relate to the foundations of governmental
process.").
329 Wynn & Wynn P.C. v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination,
729 N.E.2d 1068, 1083
(Mass. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Stonehill Coll. V. Mass. Comm'n Against
Discrimination, 808 N.E.2d 205 (Mass. 2004); see also Green v. Brookline, 757 N.E.2d 731, 738
(Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (stating same).
330 Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 262 (2008).
331 See Jones v. Wayland, 373 N.E.2d 199, 203 n.3 (Mass. 1978) ("The theory of law on
which by assent a case is tried cannot be disregarded when the case comes before an appellate
court for review of the acts of the trial judge.") (quoting Kagan v. Levenson 134 N.E.2d 415, 418
(Mass. 1956))); see also Budish v. Daniel, 631 N.E.2d 1009, 1012 n.5 (Mass. 1994) (stating

same).

332

Tri-M Grp., LLCv. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 412 (3d Cir. 2011).
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allowing for review, the majority relied upon the following: (1) the strong
public interest in considering all arguments, particularly because the case
involved "crucial and unresolved issues of state sovereignty and state
procurement spending, and tests the limits of the dormant Commerce
Clause in this field"; (2) the issue had not yet been addressed by the Third
Circuit; (3) the issue was sufficiently "intertwined" with other contentions
that had been preserved; (4) the issue was one of law; and (5) addressing
the issue would "preserve judicial resources."3 3 3
In a concurring opinion, however, Judge Hardiman disagreed.
While he agreed that the argument on appeal implicated significant issues
as to state sovereignty and was one of law, in his opinion this was not
enough to constitute "exceptional circumstances 334 Judge Hardiman
found that since the construction project at issue had been completed and
that all that was at issue was "some $10,000 in wages" that had been paid
to some apprentices, there was no urgency to address this issue, as it could
be presented in another case upon a full trial record.335 Also significant
was the belief that nothing in the record indicated that the failure to make
the contention below was inadvertent.33 6 The argument was a recognized
exception and it was, according to Judge Hardimann, unlikely that counsel
had missed it, as opposed to it having been a deliberate decision to focus on
337
other arguments.
This debate is no stranger to the First Circuit. Even in the leading
decision in Harwood, where the court delineated the various factors
informing the discretion as to review of forfeited issues under the
"exceptional circumstances" exception, there was no unanimity in
application. The majority found that there was no absence of necessary
fact finding and that the issue was one of law; that the issue was one of
"constitutional magnitude"; that it was "highly persuasive"; that there was
no prejudice or inequity to the opposing party; that the issue had been fully
briefed and presented; that the failure to preserve was inadvertent rather
than deliberate; and that "perhaps most salient" the otherwise forfeited
issue "implicates matters of great public import, and touches upon policies
as basic as federalism, comity, and respect for the independence of
democratic institutions. 3 38
Justice Lynch dissented, stating that there were no "exceptional

...Id. at 416-18.
114 Id. at 432-33 (Hardiman, J., concurring).
115

Id. at 432.

336

id.

337 Id. at 434.
338

Nat'l Ass'n of Soc. Workers v. Harwood, 69 F.3d 622, 627-29 (1st Cir. 1995).
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circumstances," finding that the immunity argument was "hardly an
obscure legal concept" and able counsel represented all parties in the lower
court.33 9 Justice Lynch likewise noted that inadvertence, question of law,
and implication of constitutional concerns are always present and would, if
controlling, require the appeals court to always have to consider the
legislative immunity issue even though raised for the first time on
appeal.3 40 Justice Lynch also added that one of the rationales for legislative
immunity is to prevent vexatious litigation, which is undermined by
allowing the legislator to raise the immunity issue for the first time on
appeal after trial.34 '

The First Circuit was likewise unable to reach consensus in
Chestnut v. City of Lowell.342 There, a municipality was subject to a
punitive damages finding following trial as to claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. 34 3 Prior to the jury charge, the trial judge asked both counsel about
the propriety of punitive damages, with the claimant's attorney stating it
was proper and the defense attorney making no response or taking issue
with the claimant's attorney's statement.344 The trial court proceeded to
instruct the jury on punitive damages even though the Supreme Court had
long held such damages were not available against a municipality under §
1983. 3 4' Following the verdict, the defense raised the issue of the
impropriety of punitive damages, asserting "immunity," which request was
denied.346
In an en banc decision, the First Circuit upheld the ruling. It found
that most of the Harwoodfactors were present except that the issue was not
one of constitutional magnitude; although it proceeded to note that
Harwood did not involve the "disregard [of] plainly applicable Supreme
Court precedent., 347 In a dissent by Justices Lipez and Cyr, it was noted
that the First Circuit had never before found "exceptional circumstances" to
have been met in a civil case claiming error in jury instructions. 34 They
found that reliance on the fact that the error was "shared" between counsel
is not a relevant consideration and had never before been considered in the
exceptional circumstances analysis.3 4 9 They likewise found that unlike in

9 Id. at 638-39 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
id.
341 id.
342 305 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2002).
340

343

344
345
346
347
348

349

Id. at 19.
id.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 21.
Chestnut, 305 F.2d at 25-28.

Id. at 27.
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Harwood,the issue was not one of constitutional dimension, but rather "a
purely common law defense and did not otherwise implicate a matter of
great public import."3 50 According to the dissenters, "we are faced only
with the sort of 'individualized harm that occurs whenever the failure

seasonably to raise a claim or defense alters the outcome of the case." 35 '
ii. Unification

Subjecting

some cases to plain error review and others to

exceptional circumstances raises the specter of unequal treatment and begs
the question of whether the two strands are truly (or otherwise should be)
discreet and separate. Indeed, the co-terminus and overlapping nature of
both plain error and exceptional circumstance discretion is substantial.3 52
There can be little question that plain error and other "exceptional

circumstances"

discretion have

suffered

a substantial measure

of

3 53

intermingling in their common law soj oum.
Although neither Hormel
nor Singleton expressly cited to, or otherwise referenced, the power to
review unpreserved errors for "plain error," the decisions implicitly
encompassed the fundamental or plain error exception to procedural
default, as it was certainly already present and part of common law practice
at the time. The Supreme Court had, in fact, already decided at least two
leading decisions, one criminal (Wiborg v. United States3 54 ) and one civil

350
351

Id. at 28.
Id. The dissenters also noted considerations such as that the failure of counsel to raise the

issue was particularly egregious given that punitive claim had always been present and the
defendant never raised or asserted the well established defense at any time including at the charge
conference or after closing argument. Id. at 28-29. Additionally, reaching the issue and vacating
the award would be prejudicial as it may have influenced the compensatory award. Id. at 29.
Even where there is no dissent, the weighing of the factors is elusive. See In re Net- Velazquez,
625 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2010) ("Of those [Krynicki-Harwood] factors, a few seem to weigh
slightly ... in favor here."); Montalvo v. Gonzalez-Amparo, 587 F.3d 43, 48-49 (1st Cir. 2009)
(granting review despite issue's lack of constitutionality or public importance, "most salient"
factors in analysis); Harvey v. Veneman, 396 F.3d 28, 45 (1st Cir. 2005) (stating constitutional
issue not sufficiently publicly important to favor considering question).
352

See DANWL JOHN MEADOR & JORDANA SIMONE BERNSTEIN, APPELLATE COURTS IN

23 (West 1994) ("The judicial system at all levels should strive to speak
with a consistent voice and treat litigants even handedly.").
151 See Salazar ex. rel. Salazar v. District of Columbia, 602 F.3d 431, 437
(D.C. Cir. 2010)
("We have yet to determine whether the two inquiries [plain error and exceptional circumstances]
are coterminous.").
354 163 U.S. 632 (1896). In Wiborg, a private vessel's captain and mates were found guilty
of launching a private military expedition against Cuba. Id. at 633. The Court affirmed the
THE UNITED STATES

captain's conviction. Id. at 660. However, it reversed the convictions of the mates, finding there

was no evidence that they had knowledge of the military nature of their voyage when they left the
United States. Id.
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(United States v. Atkinson355 ), in which it reiterated the long embedded
plain or fundamental error exception.
There is no express reference in either Hormel or Singleton to the
"plain" or "fundamental" error default standard for unpreserved errors or
new issues on appeal, yet the recited circumstances in Singleton-to where
resolution of the case is "beyond any doubt"-and in Hormel-to where
"the obvious result would be a plain miscarriage of justice"-certainly
356
seem to encompass the established "plain" or "fundamental" principle.
Many courts, including the First Circuit, have, in fact, at times cited to
either or both of Hormel and Singleton as standing for the plain error
principle, 357 or otherwise only reference plain error as to any exception to

the general rule.358
The co-mingling can be seen in many of the exceptional
circumstances formulations. In terms of nomenclature alone, the phrase
"exceptional circumstances" has been used by both state and federal courts
to refer to either or both of plain error or other criteria for allowing review
of unpreserved error.359 Massachusetts is no exception with courts
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297 U.S. 157 (1936).

356 It could be argued that the court in Singleton was noting mutually exclusive circumstances

when it stated "where the proper resolution is beyond any doubt or where injustice might
otherwise result." 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Hormel v.
Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941)).
357 See, e.g., United States v. Tutty, 612 F.3d 128, 131 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Hormel for
review of unpreserved error for plain error); Sokoloski v. MetLife Ins. Co., 2002 WL 359974, 30
F.App'x. 209, 213 (4th Cir. 2009 (stating same); Nottingham v. Sherill, 2005 WL 1155997, 131
F.App'x. 427, 427 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding claim not raised below not considered absent
exceptional circumstances such as plain error); United States v. Cunningham, 113 F.3d 289, 292
(1st Cir. 1997) (citing Singleton for power to review unpreserved errors but stating plain error
limits review); United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1133 n.60 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (citing Hormel
and Singleton); Warren v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R. Co., 768 F.2d 709, 711 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing
Singleton); Melendez v. Boschulte, 950 F. Supp 114, 116 (D. V. I. 1997) (citing Singleton); see
also River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 111, 114 n.5 (1st Cir. 2009) (exercising
discretion where "error is plain" and "equities heavily preponderate in favor of correcting it")
(quoting Rocafort v. IBM Corp., 334 F.3d 115, 122 (1st Cir. 2003))).
358 See Velazquez-Ortiz v. Vilsack, 657 F.3d 64, 74 (1st Cir. 2011) ("Assuming that
it is only
forfeited, the test is plain error").
359 See United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936) (referencing exceptional
circumstances in defining plain error); Kenney v. Head, 670 F.3d 354, 359 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting
exceptional circumstances equivalent to plain error); Jackson v. Parker, 627 F.3d 634, 640 (7th
Cir. 2010) ("Plain error is only available in civil cases if a party can demonstrate that: (1)
exceptional circumstances exist; (2) substantial rights are affected; and (3) a miscarriage of justice
will occur if plain error review is not applied.") (quoting Moore ex rel Estate of Grady v. Tuleja,
546 F.3d 423, 430 (7th Cir. 2008))); Johnson v. Ashby, 808 F.2d 676, 679 n.3 (8th Cir. 1987)
(stating plain error only found in exceptional circumstances and but not exceptional case); Dream
Palace v. Cnty. of Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990, 1005 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Even when a case falls into
one of the exceptions to the rule against considering new arguments on appeal, [the appellate
court] must still decide whether the particular circumstances of the case overcome [the]
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interchanging "exceptional circumstances where injustice might otherwise
result" with "substantial risk of a miscarriage of ustice.",, 3 60
Not

surprisingly, courts have not been uniform as to whether or not
"exceptional circumstances" is separate and distinct from or otherwise
represents a restatement of plain error. Some have suggested that the two
are coterminous; others have indicated they are separate and with still a
number of states not otherwise adopting any exception beyond plain
error.3 61 Most jurisdictions, including the federal courts and a significant
number of states, have adopted both strains of exception although differing,
sometimes markedly, in the formulation of the exceptional circumstance
branch. Even then, some decisions, including in the First Circuit, have, at

times, defined "plain error" in terms of both Olano and the Krynicki
factors .362
This overlap and interchange between the two lines of discretion
can also be found upon isolation and inspection of the individual factors or

circumstances that have come to constitute the criteria for the exercise of

presumption against hearing new arguments."); United States v. Real Property Located at 1189
Drycreek Rd., 174 F.3d 720, 725-26 (6th Cir. 1999) (exercising discretion where failure to review
would cause "miscarriage of justice"); see also Hung Viet Vu v. Kirkland, 2010 WL 24215, 363
F. App'x. 439, 443 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting waiver exceptions: exceptional circumstances; law
change while appeal pending; law question with no prejudice); Whiteman v. Friel, 2006 WL
2441542, 191 F. App'x. 820, 821 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating absent plain error or exceptional
circumstances issue not raised below not considered); Muth v. United States, 1 F.3d 246, 250 (4th
Cir. 1993) (reviewing forfeiture issue only when failure is plain error or results in miscarriage of
justice); State v. Andrasak, 958 N.E.2d 594, 596 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (permitting plain error
where "exceptional circumstances" and necessary to prevent miscarriage of justice).
360 See Rafferty v. Town of Franklin, 826 N.E.2d 794, 2005 WL 1106690, at *2 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2005) ("Only in exceptional cases, where injustice might otherwise result, will we review
issues not raised at trial.") (internal quotations omitted) (citing Cruz v. Comm'r of Pub. Welfare,
478 N.E.2d 1262, 1264 (Mass. 1985))).
161 See cases cited, supra note 327; see also Crawfordv. Falcon Drilling Co., 131
F.3d 1120,
1123 n.3 (5th Cir 1997) (noting exception allows consideration of newly raised issues if refusal
would work manifest injustice); Douglass v. United Serv. Auto Ass'n., 79 F.3d 1415, 1416 (5th
Cir. 1996) (rejecting manifest injustice as independent test), superseded by statute, ACS
Recovery Serv., Inc. v. Griffin, No. 11-40446, 2012 WL 1071216, at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 2, 2012).
362 See Babcock v. Gen. Motors Corp., 299 F.3d 60, 65 (1st Cir. 2002). The Court in
Babcock stated:
We might find plain error where the failure to raise the claim below
deprived the reviewing court of helpful factfinding; . . . the issue is one of
constitutional magnitude; ... the omitted argument is highly persuasive; ...
the opponent would suffer prejudice and . . . the issue is of great public
importance to the public.
Id. (quoting Play-Time Inc. v. DDS Metromedia Commc'ns Inc., 123 F.3d 23, 30 n.8 (1st Cir.
1997)); see also Kenney v. Head, 670 F.3d 354, 359 (1st Cir. 2012) (explaining waived issue may
be reviewed for plain error).
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exceptional circumstance discretion. The primary or recurring factors or
considerations comprising "exceptional circumstances" discretion can be
grouped into four general categories: court authority and competency;
application and classification; error correction; and issue stature/law
declaration. An examination of these factors or considerations reveals that
some simply demonstrate that the appellate court is competent to address
the issue, providing no other basis for exception from the general rule.
They thus offer nothing that is not otherwise encompassed within plain
error other than a more lenient means to escape the general rule. Other
factors or considerations do not respond at all to the concerns underlying
the general rule. Certain additional factors, such as the emphasis on
significant public interest, in turn, are removed from the fundamental
appellate function of adjudicating a claim of error.
Many of the circumstances do not truly constitute exceptions but
address whether the raise or lose rule is even applicable. These include the
court authority circumstances such as subject matter jurisdiction, standing,
ripeness, venue, and notices of appeal; the court capability factors such as
questions of law, adequacy of factual record, appellate briefing and
prejudice to the opposing party; and the applicability and classification
factors such as intervening change in law, futility, preclusion as well
strategic versus inadvertent. These are all already encompassed within the
plain error default standard.
1. Court Authority and Competency
The court authority circumstances center on jurisdictional issues
which all directly concern the fundamental power of the court even to
363
entertain the issue.
A number of courts, including certain Massachusetts
decisions, have stated the general rule of raise or lose as incorporating the
notion ofjurisdiction,36 4 i.e., "[a] party is not entitled to appellate review of
365
a non-jurisdictional issue or theory never presented to the trial court.,
363 Subject matter jurisdictional issues are excepted from the raise or lose rule as they

concern the court's underlying authority to hear and adjudicate cases. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §1 (1982) (noting court's judgment only valid if it had jurisdiction);
Frost, supra note 5, at 462 ("The best-known exception to the party presentation rule permits
courts to question their capacity or suitability to hear a case or a specific issue.").
364 Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 927 N.E.2d 455, 459 (Mass. 2010) (defining subject
matter jurisdiction as jurisdiction over nature of case and type of relief sought).
165 Gaw v. Sappett, 816 N.E.2d 1027, 1032 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004); see
Royal Indem. Co. v.
Blakely, 360 N.E.2d 864, 865 (Mass. 1977) (stating same); see also Louisville & Nashville R.
Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (holding duty to determine whether lower court had
jurisdiction even though issue unaddressed by parties); Belden v. Lampert, 251 P.3d 325, 328
(Wyo. 2011) (stating waiver rule inapplicable to issues which are either jurisdictional or
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As the First Circuit has noted, "parties cannot confer subject-matter
jurisdiction on a district court by sloth or acquiescence,"366 with a
jurisdictional defect implicating the foundational question of a court's
power to decide a case or issue or decree.367 The same principle is
followed under Massachusetts practice with it long held that "[w]hen
jurisdiction is lacking, it 'cannot be conferred by consent, conduct or

waiver.-368

addtio
t isuesof369

370

In addition to issues of ripeness,
standing,
venue, and notices
37
of appeal, i the court authority grouping includes where an agency

declines to review the issue or asserts lack of authority to hear the issue. 372
Such issues are immune from the raise or lose rule regardless of

fundamental in nature). Notably, at least on the federal level, the non-waiverability of subject
matter jurisdiction was not always so absolute as it is today. See Short v. Marinas USA Ltd., 942
N.E.2d 197, 203-04 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011); Michael G. Collins, JurisdictionalExceptionalism, 93
VA. L. REv. 1829, 1835 (2007) (detailing various practices at common law illustrating that
raising jurisdictional objections subject to procedure regulation).
366 Trenkler v. United States, 536 F.3d 85, 96 (1st Cir. 2008); see United States v. Cotton,
535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002).
367 Ascroftv. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 671 (2009).
368 Jamgochian v. Dierker, 681 N.E.2d 1180, 1182 (Mass. 1997) (quoting Litton Bus. Sys.,
Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 420 N.E.2d 339, 342 (Mass. 1981)). Such jurisdictional issues have
been held to allow a court to address the issue sua sponte even if not properly preserved or raised
in the appeal. See Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 588 N.E.2d 639, 642
(Mass. 1992); see also Spoonerv. EEN, Inc., 644 F.3d 62, 67 (1st Cir. 2011) ("A court is dutybound to notice, and act upon, defects in its subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte."); McCulloch
v. Velez, 364 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2004) (stating same).
369 Hidalgo Cnty. v. Dyer, 358 S.W.3d 698, 710 (Tex. App. 2011) ("Ripeness cannot be
wavied and may be raised for the first time on appeal."); see Arambarri v. Armstrong, No. 38351,
2012 WL 739486, at *3 (Idaho Mar. 8, 2012) (explaining issues of standing and mootness are
jurisdictional and can be raised at any time).
370 Warrington v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 937 N.E.2d 980, 982 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010)
(stating zoning standing is subject matter jurisdiction).
37' Tsagronis v. Bd. of Appeals of Wareham, 613 N.E.2d 893, 896 (Mass. 1994) (Abrams, J.,
dissenting) ("Standing as an aggrieved party is jurisdictional, and cannot be conferred by
stipulation or waiver of the parties.") (Abrams, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Mannos, 40
N.E.2d 291, 297 (Mass. 1942) (equating "territorial jurisdiction" with "venue and not with
jurisdiction"); Warrington, 937 N.E.2d at 982 (holding abutter's standing under zoning statute
raiseable at any time constitutes subject matter jurisdiction issue); Commonwealth v. Hart, 918
N.E.2d 96, 2009 WL 4403315, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009) (unpublished table decision) (holding
conduct occurring outside territory constitutes venue, not jurisdiction, and thus waiver applies);
Pavian, Inc. v. Hickey, 874 N.E.2d 670, 673 n.3 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (stating notice of appeal
timeliness implicates subject matter jurisdiction and challengeable at any state), rev 'd on other
grounds, 895 N.E.2d 480 (Mass. 2008); Barvenik v. Bd. of Aldermen of Newton, 597 N.E.2d 48,
50 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (stating "aggrieved person" status jurisdictional prerequisite for § 17
review), abrogated, Marashlian v. Zoning Bd. Of Newburyport, 660 N.E.2d 369 (Mass. 1986).
372 See M. H. Gordon & Son, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 434 N.E.2d 986,
989 (Mass. 1982). For instance, where an agency had found or stated in another analogous case
that it would leave the question of whether state regulation violated Sherman act to the courts, it
was proper for appellate court to address issue. Id.
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hardship.37 3 Jurisdictional forfeiture issues can take a myriad of other
forms, 3 74 with courts sometimes expressly recognizing that the new
argument on appeal couched as one of "subject matter jurisdiction" has a
"strategic explanation" of an attempt to avoid waiver in having not raised
the issue below.37 5
Since issues pertaining to subject matter jurisdiction3 76 involve the
court's very authority, there is much less concern as to discretionary
looseness or unequal treatment. 377 The underpinnings to the raise or lose
171

See E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 160 F.3d 925, 929, 940 (2d Cir.

1998) (vacating judgment after sixteen years of litigation); United States v. Jacobo Castillo, 496
F.3d 947, 952 (9th Cir. 2007) ("Defects in procedural rules may be waived or forfeited by parties
who fail to object properly, whereas defects in our subject-matter jurisdiction go to the inherent
power of the court and cannot be waived or forfeited.").
174 Both First Circuit and Massachusetts courts have addressed claims of jurisdiction both in
the raise or lose context and otherwise. See Maxwell v. AIG Domestic Claims, Inc., 950 N.E.2d
40, 48 (Mass. 2011) ("[T]he question of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by the parties at
any time orby the court on its own motion."); Miller v. Miller, 861 N.E.2d 393, 398 (Mass. 2007)
("[W]e consider whether the judge was correct in determining that the court had subject matter
jurisdiction over the case, would be a waste of judicial resources for that issue to remain
unresolved."); ROPT Ltd. P'ship v. Katin, 729 N.E.2d 282, 287 (Mass. 2000) (stating right of
party to raise subject matter jurisdiction at any time); Nature Church v. Bd. of Assessors of
Belchertown, 429 N.E.2d 329, 330 (Mass. 1981) ("Courts . . . have both the power and the
obligation to resolve problems of subject matter jurisdiction whenever they become apparent,
regardless whether the issue is raised by the parties."); see, e.g., Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880,
884 (7th Cir. 2011) (considering whether lack of consent to magistrate is issue of jurisdiction not
subject to forfeiture); Sperounes v. Farese, 873 N.E.2d 239, 244 (Mass. 2007) (explaining
$25,000 filing limit "procedural," not "jurisdictional," and must be raised in answer or waived);
Middleborough v. Hous. Appeals Comm., 870 N.E.2d 67, 74 (Mass. 2007) (requiring project be
"fundable" to challenge comprehensive permit decision "substantive," not "jurisdictional");
Jamgochian v. Dierker, 681 N.E.2d 1180, 1183-84 (Mass. 1997) (finding statutory jury
requirement not jurisdictional where verdict rendered by 11 of 14 jurors).
175 See Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 927 N.E.2d 455, 458 (Mass. 2010) ("Given
the
fact that the plaintiff neglected to raise this issue ... there is a strategic explanation for why he
has couched his argument in terms of subject matter jurisdiction. As we have said, questions of
subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time . . . and are not waived even when not
argued below.") (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 795 N.E.2d
547, 551 (Mass. 2003))).
376 See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002); Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). Only subject matter jurisdiction
is excepted from the no waiver rule. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 630; Ins. Corp. of Ireland,456 U.S. at
702. Personal jurisdiction can be waived as it relates to the due process liberty restriction on
judicial power as opposed to the statutory or constitutional authority of the court to hear a
particular action. Id. at 703.
177 The battleground as to the jurisdictional exception to the raise or lose rule is usually over
whether an issue is jurisdictional or not. See Ryan Walters, Note, Raise It or Waive It?
Addressing the Federal and State Split in Authority on Whether a Conviction Under an
UnconstitutionalStatute is a JurisdictionalDefect, 62 Baylor L. Rev. 909, 913-14 (2010) ("[T]he
question of when a defect qualifies as jurisdictional has not proved to be a simple one and has
caused courts a great deal of headache over the years."). The term "jurisdiction" has been noted
to be a "chameleon," and otherwise notoriously broad with courts giving it a wide variety of
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meanings. Moore v. Olson, 368 F.3d 757, 759 (7th Cir. 2004); see Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of
Locomotive Eng'gs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment Cent. Region, 130 S. Ct. 584, 596
(2009); Bennett v. Holyoke, 362 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2004); see also Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546
U.S. 500, 510-11 (2006) (noting history of "profligate" and "less then meticulous" use of the
term). In recent years, the Supreme Court has attempted to limit and more carefully define
"jurisdiction" stating it is limited to either "subject matter jurisdiction" or "personal jurisdiction."
See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1243 (2010) ("'[J]urisdictional' properly
applies only to 'prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the
persons (personal jurisdiction)' implicating [the court's adjudicatory] authority.") (quoting
Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004))). Additionally, the Supreme Court noted that courts
should use the term jurisdiction "only when it is apposite," and should "curtail . . . 'drive-by
jurisdictional rulings.' Id. at 1243-44 (quoting Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455; Steel Co. v. Citizens
for Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)). See, e.g., Henderson ex rel Henderson v. Shinseki,
131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202-07 (2011) (holding veteran's failure to file notice of appeal within required
period did not deprive jurisdiction); Reed Elsevier, 130 S. Ct. at 1249 (holding copyrightregistration requirement not jurisdictional); Union Pac. R.R., 130 S. Ct. at 598-99 (holding
settlement-conference requirement not jurisdictional); Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514-15 (holding Title
VII provision exempting employers with fewer than 15 employees jurisdictional); Kontrick, 540
U.S. at 452-56 (holding bankruptcy rule governing timely amendments not jurisdictional);
Cotton, 535 U.S. at 630-31 (holding sentencing in excess of a statutory maximum did not deprive
sentencing court of jurisdiction). But see Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209-10 (2007)
(holding statutory time for taking of appeal from district court decision jurisdictional). Further,
distinguishing true jurisdictional issues from "merits" based issues or "procedural" issues is not
always particularly apparent. See Reed Elsevier, 130 S. Ct. at 1243 (noting it can be confusing in
practice); see also Howard M. Wassermann, The Demise of "Drive by JurisdictionalRuling",
105 Nw. U. L. REv. 947, 955-58 (2011) (discussing several Supreme Court decisions decided in
October 2009). Recent Supreme Court decisions concerning "jurisdiction" indicate that the Court
has retreated from its admittedly "profligate" and "less than meticulous" use of the term
jurisdiction and now rejects "drive-by jurisdictional rulings," in which a legal rule has been
labeled as jurisdictional only through "unrefined" analysis, without rigorous consideration of the
label's meaning or consequence. Id. The Supreme Court, for instance, has confessed that
"[w]hile perhaps clear in theory, the distinction between jurisdictional conditions and claimprocessing rules can be confusing in practice." Reed Elsevier, 130 S. Ct. at 1243. For example,
it has been held that mandatory notice or presentment provisions are not jurisdictional and can be
waived, yet exhaustion of administrative remedies have been found to be either jurisdictional or
not turning on whether the legislature has designated the requirement as such. See Global NAPs,
Inc. v. Verizon New England Inc., 603 F.3d 71, 85 (1st Cir. 2010); see also Payne v. Peninsula
Sch. Distr., 653 F.3d 863, 871 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding Individual with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA)'s exhaustion requirements claim processing rule not jurisdictional limitation); Mosely v.
Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 434 F.3d 527, 533 (7th Cir. 2006) ("A failure to exhaust is
normally considered to be an affirmative defense, and we see no reason to treat it differently
here."); ("The exhaustion requirement ... is not jurisdictional .... "); Blanchard v. Morton Sch.
Dist., 420 F.3d 918, 920-21 (9th Cir. 2005) ("If a plaintiff is required to exhaust administrative
remedies but fails to do so, the federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's
claim."), overruled, Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Distr., 653 F.3d 863, (9th Cir. 2011); MM ex rel.
DM v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cnty., 303 F.3d 523, 536 (4th Cir. 2002) ("The failure of the
Parents to exhaust their administrative remedies ... deprives us of subject matter jurisdiction over
those claims .... "); N.B. ex rel D.G. v. Alachua Cnty. Sch. Bd., 84 F.3d 1376, 1379 (11th Cir.
1996); Urban by Urban v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 89 F.3d 720, 725 (10th Cir. 1996) ("We
conclude that the district court correctly dismissed the [unexhausted] claims for lack of
jurisdiction."). Similarly, preemption claims under federal statutes or law can raise issues of
subject matter jurisdiction that can be raised for first time on appeal. See Cent. Transp. Inc. v.
Package Printing Co., 706 N.E.2d 698, 699 (Mass. 1999) (considering issue of ERISA
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rule are secondary given the focus on the court's constitutional or statutory
power to adjudicate the case. 378 Indeed, "[a] court's responsibility to
satisfy itself of its jurisdiction to proceed is rationalized as necessary to
maintain the judiciary's limited role in the constitutional structure.
Further, jurisdictional issues provide no distinction for purposes of plain
error or exceptional circumstances discretion. If there is no jurisdiction,
there is no basis to exercise either line of discretion.
The court capability or competency factors or circumstances,
namely the status of the issue as one of law,38 0 the completeness of the
factual record, the existence of applicable appellate briefing, and lack of
prejudice to the opposing part also do not truly constitute "exceptions" to
the general rule. 38' These factors go to the competency of the appellate
court to provide meaningful review and, again, apply equally to plain error.
The Supreme Court in Hormel specifically referenced "questions

preemption for first time on appeal); Chestnut-Adams Ltd. P'ship v. Bricklayers & Masons Trust
Funds of Bos., 612 N.E.2d 236, 237 (Mass. 1993) (considering same), abrogated,Cent. Transp.,
706 N.E.2d 698 (Mass. 1999); Barry v. Dymo Graphic Sys., Inc., 478 N.E.2d 707, 711 (Mass.
1985) (considering same), disapproved,Massachusetts v. Morash- 490 U.S. 107 (1989). Federal
statutes controlling substantive law rather than forum choice, render any such "preemption" a
waivable non-jurisdictional defense. See Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380,
389-99 (1986); Wolfv. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 71 F.3d 444, 449 (1st Cir. 1997); Central
Transp., 706 N.E.2d at 700; Violette v. Smith & Nephew Dyonics, Inc. 62 F.3d 8, 11-12 (1st Cir.
1995).
378 See generally Cotton, 535 U.S. at 630 (explaining defects in indictment do not deprive
court of jurisdiction); Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89; Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of
Jurisdiction,54 HASTINGS L.J. 1613, 1620 (2003) (discussing the adjudicatory competency and
legitimate authority underpinnings to jurisdiction).
Even with such arguably benign
considerations, the current absolute rule allowing for objection to jurisdiction to be raised at
anytime merits discussion about whether there can and/or should be a workable limitation. See
Belleville Catering Co. v. Champaign Mkt. Place, L.L.C., 350 F.3d 691, 692 (7th Cir. 2003)
(chastising "litigants' insouciance" to federal jurisdiction requirements and listing cases reversed
for unnoticed jurisdictional defects).
379 Frost, supra note 5, at 462.
380 See Dennerline, supra note 2, at 996-99 ("One of the most common exceptions
to the
general rule appellate courts use is the characterization of a new issue on appeal as one that is
purely legal in nature."); see, e.g., Montalvo v. Gonzalez-Amparo, 587 F.3d 43, 48-49 (1st Cir.
2009); United States v. La Guardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1013 (1st Cir. 1990) (reaching constitutional
due process challenge to sentencing as it presented question of law); United States v. Krynicki,
689 F.2d 289, 291 (1st Cir. 1982) (discussing statutory construction-Speedy Trial Act-and no
need to develop record further); Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Loomer, 837 N.E.2d 712, 715
(Mass. 2005) (considering issue despite waiver because question of law); Fortier v. Town of
Essex, 752 N.E.2d 818, 821 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (refusing to consider best evidence rule on
appeal because waived), overruled on other grounds, Morrissey v. New Eng. Deaconess Ass'nAbundant Life Communities, Inc., 940 N.E.2d 391 (Mass. 2010).
381 See Denuerline, supra note 2, at 999 ("[A]lthough termed an 'exception' to the general
rule, it actually is not because the exception only partially addresses the commonly accepted
rationales for the general rule.").
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of law" in its discretionary pronouncement, 382 and both First Circuit and
Massachusetts decisions have repeatedly referenced the legal nature of the
unpreserved issue.383 Even if the issue is not strictly a "question of law,"
courts have opted to review a waived or forfeited issue where the record
below provides a sufficient and adequate record and the parties have
otherwise fully briefed the issue.384 If the record is fully developed, there is
no concern that the failure to raise the issue below has hampered or limited
the appellate court's ability to decide the issue.385 Similarly, if the record
or brief is inadequate, even as to what is considered a pure question of law,
discretion to review an unpreserved argument or error is usually
declined.386 Courts have reviewed otherwise forfeited issues relying on the
adequacy of briefing factor alone,387 or when coupled with another factor,
382 Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557

(1941); LaGuardia, 902 F.2d at 1013;

Springfield v. Dep't of Telecomm. & Cable, 931 N.E.2d 942, 950 (Mass. 2010); Albert v. Mun.
Court of City of Bos., 446 N.E.2d 1385, 1386-87 (Mass. 1983).
383 See Krynicki, 689 F.2d at 292 (stating issue whether an indictment must be returned
within 30 days legal, thus favoring review); Nuclear Metals, Inc. v. Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Mgmt. Bd., 656 N.E.2d 563, 572 (Mass. 1995) (noting issue legal because interpretation of
statutory and regulatory language and validity of agency's interpretation); Commonwealth v.
Dyer, 138 N.E. 296, 313 (Mass. 1923) (stating exceptions not argued waived but court retains
power to correct genuine errors of law); Vahey v. Bigelow, 94 N.E. 249 (Mass. 1911) (stating
question of law not presented to trial court cannot be raised on appeal).
384 See Nat'l Ass'n of Soc. Workers v. Harwood, 69 F.3d 622, 627-28 (1st Cir. 1995);
Krynicki, 689 F.2d at 291; see also Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 950 N.E.2d 853, 865 n.9
(Mass. 2011) ("We are loath to approach such a complicated question [sua sponte] without the
benefit of briefing from the parties."); Slater v. Rawson, 42 Mass. 450, 450 (Mass. 1840) (stating
proper for court to consider argument not presented below because facts conceded); Vaughan v.
E. Edison Co., 719 N.E.2d 520, 524 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (exercising discretion to consider new
issue where both parties briefed issues and neither had objected); Altschuler v. Bos. Rent Bd.,
425 N.E.2d 781, 786 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (finding issues presented question of law and briefed
and argued by parties).
385 See e.g., United States v. Pakala, 568 F.3d 47, 57 (1st Cir. 2009) (stating legal issue not
raised below reviewable because record fully developed, and no special prejudice); Nuclear
Metals, Inc., 656 N.E.2d at 572 (noting waived issue addressed as question of law and as
adequate record); In re Redgate, 633 N.E.2d 380, 383 (Mass. 1994) ("[Ilt is within our discretion
to consider issues not otherwise properly before us when presented with argument and a complete
record on which to examine the issue."); Loomer, 837 N.E.2d at 716.
186 Denny v. Westfield State Coll., 880 F.2d 1465,
1473 (1st Cir. 1989); see Dobb v. Baker,
505 F.2d 1041, 1044-45 (1st Cir. 1974) (noting reliance claim forfeited despite appellant
presenting evidence, because not raised below); Friedman v. Bd. of Registration in Med., 561
N.E.2d 859, 862 (Mass. 1990) (declining review of unpreserved issue where "factoral predicate of
such arguments not in the record"); Fedorchuk, 723 N.E.2d at 44 ("[The] general rule will not be
invoked where justice will be served by a consideration of the claim and the other party is not
prejudiced by consideration of the issue."). This has also been held to be applicable to plain error
review. See United States v. Brown, 352 F.3d 654, 665 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating where record
below is incomplete, review for plain error is to be more rigorous); Cornell v. Michaud, 947
N.E.2d 1138, 1143-44 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (noting "typically" failing to raise issue constitutes
waiver where resolution requires adequate record and findings concerning claim).
387 See RYO Cigar Ass'n, Inc. v. Bos. Pub. Health Comm'n., 950 N.E.2d 889, 894 (Mass.
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such as when the issue isinthe "public interest"388 or affects outcome.389
For instance, it is not uncommon for courts to address the otherwise waived
issue because it was
briefed "and because the answer to the issue [was]
390
reasonably clear.,

The absence of prejudice has also been identified as a factor and
interest militating toward discretionary review of an otherwise forfeited
issue, and is tied closely to the adequacy of record factor. 391 The question
asked is whether the party asserting forfeiture has been harmed or
prejudiced in not having the chance to address the issue below. If the issue
is one where the party could have presented helpful evidence, for instance,
prejudice will exist militating against permitting appellate review.392
All of these factors address the capability/competency of the
App. Ct. 2011) ('JAill issues have been briefed by both sides and we therefore consider them
all.").
388 Maslab Liquidation Trust v. Commonwealth, 806 N.E.2d 947, 948 ni (Mass. App. Ct.
2004); Smith v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 844 N.E.2d 680, 686 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (stating
constitutional challenge to newly drafted sex-offender classification guidelines addressable
because fully briefed).
389 See Police Dep't of Bos. v. Fedorchuk, 723 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Mass. 2000).
390 Woburn Bd. of Appeals v. Housing Appeals Comm., 847 N.E.2d 1140, 2006 WL
1493052, at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (unpublished table decision) (quoting Brown v. Guerrier,
457 N.E.2d 630, 631 (Mass. 1983)).
391 See Royal Indem. Co. v. Blakely, 360 N.E.2d 864, 865 (Mass. 1977) ("[The general rule]
has force where the other party may be prejudiced by the failure to raise the point below."); see
also Nat'l Ass'n of Soc. Workers v. Harwood, 69 F.3d 622, 627-28 (1st Cir. 1995); United States
v. Krynicki, 689 F.2d 289, 291-92 (1st Cir. 1982); Albert v. Mun. Court of Bos., 446 N.E.2d
1385, 1387 (Mass. 1983); First Nat'l Bank ofBos. v. Haufler, 385 N.E.2d 970, 972 (Mass. 1979)
(stating will not consider new issue on appeal if other side would be prejudiced).
392 See e.g., Bird v. United States, 241 F.2d 516, 521 (1st Cir. 1957)
("If the taxpayer had
made this 'recovery exclusion' argument an issue in the district court, we assume the government
could have introduced evidence tending to defeat its applicability by showing that the taxpayer
received some tax benefit from claiming the original interest deduction in his return for 1942");
Ingram v. Problem Pregnancy of Worcester, Inc., 488 N.E.2d 408, 409 n.4 (Mass. 1986); Cruz v.
Comm'r of Pub. Welfare, 478 N.E.2d 1262, 1264-65 (Mass. 1985); Albert, 446 N.E.2d at 1387
("[T]he rule that an issue need not be considered for the first time on appeal 'has particular force
when the other party may be prejudiced by the failure to raise the point below.'") (quoting Royal
Indem. Co., 360 N.E.2d at 865)). For example, the Supreme Judicial Court relied on this factor in
an action in which an appellant claimed to have been denied Medicaid benefits but had never
raised her eligibility for such benefits under a federal regulation allowing such status where the
alien is permanently residing in the United States "under color of law." Cruz, 478 N.E.2d at
1264. It was found that "justice" weighed in favor of considering the issue as the appellant "has
been denied benefits to which she may in fact be entitled under the applicable Federal
regulations" and that it did not "appear that the department will have been prejudiced by the
plaintiff's failure to press this issue below." Id.See In re Dustin A., No. F060297, 2011 WL
2637499, at * 13 (Cal. Ct. App. July 6, 2011) (refusing to reach unpreserved constitutional claim
as was not sufficiently briefed); E.H.S. v. K.E.S., 676 N.E.2d 449, 450 (Mass. 1997); In re
Gagnon, 625 N.E.2d 555, 558 (Mass. 1994). Conversely, where an appellant would suffer
prejudice on rehearing due to difficulty of locating witnesses many years after events at issue, the
unpreserved issue would not be heard. Cruz, 478 N.E.2d at 1264.
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appellate court to provide meaningful review with the briefing and
prejudice factors also representing the importance of the party presentation
principle. Questions of law are "excepted" from forfeiture due to the fact
that such questions do not depend on the factual record below.3 93 This
"exception" appears to derive as well from the principle that an appellate
court reviews questions of law de novo without deference to the lower

court evaluation.
These court capability or competency factors do not otherwise
address any of the other underpinnings to the raise or lose rule such as
judicial economy, finality and encouraging all issues to be raised at trial.

Moreover, there remains great value to an appellate court to have the lower
court address, in the first instance, any issue including questions of law and
regardless whether or not the appellate court need not afford deference.
These capability/competency factors, if sufficient alone to merit
not only review of unpreserved or new issues on appeal but reversal or
remand, severely undercut the plain error/substantial risk of miscarriage of
justice default standard. The unpreserved issue is reviewed de novo and
without regard as to any plain or fundamental error. There is likewise
nothing particularly "extraordinary" in an appellate issue involving a
question of law with a complete record and full briefing of the parties.
The retort may be that the pure legal question "exception" fits into
the understanding that it is the appellate court, in the end, that must
properly declare the governing law to the dispute as well as future cases
justifying exception.39 4 Yet this is not truly an "exception" as opposed to a
policy choice, and wary territory, particularly for intermediate appellate
courts.39 5 Many courts have admirably declined to review even pure legal
questions if not raised below, 396 with others refusing absent at least a
393 Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556 (1941); see also United States v. Miller, 636 F.2d
850, 853 (1st Cir. 1980) ("Ilt would be unfair if litigants were 'surprised on appeal by final
decision there of issues upon which they had no opportunity [below] to introduce evidence."')
(quoting Hormel, 312 U.S. at 556)); Atlas Tack Corp. v. DiMasi, 637 N.E.2d 230, 233 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1994) (stating no opportunity to present issue below, issue was one of law and fully
briefed).
194 See Appellate Courts, supra note 352, at 60 ("Justification for de novo authority derives from
one of the major reasons for the existence of the appellate courts: to maintain uniformity in the
law throughout the jurisdiction and to keep the law evolving and developing[.]"); Frost, supra
note5,at 470-71 ("[Flederal courts have the power 'to say what the law is,' and thus must be able
to take notice of legal sources, arguments, and claims omitted by the parties to avoid issuing
inaccurate statements of law."); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1807) (explaining
Supreme Court has power "to say what the law is").
395 See James D. Hopkins, The Role of the IntermediateAppellate Court, 41 BROOK. L. REV.
459, 460-78 (1975) ("The intermediate court is usually cast in the error correcting mold rather
than into a rule making model").
396 Unified Indus., Inc. v. Easley, 961 P.2d 100, 103 (Mont. 1998) (refusing except ion for
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showing that the argument is "so compelling as virtually to insure
"3197
According to the Tenth Circuit:
appellant's success.

[N]o case in this circuit has held that we may reverse based
on "purely legal" arguments in the absence of plain error.
And the fact that this court has sometimes reversed on the
basis of a new legal argument without indicating the

burden the appellant must carry to obtain reversal cannot
ensconce binding precedent requiring or allowing us to
ignore the longstanding requirement
that new legal
39 8
arguments overcome plain error.
This is in keeping with the prudential concern behind prohibiting
litigants from trying a case under one theory and then changing horses on
appeal once unsuccessful, as well as the need to remain tied to the
fundamental error correction appellate function.399 This approach, in

effect, eliminates the question of law as a separate basis for the
"exceptional circumstances" exception to the raise or forfeit rule, leaving
the issue to be addressed under the plain error/miscarriage ofjustice default

standard.40 0
Although the capability criteria under "exceptional circumstances,"
i.e., question of law, adequate record and no prejudice are seldom

pure questions of law from general of raise or lose).
'97 Denny v. Westfield State Coll., 880 F.2d 1465, 1473 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting SanchezArroyo v. E. Airlines, Inc., 835 F.2d 407, 408-09 (1st Cir. 1987)); see also Johnson v. Helmerich
& Payne, Inc., 892 F.2d 422, 424 (5th Cir 1990) (stating failure to object precludes review unless
issue legal question because to ignore miscarries justice); Fortier v. Town of Essex, 752 N.E.2d
818, 822 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) ("Where injustice might otherwise result, an appellate court
properly may consider questions of law which were neither argued nor passed upon in a court or
agency below.") (quoting Hoffer v. Comm'r of Corr., 589 N.E. 2d 1231, 1235 (Mass. 1992))),
overruled by Morrissey v. New Eng. Deaconess Ass'n, 940 N.E.2d 391 (Mass. 2010).
398 Richisonv. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1128-29 (10th Cir. 2011).
'99Denny, 880 F.2d at 1473 (Johnson v. Allyn & Bacon, Inc., 731 F.2d 64, 73 (1st Cir.
1984); see B & T Masonry Constr. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir.
2004).
400 Another concern with the question of law factor is the sometimes knotty issue of whether
the issue is truly one of law and whether the opposing party could have presented different
arguments or new evidence had the "legal" contention been made at trial. Some courts have thus
refused to invoke the exception finding the issue not one of law if there was a loss of opportunity
to develop the record or argument below and/or the opposing party would have otherwise altered
its position. See Runnebaumv. NationsBank of Md., N.A., 123 F.3d 156, 177-78 (4th Cir. 1997)
(Michael, J., dissenting) (disputing majority's finding disability a question of law when court
endorses an individualized inquiry), overruled on other grounds, Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.
624 (1998); Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1144 (5th Cir.
1981).
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40 1
mentioned as to plain or fundamental error review, the criteria is implicit.
An appellate court cannot fairly find plain error, never mind plain error,

resulting in either a miscarriage of justice or affecting the fairness or
integrity of the proceeding unless there is an adequate record, briefing, and

absence of prejudice.
2. Applicability and Classification
The applicability and classification criteria identified in
"exceptional circumstance" discretion concerns the question of whether the
general rule precluding addressing new issues or unpreserved claims even
applies. They address those situations where (a) there has been no true

waiver or forfeiture, and (b) otherwise distinguish between waiver and
forfeiture. These are also not true "exceptions" and are otherwise equally
applicable to plain error.
The governing circumstances as to whether the issue was ever truly
waived or forfeited include where there is an intervening change of the law;
where the claim or argument was not known; where the party was
precluded from raising the issue; or where raising the issue was futile.
Where the appellant had no opportunity to raise the question on appeal in
the trial or lower court, or otherwise was precluded from doing so,
establishes that there was never any true waiver of forfeiture eliminating
the applicability of the general rule.40 2 Related circumstances include
where it has been found that the particular objection or claim was not
known to be available at the time it could have first been made.40 3 A party
will be excused from raising a claim or defense if at the time it should have

401

See United States v. Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d 110, 116 (1st Cir. 2011) ("How far Olano

embraces concerns of prejudice to the other side might be debated .... ).
4u2 See Mass. Ass'n of Older Ams., Inc. v. Comm'r of Ins., 471 N.E.2d 1281, 1287 (Mass.
1984). For example, inAtlas Tack Corp. v. DiMasi, an appeal was taken on the grant of sumnmary
judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff's partnership by estoppel claim. 637 N.E.2d 230,
237 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994). The defendants had also argued that the appeal should be dismissed
because following sumnmary judgment, the plaintiff settled the claim against one of the defendants
and the terms of the release purported to prevent any further action. Id. at 231. The court agreed
to address the issue even though it was not raised below on the grounds that the defendants did
not have the opportunity to raise it below. Id. at 233. According to the court, under
circumstances where the defendants "would not have had the opportunity to present the issue to
the court below and where the issue is one of law which [had] been fully briefed and argued on
appeal by the parties, [the court] believe[d] the interests of judicial economy warrant[ed]
consideration of the issue." Id.
403 See Bennett v. Holyoke, 362 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2004) (stating exception in civil case);
United States v. Lopez-Pena, 912 F.2d 1542, 1549 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating same exception in
criminal case); see also Gurry v. Bd. of Pub. Accountancy, 474 N.E.2d 1085, 1090 (Mass. 1985).
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been raised it would have been futile under existing precedent.40 4
Examples would include the overruling of a prior decision or legislative
clarification as well as a change in decisional law 4after
the lower court
05
decision which may have materially altered the result.
Further, where any objection, if made, would have been futile
review has been permitted.40 6 Where, for instance, it is clear that an agency
would not have ruled on the argument based on its established position or
4M See In re San Juan DuPont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 994 F.2d 956, 961 (1st Cir. 1993)
("The law does not require litigants to run a fools' errand. Thus, a party who forgoes an
obviously futile task will not ordinarily be held thereby to have waived substantial rights.");
Franki Found. Co. v. Alger-Rau & Assocs., Inc., 513 F.2d 581, 587 (3d Cir. 1975) (noting waiver
rejected where grounded in party's dereliction of a futile task).
405 M.H. Gordon & Son, Inc. v. Alcohol Beverages Control Comm'n, 434 N.E.2d
986, 989
(Mass. 1982) ("[W]here new interpretations of law may have materially altered the result of the
commission's decisions, we are inclined to allow a previously unadvanced issue to be raised
before the court."); Commonwealth v. Williams, 951 N.E.2d 55, 2011 WL 3299022, at *3 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2011) (unpublished table decision) (allowing defendant to raise new constitutional
argument from law announced after lower court proceeding). On this point Judge Posner of the
Seventh Circuit observed: "[a] party should be allowed to take advantage of a decision rendered
during the pendency of his case, even if he did not reserve the point decided, if the decision could
not have reasonably been anticipated. A contrary rule would induce the parties to drown the judge
with reservations." McKnight v. Gen. Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 108 (7th Cir. 1990),
superseded by statute as stated in Humphries v. CBOCS West, Inc., 474 F.3d 387 (7th Cir. 2007).
This exception, in fact, has been held to allow a court to consider the issue sua sponte. United
States v. Garcia, 77 F.3d 274, 276 (9th Cir. 1996); State v. Harris, 224 P.3d 830, 834 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2010). Massachusetts follows a variant of this principle for constitutional issues referred to
as the "clairvoyance exception." See Commonwealth v. Randolph- 780 N.E.2d 58, 65 (Mass.
2002); Commonwealth v. Rembiszewski, 461 N.E.2d 201, 204 (Mass. 1984); see also
Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 914 N.E.2d 944, 952 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009), rev'd by 923 N.E.2d
524 (Mass. 2010). "[W]hen the constitutional theory on which the defendant has relied was not
sufficiently developed at the time of trial or direct appeal to afford the defendant a genuine
opportunity to raise his claim at those junctures of the case" the raise or lose rule does not apply.
Rembiszewski, 461 N.E.2d at 204. The waiver test is whether "the theory on which [the]
argument is premised has been sufficiently developed to put [the defendant] on notice that the
issue is a live issue. Counsel need not be clairvoyant." Commonwealth v. Amirault, 677 N.E.2d
652, 667 (Mass. 1997) (quoting Commonwealth v. Bowler, 553 N.E.2d 534, 536 (Mass. 1990)).
This clairvoyance exception has not developed principally in connection with direct appeals but
rather been at play as to appeals collateral to a direct appeal, specifically under the purview of
motions for new trial. Vasquez, 914 N.E.2d at 952. If the exception applies, the appellate court
will review the claim as if it were preserved. Commonwealth v. Woodworth, 922 N.E.2d 862,
2010 WL 743506, at *2 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010) (unpublished table decision). It has been
suggested that the exception is limited to constitutional issues. Commonwealth v. Peppicelli, 872
N.E.2d 1142, 1152-53 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (questioning clairvoyance exception applicability
outside constitutional issues or to new common law rule of evidence).
406 A.H. Gordon & Son, 434 N.E.2d at 989 (stating justice served by considering claim
not
raised because Supreme Court decision arguably modified law); see also Brent E. Newton, An
Argument for Reviving the Actual Futility Exception to the Supreme Court's ProceduralDefault
Doctrine, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCEss 521, 559 (2002) (examining futility exception to procedural
default and exception). "The actual futility exception promotes fundamental fairness and serves

other legitimate purposes. Id.
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understanding of existing law, the raise or lose is inapplicable.40 7
The application and classification grouping also includes criteria
seeking to differentiate between waived and forfeited issues. If waived,
there has been an intentional relinquishment of a right which is not subject
to any exception, discretionary or otherwise.
If not intentional, but
inadvertent, the issue is "only" forfeited, thus allowing for the application
of discretionary exception if otherwise applicable.
Courts frequently look to whether the failure to preserve or timely
raise the issue was "strategic." Similarly, if the error claimed on appeal
was "invited," a party is deemed to have waived the claim and loses any
right to invoke discretionary exception.
In examining whether strategic or inadvertent, courts have looked

at the circumstances of the failure to object or preserve 408 as a relevant
consideration in determining whether to afford review on the merits. If the

failure to preserve is "inadvertent," or where it was not due to a desire or
intent for tactical advantage, is deemed a favorable, if not dispositive,
409

circumstance to consider in whether to afford discretionary review.
Some courts have noted that the distinction can be one of degree. For
instance, a repeated failure to preserve has been noted to militate against

review, 410 plain error or otherwise, with some courts suggesting that a

407
408

AIH. Gordon & Son, 434 N.E.2d at 989.
See United States v. Ortz-Arrigoitia, 996 F.2d 436, 442 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding reasons

for failing to move for mistrial were not inadvertent but tactical); Commonwealth v. Trappaga,
924 N.E.2d 298, 308 n.6 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010) (reviewing record disclosed failure to request
instruction was not deliberate litigation tactic).
409 Montalvo v. Gonzalez, 587 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2009); Nat'l Ass'n of Soc. Workers v.
Harwood, 69 F.3d 622, 628 (1st Cir. 1995); see also New Yorkv. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645
F.3d 114, 140 (2d Cir. 2011) ("[W]e will not excuse the defendants' forfeiture in this instance,
where there is every indication defendant's default was not the product of inadvertence, but a
deliberate tactic instead."); LNC Invs., Inc. v. Nat'l Westminster Bank, 308 F.3d 169, 176 n.8 (2d
Cir. 2002)("It would be particularly unusual [to address an argument despite its abandonment on
appeal] ... where the abandonment appears to be strategic choice rather than inadvertent error.").
This also has been applied to plain error review. See United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 128
n.2 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting plain error finding more likely where there is no likelihood of strategic
manipulation); People v. Stewart, 55 P.3d 107, 119 (Colo. 2009) (stating where omission is
strategic, invited error should not be invoked).
410 United States v. Figueroa, 818 F.2d 1020, 1026 (1st Cir. 1987). The court
in Figueroa
stated:
The record makes it excruciatingly plain that at no time before, during, or
after the trial did the defendant object to the proffer of [testimony challenged
on appeal] . . . . Notwithstanding what appellate counsel now urges, trial
counsel-for what may well have been sound tactical reasons-appears
deliberately to have bypassed such a defense stratagem.
Id. See, e.g., Vaspourakan, Ltd. V. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 516 N.E.2d 1153,
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41
repeated failure to object can move a forfeited error to a waived one. 1
The difficulty remains being able to fairly determine between inadvertence
and strategic in any given case.412
Under invited or induced error, "a party may not complain on
appeal of errors that he himself invited or provoked the court or the
opposite party to make. 4 13 It is a principle of estoppel. The focus is less
on the failure to preserve and more on the perversion of the judicial
414
proceeding stemming from the use or adoption of inconsistent positions.

1158 (Mass. 1987) (noting number of opportunities to raise issue); In re Adoption of Ernest, No.

04-P-1731, 2005 WL 1773697, at *4 (Mass. App. Ct. July 26, 2005) (noting matter not
exceptional case given "opportunity to have preserved the issue below"); In re Georgette, 768
N.E.2d 549, 553 n.6 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (finding exception inapplicable because of appellant's
"untrammeled opportunity to have preserved the issue below"); Waxman v. Amherst Hous.
Review Bd., 1992 Mass. App. Div. 89, 1992 WL 102801, at *2 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1992) (noting
"numerous occasions" party failed to raise issue).
411 In re Net-Velazquez, 625 F.3d 34, 40 (1st Cir. 2010) (stating despite including defense in
answer, subsequent inattention precludes exercise of discretionary power); Chestnut v. Lowell,
305 F.3d 18, 32-33 (1st Cir. 2006) (Lopez, J. and Lynch, J., dissenting) (noting immunity issue
"particularly egregious" because not raised at multiple opportunities); see also United States v.
Patrick, 359 F.3d 3, 8 (1st Cir. 2004) (allowing restitution issue on appeal despite "lack of
emphasis" at disposition hearing); Carter, supra note 2 at 950. The notion of "inadvertence" is
found in Rule 60(b)(1) of both the Federal and Massachusetts rules of civil procedure. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1); MAss. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). The Rule authorizes relief from ajudgment on the
basis of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect." FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). It has
been held, however, that neither "strategic miscalculation" nor "counsel's misinterpretation of
law" warrants relief from judgment. FHC Equities, L.L.C. v. MBL Life Assurance Corp., 188
F.3d 678, 683-87 (6th Cir. 1999).
412 See Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting could not determine
from record whether failure to object strategic or inadvertent), abrogation recognized by
Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 1999); O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, 121415 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating same); In re Oleg, 776 N.E.2d 1039, 2002 WL 31322751, at *2 n.6

(Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (unpublished table decision) ("Given the record on appeal, we also cannot
determine whether counsel's actions were the result of deliberate tactical choices").
413 United States v. Barrow, 118 F.3d 482, 490 (6th Cir. 1997) ("[Invited error intended to
deter] party from inducing erroneous ruling and later seeking to profit from the legal
consequences by having the verdict vacated."); Harvis v. Roadway Express, Inc., 923 F.2d 59, 60
(6th Cir. 1991); see also Ford v. Cnty. of Grand Traverse, 535 F.3d 483, 490-91 (6th Cir. 2008)
(explaining the invited-error doctrine). See State v. Charles, 39 A.3d 750, 754 (Conn. App. Ct.
2012) ("The term induced error, or invited error, has been defined as [an error that a party cannot
complain of on appeal because the party, through conduct, encouraged or prompted the trial court
to make the erroneous ruling.") (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Kitchens, 10 A.3d 942,
945 (Conn. 2010))); Tittizer v. Union Gas Corp., 171 S.W.3d 857, 862 (Tex. 2005) ("[A] party
cannot complain on appeal that the trial court took a specific action that the complaining party
requested, a doctrine commonly referred to as the invited error doctrine.") (internal quotations
omitted).
414 See Box Pond Ass'n. v. Energy Facilities Sitting Bd., 758 N.E.2d 604, 615 n.14 (Mass.
2001) ("One who by his conduct induces the commission of some error by the trial court, or, in
other words, who has invited error, is estopped from insisting that the action of the court is

erroneous.") (quoting Deland v. Old Republic Life Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 1331, 1336 (9th Cir.
1985))); see also Data Gen. Corp. v. Johnson, 78 F.3d 1556, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("The doctrine
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As the First Circuit has stated, "a party may not appeal from an error to
which he contributed, either by failing to object or by affirmatively

presenting to the court the vrong law. ,4 The First Circuit has held that
invited error precludes plain error review 416 and has otherwise applied the
doctrine to such instances as complained of statements elicited on cross
4
examination' 4 7 claims the court failed to conduct choice of law inquiry, 18
and jury instructions.41 9 Massachusetts practice recognizes the doctrine but
allows for review, in criminal cases, under the substantial risk of
miscarriage default standard. 420 As to civil matters, the doctrine precludes
of judicial estoppel is that where a party successfully urges a particular position in a legal
proceeding, itis estopped from taking a contrary position in a subsequent proceeding where its
interests have changed."); Freedman v. Freedman, 557 N.E.2d 1386, 1387 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990)
("The case was presented and tried on the theory that the judgment of divorce was modifiable
upon a showing of a material change in circumstances. The appeals, therefore, should proceed on
the same theory."); State v. Richard, 7 A.3d 1195, 1200 (N.H. 2010) (stating invited error is
classified as waiver or estoppel).
415 Austinv. Unarco Indust., Inc., 705 F.2d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 1983).
416 McDonald v. Fed. Labs., Inc., 724 F.2d 243, 248 (1st Cir. 1984) ("It has been said that
the 'plain error' doctrine has no application where the party claiming error invited or elicited the

alleged error.") (citing 11

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT

& ARTHUR R. MWLER,
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§ 2885 (1973))); see United States v. Mitchell, 85 F.3d 800, 807 (1st Cir. 1996)
(stating invited error waives all claims of error including plain error); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Trayniecki, 293 F.2d 289, 291 (5th Cir. 1961) (stating same).
417 United States v. Lizardo, 445 F.3d 73, 84 (1st Cir. 2006); see also Buggs
v. State, 640
AND PROCEDURE

So.2d 90, 91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding objectionable comment during cross-examination
invited error because comment in response to defense counsel's question).
418 P.R. Hosp. Supply, Inc. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 426 F.3d 503, 505-06 (1st Cir. 2005).
419 See Fraser v. Major League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 63 n.11 (1" Cir 2002) (applying
invited error because complaining party had requested instruction below); see Harvis v. Roadway
Express Inc., 923 F.2d 59, 61-62 (6th Cir. 1991); Lively v. Elkhorn Coal Co., 206 F.2d 396, 399
(6th Cir.1953) (declining claimed error where appellant failed to request or object to jury
instructions); see also People v. Flores, No. G044509, 2012 WL 733900, at *10 (Cal. App. Ct.
Mar. 7, 2012) (barring defendant from raising issue on appeal when "conscious and deliberate
tactical choice" made below); State v. Wilson, 270 P.3d 1230, 2012 WL 718916, at *15 (Kan. Ct.
App. 2012), (unpublished table decision) (refusing to apply invited error in sentence stipulation).
In Wilson, the court noted that "no party can properly stipulate to an incorrect application of the
law" and that the "invited error rationale is not applicable when the erroneous infonnation at the
heart of a stipulation is within the knowledge of the court, the prosecutor, and defense counsel,
but not the defendant." Id. (quoting State v. Donaldson 133 P.3d 154, 157 (Kan. Ct. App.
2006)).
420 Commonwealth v. Roderiques, 940 N.E.2d 1234, 1237-38 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011);
see
also Commonwealth v. Knight, 637 N.E.2d 240, 244 (Mass. App. Ct.1994) (recognizing heavy
burden of demonstrating substantial miscarriage of justice). The court in Knight stated:
As the challenged instruction was given upon the specific request of defense
counsel at trial, to the extent that the issue is reviewable at all, the defendant
on appeal bears a heavy burden in attempting to have his conviction
overturned. He must demonstrate at least a substantial risk of a miscarriage
of justice.
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any review.4 2'

These applicability and classification factors are not a basis for any
separate non-plain error discretionary exception. Rather, they determine
whether there has, in the first instance, been a waiver precluding any
exception at all. If a party has waived the issue or is otherwise estopped
from making such a claim due to induced or invited error, discretionary
exception under plain error or exceptional circumstances has no
applicability. Indeed, these considerations apply equally to plain error
review and further exemplify why there is a substantial question of whether
exception outside of plain error is truly justified.

Id. (citations omitted); Lannon v. Commonwealth, 400 N.E.2d 862, 866 (Mass. 1980) ("The
petitioner cannot now object to the judge's use of wording which his own counsel proposed for
inclusion in the instructions."); Commonwealth v. Gladney, 607 N.E.2d 750, 754 n.3 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1993) ("Ordinarily, we would not review an instruction requested by defense counsel. We do
so here out of an abundance of caution and fairness and because the defendant claims that the
incorrect instruction resulted from trial counsel's ineffectiveness."); Commonwealth v. Simcock,
575 N.E.2d 1137, 1144 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) ("The consequences of trial tactics may not be
converted after conviction into alleged errors by the judge. The less is this so if the tactics
produce some measure of success, as they did here.") (citations omitted); Commonwealth v.
Grant, 727 N.E.2d 1207, 1209-10 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) ("Where the error [in giving an
instruction] was invited by the defendant, our review is limited to whether a substantial risk of a
miscarriage of justice occurred."); see Commonwealth v. Vinnie, 698 N.E.2d 896, 910-11 (Mass.
1998) (affirming first degree murder conviction because defendant asked instruction on second
degree murder be omitted).
421 Box Pond Ass'n. v. Energy Facilities Sitting Bd., 758 N.E.2d 604, 615 n.14 (Mass.
2001);
Vescera v. Vescera, 938 N.E.2d 906, 2010 WL 5071965, at *2 n.5 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010)
(unpublished table decision). There is some concern that applying invited error too broadly such
as not differentiating between cleat strategic choices and unwitting failures subverts substantial
justice. See Sean Arthurs, Case Comment, A Foolish Consistency: How Refusing to Review Ford
v. Garcia's Invited ErrorDemonstratesthe Eleventh Circuit'sPrioritizationof Procedure Over
Justice, 72 U. CINN. L. REv. 1707, 1721 22 (2004).

The primary purpose of the invited error doctrine is to deter defendants from
making 'an affirmative, apparently strategic decision at trial and then
complain[ing] on appeal that the result of that decision constitutes reversible
error.' The widespread acceptance of the plain error exception to the
preservation of error requirement has prompted some legal charlatans to
devise trial strategies that ensure the presence of a plain error at the trial
court level .... [T]he invited error doctrine assumes a complete familiarity
with the relevant law and penalizes the ill-prepared or unwitting lawyer just
as harshly as the malicious lawyer .

. .

. This complete prohibition on

reviewing invited error disregards the dangers of establishing a flawed
precedent and ignores any role played by the opposing counsel or the judge
in contributing to the error.
ld. (quoting United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1290 (11th Cir.2003)).
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3. Error Correction
The coterminous relationship between "exceptional circumstances"
and plain error discretion is particularly apparent with the outcome
determinative or compelling argument factor comprising many of the
formulations of "exceptional circumstance" discretion including under

Krynicki.

2

In Singleton, the Supreme Court agreed to address the merits

of an argument not properly preserved as "proper resolution was beyond
any doubt." 423 The justification is that it remains with the appellate court to

ultimately do justice and, to a lesser extent, that a preliminary or earlier
examination of the "compelling argument" by the lower court would not
likely benefit the appellate court or the parties. 4 24 This factor is focused, as
plain error, on the error correcting function of the appellate court.
In the exceptional circumstance discretionary context, courts have
stated the consideration in various ways, including "miscarriage of justice,"
"manifest injustice," as well as the First Circuit's "virtually assuring
Regardless of terminology, the centerpiece
success 4 2 5 formulation.
remains the issue of "error."
The compelling argument or "virtually assuring success"

"exception" is akin to the notion of a "miscarriage of justice" and/or
"injustice might otherwise result" at least where the ruling below is in
error. 42 6 The First Circuit, in fact, suggested that the new issue not only
422
423

See 689 F.2d 289, 291-92 (1st Cir. 1982).
428 U.S. 106,121 (1976); see Krynicki, 689 F.2d at (finding government's statutory

interpretation "highly persuasive . . . leaving no doubt as to . . . proper resolution of issue")
(citation omitted).
424 Id. at 292 ("Given the compelling nature of the government's argument,
preliminary
examination of this legal issue by the trial court would not benefit either the court or the parties
appreciably.").
425 Daigle v. Me. Med. Ctr., 14 F.3d 684, 688 (1st Cir. 1994) ("[W]e invoke
... exception
only when, at a bare minimum, the omitted ground is so compelling as virtually to ensure an
appellant's success."); Denny v. Westfield State Coll., 880 F.2d 1465, 1473 (1st Cir. 1989)
(assuring success prong met because record lacking and latent legal issues resolution uncertain);
Johnston v. Holiday Inns Inc., 595 F. 2d 890, 894 (1st Cir. 1979) ("[P]osing the issues raised by
the appellant before us for the first time shows the wisdom of the rule requiring that appellate
review be limited to what was raised and argued in the trial court."); Dobb v. Baker, 505 F.2d
1041, 1044 (1st Cir. 1974) (noting contention was not "frivolous" but also not "self-evident"); In
re Redgate, 633 N.E.2d 380, 382 (Mass. 1994) ("In the circumstances, we feel it appropriate to
consider the issue [because it] would be a reproach to the justice system and would squander
judicial and legal resources.") (internal quotations and citations omitted); Attorney General v.
Brown 511 N.E.2d 1103, 1105 (Mass. 1987) (noting would exercise exceptional circumstance
discretion because the issue of preemption could be dispositive), superseded by statute as stated,
DiLiddo v. Oxford Street Realty, Inc., 876 N.E.2d 421 (Mass. 2007); Police Dep't of Bos. v.
Fedorchuk, 723 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (allowing issue because fully briefed and
"just result" required consideration).
426 See Krynicki, 689 F.2d at 292 ("[D]eclining to reach the government's . . . argument
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must be so compelling as to virtually assure success, but it must also result
in a miscarriage of justice. 427 In this context, miscarriage of justice has
been defined to mean "more than the individualized harm that occurs
whenever the failure seasonably to raise a claim or defense alters the
outcome of a case." 4 28 "Rather, courts ordinarily relax the raise or waive
principle on this basis only if a failure to do so threatens the frustration of
some broadly important right." 429 "For this reason, courts often are more
prone to make the infrequent exception in cases that involve a discernible
public interest, and less prone to do so in disputes between private
parties.'43°

Some courts appear to conduct a review of the merits to determine
if it is compelling. This has been noted to include examination of the
overall evidence and whether it supports the verdict. 431 The court conducts

a review of the merits of the unpreserved contention to determine whether
it should be excepted from forfeiture, yet simultaneously addresses the
merits. Other courts simply "determine" whether assuming the argument
432
has merit, it would result in a miscarriage of justice not to address it.
The inquiry is "restricted" involving a "survey" of the record "always
bearing in mind that we are not ruling on the merits of the claim
but only
433

searching for rank injustice or overwhelming evidence of error.,

The overlap with plain error is readily apparent. Under the
Krynicki terminology of "virtually assuring success" it might be that the
argument need only be demonstrated as "compelling," which when
accompanied by other "exceptional circumstances" like significant public

would result in a miscarriage of .... [and] justice requires that this court correct the lower

court's error even though the government failed to apprise the court below of its error."); see also
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Wheeler, 814 F.2d 812, 820-21 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding
refusal to fee award would constitute manifest injustice where lower court applied incorrect
standard).
427 See Nat'l Ass'n of Soc. Workers v. Harwood, 69 F.3d 622,
628 n.5 (1st Cir. 1995); See
also Chambers v. Calais, 187 F.3d 621, 1998 WL 1085801, at *4 (1st Cir. 1998) (unpublished
table decision); Credit Francais Int'l, S.A. v. Bio-Vita, Ltd., 73 F.3d 698, 709 (1st Cir. 1996).
428 Harwood, 69 F.3d at 628 n.5.
429

id.

430 Id; contra Miller, supra note

3, at 1307 ("IT]he miscarriage of justice standard is the
most open and manipulative of all.").
431 See In re Adoption of Ernest, No. 04-P-1731, 2005 WL 1773697, at *4 (Mass. App. Ct.
July 26, 2005) ("This is not such an exceptional case (given the substantial evidence of the
parties' unfitness"); In re Georgette, 768 N.E.2d 549, 553 n.6 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (noting not
exceptional case because of overwhelming evidence supporting finding).
432 See United States v. La Guardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1013 (1st Cir. 1990) ("[I]f the
defendants' constitutional claim has merit, it would be a rank miscarriage of justice to allow their
sentences to stand."); see Case of McLeod's, 450 N.E.2d 612, 614 (Mass. 1983) (recognizing

where injustice might otherwise result, an appellate court may consider questions of law).
4" Hernandez-Hernandez v. United States, 904 F.2d 758, 763 (1st Cir. 1990).
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interest, justifies further review. Yet this would not appear to be a
meaningful distinction. If not tied to any need for error but simply a means
justifying review for "institutional" reasons, it perpetuates unequal
treatment and otherwise unnecessarily dilutes the plain error/substantial
risk of miscarriage of justice default standard, particularly if reversal is
permitted. If the issue must "virtually assure success," why isn't the plain
error default standard enough in applying to all unpreserved issues or new
arguments, particularly where any such error must be shown to effect
"fairness, integrity or public reputation of the proceeding?"
4. Issue Stature and Law Declaration
The co-terminus relationship between plain error and exceptional
circumstances is not seamless. New issues or arguments, as opposed to
unpreserved errors together with the "public interest" or issue stature
component of exceptional circumstances discretion, are not readily
subsumed into the plain error standard. For the same reasons, the
differentiation between the two strands of discretion can be argued to be
justified by the separate error correcting and law declaring appellate
functions.
Plain error/substantial risk of miscarriage of justice review usually
involves a lower court ruling to which the plain error default standard can
be applied. The First Circuit has noted that plain error does not readily
apply to those instances where there is no per se ruling at issue (admission
of evidence, instruction, etc.) and a new claim or argument is being made
on appeal. It, in fact, has repeatedly stated that "it is normally not error at
all, let alone plain error, for a court to ignore a possible claim or defense
that a party fails to proffer or pursue.
Nonetheless, plain error would seem applicable even to new issues
or arguments. 435 The new issue or argument is addressed under plain error
from the perspective of determining whether the court committed error in
not raising the argument or issue on its own sua sponte. If the issue is truly
that compelling and "plain," then evaluating the trial court's failure to raise
it on its own is workable under plain error and furthers consistency and

414 Town of Norwood, Mass. v. New Eng. Power Co., 202 F.3d 408, 417 (1st Cir. 2000).
411 See Jordan v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 668 F.3d 1188, 1199 (10th Cir. 2011) (stating new

theories on appeal are subject only to review for plain error); Demere Landing Condo. Owner
Ass'n v. Matthews, No. AIA2154, 2012 WL 562670, at *3 (Ga. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2012)
(finding where no trial court ruling nothing to review of appeal); Bassinger v. Neb. Heart Hosp.,
806 N.W. 2d 395, 400 (Neb. 2011) (explaining lower court cannot commit error in resolving

issue never presented).
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equal treatment of cases. 436

The public interest component that dominates many of the existing
formulations of "exceptional circumstances" discretion, including those of
the First Circuit and Massachusetts, is more problematic. This factor, by
itself, is not able to be readily absorbed into plain error. Absent a direct tie
to the issue of whether there was error, it does not fit into the plain error
analysis, including the discretionary integrity, fairness, and public
reputation prong.
The public interest factors or circumstances under "exceptional
circumstance" discretion include where the issue is deemed of significant
public interest or importance, 3 the issue is novel or one of first
impression,438 or an issue which the appellate court believes requires
intervention to provide guidance to the lower court and/or the public.439
Both Massachusetts and the First Circuit, together with a great many other
jurisdictions, have identified significant public interest as to the
unpreserved argument or issue as meriting the exercise of discretion to
consider the otherwise forfeited matter. 440 The First Circuit has noted, with
little elaboration,
that this issue stature based factor or consideration is "the
44 1
most salient.

'

,

436 See Munoz v. Sociedad Espanola De Auxiolio Mutuo Y Beneficiencia De P.R., 671 F.3d

49, 59 (1st Cir. 2012) ("We have held, on rare occasions, that a court's failure to recognize and
apply, sua sponte, well-established case law can be so clear and obvious as to constitute plain
error.") (quotations omitted).
437 See cases at supra note 205; contra Abbott v. Law Office of Patrick J. Mulligan, 2011
WL 4375087, 440 Fed. App'x. 612, 624 (10th Cir. 2011) (explaining public policy arguments not
immune from waiver).
438 See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
439 See cases at supra note 256.
440 See In re Gagnon, 625 N.E.2d 555, 558 (Mass. 1994) (noting significant important public
interest but declining to review due to inadequate record); Filippone v. Mayor of Newton, 452
N.E.2d 239, 243 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984) ("Because of the public interest involved and the
uncertainty which would likely result if the question is left unresolved, and to avoid an unjust
result... [the] issue first briefed and argued on appeal, and neither raised nor passed upon below,
should be decided."), rev 'd by 467 N.E.2d 182 (Mass. 1984); see, e.g., Harvey v. Veneman, 396
F.3d 28, 45 (1st Cir. 2005) (considering whether issue of "great public moment"); B & T
Masonry Constr. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 2004) (reaching issue
because it is one of "paramount importance").
441 Harwood, 69 F.3d at 628; see Harvey, 396 F.3d at 45.
Both the First Circuit and
Massachusetts courts have gone on to find, again with little elaboration, that certain unpreserved
issues or arguments merited exception due to their public interest stature. See Harwood, 69 F.3d
at 27-28; (noting public importance of issue); Sheridan v. Michels, 362 F.3d 96, 104-05 (1st Cir.
2004) (stating same); United States v. La Guardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1012-13 (1st Cir. 1990)
(stating same); Norfolk v. Dep't of Env't Quality Eng'g, 552 N.E.2d 116, 119-20 (Mass. 1990)
(stating same);Attorney Gen. v. Brown, 511 N.E.2d 1103, 1105 n.4 (Mass. 1987) (stating same).
Relying on the public interest consideration, the First Circuit in Harwood held that the
unpreserved issue of the applicability of legislative immunity would be reviewed under the
exceptional circumstance principle because it involved a matter "of great public moment, and
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Courts have also referenced novelty or an issue of "first
impression" as a basis to review an otherwise unpreserved issue. 442
Unpreserved issues have been reviewed where it was determined that the
appellate court needed to provide guidance to the lower courts or the issue
concerned a matter "almost certain to arise in other cases. 4 43 These
circumstances are closely related if not subsumed within the "public

touches upon policies as basic as federalism, comity, and respect for the independence of
democratic institutions." Harwood, 69 F.3d at 628. It was determined that the failure to address
the issue would result in a federal court wrongly intruding into the internal operation of a state
legislature. Id. at 629; see also The Real Estate Bar Ass'n for Mass., Inc. v. Nat'l Real Estate
Info. Servs., 608 F.3d 110, 125-26 (1st Cir. 2010) (stating whether injunctive relief request
violated First Amendment was "issue of great public concern"). Additionally, the First Circuit
noted that "[n]o party bringing suit should fear that its non-frivolous advocacy of a reasonable
position in federal court will, on that basis alone, lead to an injunction and declaration against it
based on the dormant Commerce Clause.
Much less should a party be made, based on its
conduct in bringing such a suit, to fear the imposition of attorney's fees." Id. at 126. As to
Massachusetts practice, the public interest of the subject matter has also been noted as meriting
exception from the general rule. See Brown, 511 N.E.2d at 1105 n.4 (noting federal preemption
raised issue of "significant public importance"); Altschuler v. Bos. Rent Bd., 425 N.E.2d 781,
786 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (agreeing to review new argument on appeal because fully briefed and
had implications beyond case). For example, cases presenting issues such as the applicability of
comparative negligence to legal malpractice claims, of whether, pursuant to a state statute, certain
municipalities were free from laws of general applicability governing activities engaged in by
private businesses where the municipality voluntarily engages in such activities; and arguments
affecting the general duties of landlords and tenants have been found to merit discretionary
exception. See Clark v. Rowe, 701 N.E.2d 624, 626 (Mass. 1998) (also noting issue was fully
briefed and likely to arise in other cases); Norfolk v. Dep't of Env't Quality Eng'g, 552 N.E.2d
116, 119 n.4 (Mass. 1990) (exercising discretion because issue of great public importance and
fully briefed); Altschuler, 425 N.E.2d at 786. It has also been noted where the court is asked to
enforce or aid in the enforcement of a contract violative of public policy even though never raised
below. See McLaughlin v. Amirsaleh, 844 N.E.2d 1105, 1114 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (stating
appellate court's discretion not to enforce contract against public policy despite not raised below).
Some Massachusetts decisions have alluded to the need to address an otherwise unpreserved issue
if it involves a "fundamental right." See McSweeney v. Cambridge, 665 N.E.2d 11, 14 (Mass.
1996) ("[W]e make some comment on [claim not raised below] . . .because we deem it
imprudent to leave an issue of such importance to the People of Cambridge under a greater cloud
of uncertainty than is necessary."); Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 596 N.E.2d 325, 330 (Mass.
1992) ("[Court] choose[s] to consider [issue] because it involves a fundamental right, has been
fully briefed, and is certain to be raised in other cases.").
442 See Doe, 654 F.3d at 40; Jamgochian v. Dierker, 681 N.E.2d 1180, 1182 (Mass.
1997).
441 United States v. Krynicki, 689 F.2d 289, 291 (1st Cir. 1982); see United States v. Patrick,
359 F.3d 3, 8 n.2 (1st Cir. 2004) ("[D]eclining to hear the issue will neither promote judicial
economy nor aid in the administration of the ... justice system"); LaGuardia,902 F.2d at 1013
(finding due process sentencing challenge "almost certain to be presented in identical terms in
other cases"); United States v. Golon, 511 F.2d 298, 301 (1st Cir. 1975) (noting legal issue
"almost certain to be presented in identical terms in other cases'); In re Dep't of Soc. Sews. to
Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 467 N.E.2d 861, 863 (Mass. 1984) (addressing issue because
of its importance in future cases of same kind); In re Georgette, 768 N.E.2d 549, 553 n.6 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2002) (noting exceptional circumstances exception includes where issue review
necessary to "provide assistance in other cases").
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interest" factor. The underlying interest is to serve or promote judicial
economy or otherwise clarify and declare an area of law.444 They are
sometimes combined with the court capability factors of adequacy of
record, question of law, and no prejudice 4. 4 5

A subset of the public interest factors or criteria under "exceptional
circumstances" discretion is the "constitutional" stature of the new or
unpreserved issue. Case law is somewhat conflicting, at once stating that
unpreserved constitutional issues are subject to forfeiture just as any other
claim; 446 that a constitutional issue is usually of a greater magnitude then
other claimed errors demanding consideration in the exceptional
circumstances rubric; and that the general rule of waiver/forfeiture applies
with particular force to constitutional issues raised for first time on
appeal.4 47
Nonetheless, a number of formulations of "exceptional
444 Krynicki, 689 F.2d at 291. Examples run the gambit; decisional law includes an issue of

whether an indictment had to be returned within thirty days of arrest where the underlying charge
has been dismissed prior to indictment, the issue as to the propriety of an out of state subpoena
upon a Massachusetts accountant for financial records, and a constitutional challenge to an
agency's enabling regulations. See Krynicki, 689 F. 2d at 291; Matter of a R.I. Grand Jury
Subpoena, 605 N.E.2d 840, 845 (Mass. 1993) (addressing issue where party lacked standing to
bring appeal because necessary to provide court's guidance); Bruno v. Bd. of Appeals of
Wrentham, 818 N.E.2d 199, 203-04 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004); see also Gurry v. Bd. Pub.
Accountancy, 474 N.E.2d 1085, 1090 (Mass. 1985) (noting challenge not Hormel exception but
reviewed to give guidance to board and rulemaking agencies). Under one Massachusetts
decision, the Court viewed the need for guidance to be independent from the exceptional
circumstance rubric. Id. It held that while the constitutional argument at issue did not meet the
exceptional circumstances exception to the forfeiture rule, because of the perceived need to
provide guidance, the issue was addressed anyway. Id.; see also In re Adoption of Ernest, No.
04-P-1731, 2005 WL 1773697, at *4 (Mass. App. Ct. July 26, 2005) (noting exceptional
circumstances include whether the issue would "provide assistance for other cases"). Further,
courts have noted the waived status of the issue and lack of briefing but due to further litigation
have proceeded to review which may aid the parties in the future litigation. See Commonwealth v.
Clint C., 715 N.E.2d 1032, 1037-38 (Mass. 1999). This factor is usually not the sole factor
present but is usually coupled with the question of law, constitutional issue and/or public interest
consideration. See La Guardia,902 F.2d at 1013; Cottam v. CVS Phannacy, 764 N.E.2d 814, 819
(Mass. 2002) (considering tort issues not raised below because fully briefed and likely to arise in
other cases).
445 Jamgochian, 681 N.E.2d at 1182 (stating jurisdictional "gloss" and novelty justified
review of unpreserved argument); Geehan v. Trawler Arlington, Inc., 359 N.E.2d 1276, 1278
(Mass. 1977) (permitting review of issue of first impression where case "fully argued in adversary
proceeding").
446 See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944) ("[A] constitutional right
may be
forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right
before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it."); see also Daigle v. Me. Med. Ctr., Inc., 14
F.3d 684, 687-88 (1st Cir. 1994); Cohen v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 729 F.2d 59,
60-61 (1st Cir. 1984). Outdoor Adver. Bd. v. Sun Oil Co. of Pa., 391 N.E.2d 916, 918 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1979).
447 5K Farms, Inc. v.Miss. Dep't of Revenue, No. 2009-CT-01787-SCT, 2012 WL 1624288,
at *3 (Miss. May 10, 2012) (refusing to address new issues on appeal, particularly constitutional
questions); see In re Adoption of Donald, 750 N.E.2d 1025, 1026 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001) (stating
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circumstances" discretion identify the constitutional status of the issue as

either a stand-alone exception to the general rule or a factor or criteria
favoring exception.448
Some courts have refused review under exceptional circumstances,
stating in one case that the unpreserved constitutional claim did not present
a question of law, was not of significant public importance, and would not
result in a miscarriage of justice if not addressed.4 49 Others have found
unpreserved constitutional claims to meet or not meet "exceptional
circumstances" based on the degree of public importance. 4 0 For instance,
a constitutional due process challenge to sentencing was found to merit
exception to forfeiture, as not only was the issue of constitutional
magnitude, but it "could [also] substantially affect these, and future

defendants." 45
It may be that the "public interest" component to exceptional
circumstances discretion as with the "fairness, integrity and public
reputation" discretionary prong to plain error can be viewed as providing a
distinction from harmless error applicable to preserved error. However, if
so, then the need for two separate strains of discretion becomes
questionable.
Regardless, too many formulations of exceptional
circumstances discretion have un-moored public interest from adjudicatory
review for actual error. In the end, the tension with the public interest
component of exceptional circumstances discretion is that it is ill-defined

general rule does not consider new issues, especially constitutional ones raised for first time). It
has been held that when a party seeks protection under the constitution of a federal statute, the
party may advance other theories based on the constitutional or federal statute claim (even if not
addressed by lower court). See Lebronv. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 379 (1995);
Romano v. U-Haul Int'l, 233 F.3d 655, 663-64 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating Lebron principle
inapplicable because no alternative argument based on claim of protection under constitution).
448 See Ninestar Tech. Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n., 667 F.3d 1373, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(explaining constitutional challenges not waived if relate "to the foundations of governmental
process"); Whiteside v. Merck Nat'l Bank of Bos., 187 N.E.2d 706, 707 (Mass. 1933)
(explaining constitutionality of statute in equity may be raised for first time on appeal); Nat'l
Ass'n of Soc. Workers v. Harwood, 69 F.3d 622, 627-29 (noting presence of constitutional issue
is factor that favors review despite procedural default).
449 Webb v. Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 2008).
450 See West Virginia v. Greene, 473 S.E.2d 921, 926-27 (Cleckley, J., concurring).
451 United States v. La Guardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1013 (1st Cir. 1990). Whether the "public
interest," novelty, court guidance or constitutional stature considerations require a determination
that there be an adequate record or that there be no prejudice to the opposing party remains
unclear. Contra Dennerline, supra note 2, at 1102 ("The public interest exception is blind to this
concern because the appellate court will typically decide a new issue without explicitly
considering the development of the factual record or whether the appellee may have presented
new evidence to confront the issue were it raised in the trial court."). Some cases have suggested
the contrary. United States v. Krynicki, 689 F.2d at 289, 292 (1st Cir. 1982); In re Gagnon, 625
N.E.2d 555, 558 (Mass. 1994).
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and removed from the prudential concerns underlying the general rule. Unleashed from the need for error adjudication, it constitutes a potentially
smothering452expanse of discretion and a perpetuating force for unequal
treatment.
First, there is little to no discussion as to when an issue becomes a
matter of sufficient "public interest" to merit exception to the raise or lose
rule.453 Courts which have relied on this factor have, in fact, done so in
rather cursory terms. While the First Circuit has indicated that the "public
interest" nature of the new or unpreserved issues is the "most salient," little
to no guidance is provided as to what is an issue of sufficient public
interest.
Some states have required the issue to be of either "great, 455
456
"broad,,
or "widespread 457 public import," while others note that the
interest must firmly transcend a private interest 458 or be of only "some"
public interest. 459 Further, there is a substantial public interest in the
finality of judgments underlying the raise or lose rule, and determining
when the public interest to address the issue outweighs the public interest
behind the general rule is no easy endeavor. As one commentator has

452

See Lea Brilmayer, Judicial Review, Justiciability and the Limits of the Common-Law

Method, 57 B.U. L. Rev. 807, 811 (1977) ("If courts are to have a certain law declaring rule, then
they must themselves be constrained by rules that dictate the relationship between the judiciary
and society. One such rule is consistency in treatment; in a society of laws, elementary fairness
requires that similar cases be decided in a similar fashion.").
451 See e.g., Sandholm v. Kuecker, 962 N.E.2d 418, 435 (Ill. 2012) (identifying certain
factors in determining whether the public interest exception to mootness applies); Fontaine v.
Ebtec Corp., 613 N.E.2d 881, 887 (Mass. 1993) (summarily stating issue was "not of
significance"); Palmer v. Murphy, 677 N.E.2d 247, 255 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997) (declining review
as issue did not involve public interest). According to the Supreme Court of Illinois, the relevant
factors in the public interest exception application include: (1) the public or private nature of the
questions presented, (2) the desirability of an authoritative decision for future guidance of public
officers; and (3) the likelihood of future cases). Sandholm, 962 N.E.2d at 435. See Am. Auto.
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Comm'r, Mass. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 31 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting
unpreserved issue of public interest but it "paled in degree compared" with other cases).
454 See Cross v. Cooper, 127 Cal. Rptr.3d 903, 912 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (stating term
or
concept of public interest or public issue are "inherently amorphous").
455 Alvarez Family Trust v. Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Kaanapali Ali, 221 P.3d 452, 468
(Haw. 2009) (citing Montalvo v. Lapez, 884 P.2d 345, 353 (Haw. 1994).
456 Roberts v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 144 P.3d 546, 549 (Colo. 2006) (stating if issue
of
"broad impact" court may address despite procedural default).
457 In re Estate of Hodges, 247 P.3d 755, 758 n.5 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010) (stating exception
to preservations rule "where questions of public policy or widespread public interest involved").
458 See Gracia v. Bittner, 900 P.2d 351, 356 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) ("[T]his
case does not
involve matters of general public interest. [It] involves a private dispute between private parties
and a garden-variety failure to adequately call the trial court's attention to the precise manner in
which the jury should have been instructed."); see also N.M. R. APP. P. 12-216 (listing exceptions
to review of unpreserved issues to include jurisdiction, general public interest, fundamental error).
459 Mullins v. Pine Manor Coll., 449 N.E.2d 331, 341 (Mass. 1983) (reaching otherwise
waived issue because issue was of "some public importance").
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noted, "an exception for issues of important public interest seems desirable
at first blush, but what is an important public interest to one court will be
unimportant to another. The line will be particularly difficult to draw and
will often appear nakedly political."460
Second, the "public interest," "novelty," "constitutional," and/or
guidance considerations have no meaningful connection to the prudential
concerns underlying the general raise or lose rule. Public interest or novel
arguments of "first impression" are not uncommon particularly at the
highest appellate court level. If the issue is truly novel and one of first
impression, that is all the more reason to require that it be raised before the
lower court. 4 6 ' The same can be said for "constitutional issues," with the

longstanding canon of constitutional jurisprudence requiring that courts are
to not decide constitutional issues where a more narrow ground is available

and thus avoid judicial encroachment on democratic interests. 4 62 The use
of a loose "public interest," "first impression," or "novelty" rubric threatens
to swallow any meaningful application of the general rule.
Third, the "public interest" circumstances are primarily rooted in
the notion that it is the appellate court's function to determine and declare

the applicable law to any dispute, including as to future cases,463 instead of
460

Miller, supra note 3, at 1306-07; see Dennerline, supra note 2, at 1002; Raising New

Issues, supra note 2, at 656.
While 'public policy' may be a useful term in certain cases where some
interest other than those of the particular litigants is involved, as it is now
used it seems to be a mere rationalization to achieve a desired result and
gives no hint as to the factors to be weighed in the great bulk of the cases
where the sole public interest is in doing justice as between the two parties.
Id.
461

See Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 712 (1986) (stating application of

law to fact is be done initially by trial court); Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir.
1983) ("[W]here counsel has made no attempt to address the issue, we will not remedy the defect,
especially where, as here, 'important question of far-reaching significance' are involved.")
(internal quotations and citations omitted); but see Carter, supra note 2 at 967 ("[A study
concluded] that trial judges have greater difficulty adjusting to significant novel issues unless the
law and procedure become settled in an appellate court. Novel issues are the province of the
appellate courts because they present significant legal questions.").
462 See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011) (noting rule courts must avoid
resolving constitutional questions unnecessarily); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S.
288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("The Court will not pass upon a constitutional
question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground
which the case may be disposed of."); Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487,
508 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding court violated constitutional avoidance doctrine by addressing due
process claim).
463 Dennerline, supra note 2, at 1001-02 ("The danger of establishing a misleading precedent
and the desire to correct an erroneous interpretation of an important principle of law sometimes
become decisive factors in the consideration of a new issues on review.").
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error correction. Massachusetts's version of exceptional circumstances, for
instance, has found the public significance, novelty, first impression or
guidance alone to be sufficient to justify review.464 As to the First Circuit,
it considers the "most salient" the "public interest" factor although at least
still requiring a showing that the argument or issue be "compelling." Even
then, however, since actual error is not required, the justification shifts to
that of law declaration or clarification, as opposed to adjudicatory review
for actual error. Indeed, the public interest rubric may have more to do
with the tendency of appellate courts to gravitate to their lawmaking role as
opposed to the perceived "mundane and routine error-correction role., 465 It
may be that the very justification for maintaining the exceptional
circumstance discretion apart from plain error is so the court can engage in
law declaration or clarification unhampered by procedural default and any
need for error correction.4 66 In fact, some courts have justified review of an
unpreserved issue on the grounds that the lower court's judgment was
being affirmed.46 7 After all, so the argument goes, the party who failed to
preserve is not provided any advantage with the appellate court otherwise
able to perform a law declaring function.468
464See, e.g., McLeod's Case, 450 N.E.2d 612, 615 (Mass. 1983); Gaw v. Sappett, 816
N.E.2d 1027, 1032 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (citing In re R.I Grand Jury Subpoena, 605 N.E.2d
840, 845 (Mass. 1993)); McCallum v. Sherillo, 806 N.E.2d 969, 2004 WL 895787, *2 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2004) (unpublished table decision).
465 Justice on Appeal in Criminal Cases, at supra note 322, at 466 & 469 ("[T]he lawmaking
duty is an article of faith for American appellate judges, and it seriously diminishes their interest
in and commitment to their duties as error correctors."); William M. Richman, Much Ado About
the Tip of an Iceberg, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1723, 1731 (2005) ("Without statutory authority,
[federal appellate courts] have transformed themselves from courts of mandatory jurisdiction
(whose primary function is error correction) into de facto certiorari courts, taking only those cases
suitable for making law.").
466 See In re Pet Food Prods. Liab. Litig., 629 F.3d 333,360 (3d Cir. 2010)
(Weis, J.,
concurring and dissenting) ("Sua sponte determination of an issue may be especially appropriate
where the matter involves more than just the individuals, and addresses a matter of concern to the
courts and the judicial system."); Roosevelt v. ElI. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416,
419 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting discretion will be exercised in circumstances of uncertain state
of the law).
467 See Mullins v. Pine Manor Coll., 449 N.E.2d 331, 341 (Mass. 1983) (considering new
issue because of "some public importance" and where result reached unchanged); see also
Izquierdo Prieto v. Mercado Rosa, 894 F.2d 467, 471 n.4 (1st Cir. 1990).
468But see Raising New Issues, supra note 2, at 656.

Other courts say that they will consider new issues when they will serve to
sustain the result reached below but not when they will cause a reversal.
This rule is unfair in that it makes the introduction of the new question
dependent upon the decision below which was incorrectly arrived at, since
the new issue was necessary to uphold it.
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The ultimate antagonism lies in the fact that the public interest
component for exceptional circumstances is more concerned with the law
declaring as opposed to error correcting appellate function. Unlike plain

error, which is directed to serve the interests of the appellate court to
prevent a miscarriage of justice or obvious and plain error that affected the
outcome in a particular dispute, the public interest prong of exceptional
circumstances is focused on the appellate court's function of properly
declaring or clarifying applicable law regardless of the presence or absence
of any actual error. Further, a legal issue's uncertainty, by definition,
precludes a finding of plain error.469
Whether "public interest" is a stand-alone
exception
(Massachusetts) or the "most salient factor" (First Circuit), it remains
removed from error correction and dispute or adjudication. It is this tie to
law declaring and removal from error correcting that causes significant
pause. After all, it remains that "the error correcting function is essential to
a regime of law and to public confidence in courts as the ultimate resolver
of disputes., 470 More particularly, and on the federal level, the public
interest factor, if devoid of any real concern for error correction, runs into
the principles embodying the Article III "cases and controversies"
requirement 471 as well as the institutional competence of the court to
declare "the public interest." Reliance on such factors can led to appellate
decisions that are essentially "advisory opinions ' , 4 72 or otherwise create a
discretionary standard that results in unequal treatment, particularly where
reversal or remand result. In the related context of mootness, 47 3 many

469

See Creel v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 385, 390 n.3 (5th Cir. 1998) (distinguishing between

reviewing unpreserved legal claim due to legal uncertainty versus under plain error); see also
Munoz v. Sociedad Espanola De Auxiolio Mutuo Y Beneficiencia De P.R., 671 F.3d 49, 59 (1st
Cir. 2012) (explaining failure to recognize well-established law is plain error).
470 Appellate Courts: Structures, supra note 312, at 287.
471 See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1977) ("No principle is more fundamental to the
judiciary's proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federalcourt jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.") (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976))).
472 See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 36 (1974) ("While the Supreme Court
of
California may choose to adjudicate a controversy simply because of its public importance, and
the desirability of a statewide decision [the court is] limited by the case-or-controversy
requirement of Art. III to adjudication of actual disputes between adverse parties."); Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Haworth- 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937) ("[An Article III controversy] must be a real and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character...
."); Commonwealth v. Welosky, 177 N.E. 656, 658 (1931) (stating advisory opinions not
adjudications by court and do not fall within stare decisis doctrine). Some states have provided
advisory opinion authority by constitutional provision. See MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 3, art. II;
COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 3; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 24.
471 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cory, 911 N.E.2d 187, 189 n.3 (Mass. 2009) (reviewing
issues, although moot, because fully briefed, certain to recur, and involved significant public
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courts have, in fact, rejected the public interest of an issue as meriting a
stand-alone exception. 474 Even at the state level, regardless of any
interest); Commonwealth v. McCulloch, 879 N.E.2d 685, 688 (Mass. 2008) (stating discretion to
review regardless of mootness where significant public importance and uncertainty); Acting
Superintendent of Bournewood Hosp. v. Baker, 725 N.E.2d 552, 554 (Mass. 2000) (noting three
part test for exception to mootness); Dimino v. Sec'y of the Commonwealth, 695 N.E.2d 659, 662
(Mass. 1998) (noting exception to mootness because involves public interest and uncertainty and
confusion exist); Newspapers of New Eng. v. Clerk-Magistrate of the Ware Div. of the Dist.
Court Dep't., 531 N.E.2d 1261, 1262 n.4 (Mass. 1988) (addressing "clearly moot" issue "because
of the strong public interest in the matter"); Brown v. Guerrier, 457 N.E.2d 630, 632-33 (Mass.
1983); Geehan v. Trawler Arlington, Inc., 359 N.E.2d 1276, 1278 (Mass. 1977) (addressing
otherwise moot issue because "first impression and was important to many litigants"); Karchmar
v. Worcester, 301 N.E.2d 570, 578 (Mass. 1973) (stating same); In re Laura L., 768 N.E.2d 605,
607-08 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) ("[C]ivil commitment and treatment-related cases are mattes of
significant public interest that warrant an exception to the usual mootness rules.").
474 See Wright, supra note 61, at § 3533.9; at n. 10 (collecting cases); see, e.g., Hickman v.
Missouri, 144 F.3d 1141, 1144 (8th Cir. 1998) ("[T]here is no such exception in [the] federal
courts."); N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light, 772 F.2d 25, 30 (3d Cir. 1985)
("Although we recognize that the substantive issues are of considerable public interest, we
believe that this alone does not impart Article III justiciability when there is 'no reasonable
expectation that the wrong will be repeated."') (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345
U.S. 629, 633 (1953))); Alton & S. Ry. Co. v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
463 F.2d 872, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("The court will not decide a moot case on the sole ground of
public importance."); cf Bowman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 350 F.3d 537, 549-50 (6th Cir. 2003)
(rejecting as "not convincing" district court's belief exceptional circumstances warranted
consideration of medical policy's constitutionality).
Massachusetts does permit "advisory
opinions" but they are circumscribed limited to "important questions of law and upon solemn
occasions." In re Answer of Justices to Council, 962 N.E.2d 166, 167 (Mass. 2012) ("The
Massachusetts Constitution requires the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court to give opinions to
the Governor, the Legislature, or the Executive Council 'upon important questions of law, and
upon solemn occasions."') (quoting MASS. CONST. pt. II, c. 3, art. 2)). "A 'solemn occasion'
arises in the context of a 'serious and unusual exigency,' when a branch of government, 'having
some action in view, has serious doubts as to their power and authority to take such action, under
the Constitution, or under existing statutes."' Id (citing Answer of the Justices, 366 N.E.2d 730,
732 (Mass. 1977)); but see Carpenter v. Suffolk Franklin Say. Bank, 346 N.E.2d 892, 895 (Mass.
1976) ("State courts need not become enmeshed in the Federal complexities and technicalities
and are free to reject procedural frustrations in favor of just and expeditious determinations on the
ultimate merits."); see also Fialka-Feldman v. Oakland Univ. Bd. of Trs., 639 F.3d 711, 715 (6th
Cir. 2011) (rejecting "far reaching proposition' federal courts may hear moot issues under stand
alone public interest). According to the Sixth Circuit:
It invokes a "public interest" exception to the mootness doctrine, claiming
that the federal courts may hear non-live disputes whenever the resolution of
important legal questions will serve the public. But to state such a farreaching proposition is to doubt it. The "case or controversy" requirement
prohibits all advisory opinions, not just some advisory opinions and not just
advisory opinions that hold little interest to the parties or the public, If
advisory opinions "are ghosts that slay," it is hard to grasp why the risks
associated with them would be ameliorated, as opposed to accentuated,
when the public has a keen interest in the resolution of the issue. Matters of
great public interest are precisely the kinds of issues that demand the federal
courts to be most vigilant in this area-vigilant that the powers they exercise
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perceived importance of an issue, the issue should be reached only if
necessary to the adjudication or determination of the rights of the parties
before the court. 47 As Professor Carrington has aptly noted:
[T]he process of choosing whether to decide a case on the
basis of public interest celebrates the public and political
importance of the most visible decisions and diminishes,
even demeans, the consideration given to the individual

are powers the Constitution gives them and vigilant that they exercise those
powers in disputes with the "clear concreteness provided when a question
emerges precisely framed and necessary for decision from a clash of
adversary argument." A stand-alone public interest exception to Article III
has no meaningful pedigree. The Supreme Court has never recognized any
such exception and in several instances has refused to adopt one.
Id. at 715-16 (internal citations omitted). Massachusetts has not so expressly held although it has
been noted that most states do recognize such a stand-alone exception. See, e.g., Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment v. DeVilbiss, 729 P.2d 353, 356 n.4 (Colo. 1986); Rushy. Ray, 332 N.W.2d 325, 326
(Iowa 1983); Mead v. Batchlor, 460 N.W.2d 493, 496 (Mich. 1990), abrogated by Turner v.
Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011); see also Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 398 F.3d 1125,
1141 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) ("[A]lmost every state in the union has an
exception for cases on appeal that raise questions of 'continuing public importance"'). But see
Collins v. Lombard Corp., 508 S.E.2d 653, 655 (Ga. 1998); Loisel v. Rowe, 660 A.2d 323, 332
(Conn. 1995); see also Richardson, 418 U.S. at 36 ("While the Supreme Court of California may
choose to adjudicate a controversy simply because of its public importance, and the desirability of
a statewide decision, we are limited by the case-or-controversy requirement of Art. III to
adjudication of actual disputes between adverse parties."); Fialka-Feldman,639 F.3d at 716.
[Tlhis reality reflects an essential difference between the two court
systems-that the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and that
the state courts are courts of general jurisdiction. Article III does not
constrain the state courts. Many state courts thus not only have authority to
relax their rules on mootness, but they also permit advisory opinions and
indeed some State constitutions explicitly provide for them.
Id. As to the general power to hear matters not directly before the court, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts has stated it will do so if the matter has been fully briefed, "when there is
a public interest in obtaining a prompt answer to the question, and when the answer to be given is
reasonably clear." Brown, 457 N.E.2d at 631. This consideration is sometimes referenced as
consonant with judicial economy and aiding the administration of justice. See United States v.
Patrick, 359 F.3d 3, 8 n.2 (1st Cir. 2004). In UnitedStates v. Patrick,for instance, the concept of
restitution under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act was found to be a legal question likely to
arise in other cases and against a "paucity of case law [such that] declining to hear the issue will
neither promote judicial economy nor aid in the administration of the juvenile system." Id.
471 See Stephen R. Barnett, Making Decision Disappear: Depublication and Stipulated
Reversal in the CaliforniaSupreme Court, 26 LOY.L.A. L. REv. 1033, 1039 n.30 (1993) ("It is
basic assumption of our adversary system that neither a trial nor an appellate court will consider
or decide questions of law, no matter how important, unless they arise in the course of a
justiciable controversy calling for determination of rights of particular adversary parties.")
(quoting BERNARD E. WITKIN, MANUAL OF APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS 165 (1977))).
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fates of the parties ....
[An] orientation away from case
specifics and individual fates . . . threaten[s] the role of the
Court ....

476

Certain plain error formulations have expressly incorporated a
"public interest" component.477 Texas, for instance, expressly combines
fundamental error with the public interest factor stating that in
"determining whether fundamental-error review should apply to a matter of
public interest: (1) the error complained of must implicate a significant
public interest or policy of the state, articulated by statutes, constitution, or
case law; and (2) the nature of the error must be such that it impacts a truly
general public interest, and not solely that of private litigants. 478 Notably,
the public interest is not a stand-alone exception nor is a "compelling"
argument or "virtually assuring success" enough. The touchstone of
appellate review remains whether there was actual error.
5. Consistency and Equal Treatment
In the end, plain error represents a more consistent approach
providing for equal treatment of cases while also preserving the necessary
individualized, fact intensive inquiry. 479 There must be found an error, that
476

Paul D. Carrington, The Function of the Civil Appeal: A Late-Century View, 38 S.C. L.

REv. 411, 421, 422 (1987).
477 See Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 632 F.3d 822, 835 (3d Cir. 2011). For instance, the
Third Circuit links the two directly stating that the rule of waiver may be relaxed whenever in the
public interest. Id.
478 See id.
479 See Pucket v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 142 (2009) ("The fourth prong is meant to be
applied on a case-specific and fact-intensive basis. We have emphasized that a 'per se approach
to plain-error review is flawed."') (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 17 n.14 (1985)));
Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 411-12 (2009).
[T]he factors that inform a reviewing court's "harmless-error" determination
are various, potentially involving, among other case-specific factors, an
estimation of the likelihood that the result would have been different, an
awareness of what body (jury, lower court, administrative agency) has the
authority to reach that result, a consideration of the error's likely effects on
the perceived fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings,
and a hesitancy to generalize too broadly about particular kinds of errors
when the specific factual circumstances in which the error arises may well
make all the difference.
Id.; United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 285-86 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting fairness and integrity
prong of plain error fact intensive); United States v. Gandia-Maysonet, 227 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.
2000) ("The 'fairness, integrity or reputation' plain-error standard is a flexible one and depends
significantly on the nature of the error, its context, and the facts of the case."); see generally
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is plain, that causes prejudice (i.e., affecting the outcome) 40 and resulting
in either a miscarriage of justice 481 or affecting the "fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings." 48 2 The discretion under plain
error lies in the court's determination as to whether, even absent any

miscarriage of justice (actual innocence), the plain error affected the
fairness integrity or public reputation of the proceeding before the court.483
The public interest prong is tied directly to the purported error and is thus
centered on the integrity and fairness of the proceeding and litigants before
the court. The result is an approach more in keeping with the paramount

obligation of error adjudication as well as the substantial value of equal
treatment.484
To be sure, the case law remains not particularly illuminating as to
the criteria to be used in the discretionary determination as to whether the
plain error affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the
proceeding. 485 Not only is there some question of whether, in application,

Benjamin Kaplan, Do IntermediateAppellate Courts have a Lawmaking Function? 70 MAss. L.
REV. 10, 11 (1985) ("[O]f course the law is to some considerable extent indeterminate rather than
fixed; that is the price the law must pay for dealing with human material.").
480 See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 76 (2004) ( "a reasonable
probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea").
481 The miscarriage of justice element is traditionally defined under an "actually
innocent"
concept. See United States v. David, 83 F.3d 638, 647 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Thirty-Ninth
Annual Review of Criminal Procedure:Appeals, 39 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 856, 887
n.2630 (2010) (collecting federal appeals court cases using terms "plain error," "miscarriage of
justice," "actually innocent").
482 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993) (quoting United
States v. Atkinson, 297
U.S. 157, 160 (1936)).
483 See Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 262 (2008).
484 See Essinger v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 534 F.3d 450, 452 ("Some standard approach
[to waiver] is desirable because one of the fundamental goals of appellate review must be
uniformity in treatment of cases."); Mary Massaron Ross, Reflections on Appellate Courts: An
Appellate Advocate's Thoughts for Judges, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 355, 386 (2006) ("[T]o
be a principled adjudicator involves more than just acknowledging the true grounds of decision; it
also requires being consistent within and across cases.") (quoting Richard A. Posner, The Federal
Courts: Challenge and Reform 312 (2d Harv. U. Press 1999))).
485 See Michael H. Graham, Abuse of Discretion, Reversible Error, Harmless
Error, Plain
Error, StructuralError;A New Paradigmfor Criminal Cases, 43 CR\I4. L. BULL. 955, 963-64
(2009) (noting no discernible pattern in cases applying fourth prong of Olano plain error test); see
Dennerline, supra note 2, at 1000-01.
[Ilt is doubtful that lawyers or judges can either define or consistently
recognize an added increment of seriousness showing error to be not only
reversible but 'plain' . . . . It is this confusion between the 'plainness' of an
error and its gravity which breeds much of the criticism of the plain error
principle .... [with] the exception ... seen as basically ad hoc in nature
without any neutral standards to apply.
Id.; Dustin D. Berger, Moving

Toward Law: Refocusing The Federal Courts' Plain Error
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the public interest prong has collapsed into the prejudice prong,486 but
concern over whether the discretionary prong of plain error is hopelessly ad
hoc.487 Yet, despite any shortcomings, it remains directly tied to the need
for plain or obvious error thus serving the primary error correcting function
as well as seeks (outside of traditional miscarriage of justice) to require
something more than just outcome determinative error. When focused on
an assessment of the nature and quality of the underlying right, the prong is
concerned with errors that rise to the level of challenging the legitimacy of
the underlying judicial process itself488 and does so in the context of the
dispute and litigants before the court.489
Doctrine in Criminal Cases,
Columbia Public Law Research Paper, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1809726 ("United States v. Olano, is poorly suited to discovering and
correcting even the serious errors that the plain error doctrine was intended to remedy. Because
the doctrine is discretionary and fact-specific, it fails to generate precedents to guide future courts
and litigants and perpetuates a guilt-based approach to evaluating errors.").
486 See Graham, supra note 485, at 963-64 (noting Court folded affecting substantial rights
and public interest prongs in Johnson and Cotton).
487 See Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 322 A.2d 114, 117 (Pa. 1974).
The other major weakness of the basic or fundamental error theory is its ad
hoc nature. The theory has been formulated in terms of what a particular
majority of an appellate court considers basic or fundamental. Such a test is
unworkable when neither the test itself nor the case law applying it develop
a predictable, neutrally-applied standard.
Id. See Berger, supra note 485, at 19-20 ("[T]he discretionary system [for plain error]..fails to
appreciate that a system of well-defined rules and exceptions can also foreclose the prospects of
appellate review of an unpreserved error."); Carter, supra note 2, at 948 ("Standards such as plain
error, fundamental error, or manifest injustice, provide little notice and have, to some courts,
become an impediment to the efficient administration of our judicial system.") (internal
quotations omitted); Dennerline, supra note 2, at 1000-01 (noting plain error "basically ad hoc in
nature, without any neutral standards to apply"); see also United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct.
2169, 2169 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In our attempt to clarify [plain error], we have, I fear, both
muddied the waters and lost sight of the wisdom embodied in the Rule's spare text.").
488 Dragway 42, L.L.C. v. Kokosing Constr. Co., No. 09CA0073, 2010 WL 3796586, at *6
(Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2010) (finding error did not rise to level of challenging legitimacy of
underlying judicial process).
489 See United States v. Mudekunye, 646 F.3d 281,300 ("Without an exacting and
limited
application of [the Olano public trust] prong, it becomes illusory.") (internal quotations omitted).
Under Massachusetts practice, there is no such stated discretionary prong with the inquiry
focused solely on whether there was error and whether it may have materially affected the
outcome. Indeed, no Massachusetts case has referenced or otherwise required or adopted an
integrity prong. In most circumstances, errors that do not impact the verdict do not seriously
impugn the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See United States v.
Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 634 (2002). In Cotton, the Supreme Court argued that correcting a plain
error when confronted with overwhelming evidence of guilt would harm rather than further the
fairness and integrity of the judicial system. Id. Not surprisingly, even if the plain error is a
structural constitutional right and thus presumed to affect substantial rights it still remains for the
court to determine, in its discretion, whether the error "seriously affects the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of the judicial proceeding." United States v. Keys, 67 F.3d 801, 811 (9th Cir.
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"Exceptional circumstances" discretion, apart from plain error, is
unruly. Pocked with diverse factors, many of which are removed from the
underpinnings to the raise or lose rule, the exceptional circumstances
exception suffers from lack of true consensus, the lack of any means of
consistent or predictable application, and, too often, is severed from the
fundamental error correcting function of the appellate court. The use of
two seemingly separate lines of discretionary exception can dilute the error
correction and dispute resolution function of appellate courts and otherwise
further a lack of consistency and equal treatment. 490 "[A] legal system
which tolerates needless dis-uniformity and incoherence is not keeping
faith with those who are subject to its dominion,
for it has forsaken
49 1
commitment to even handed decision-making."
The need for consistency and equal treatment of similarly situated
litigants is paramount. The plain error rule is more consistent with this
important value striking a workable balance between the rigors and
obligations to follow procedural rules and the need to always protect
fundamental fairness regardless of any procedural default. It is a default
standard that applies equally to all unpreserved error or new issues on
appeal. It does so with a focus on whether or not there was fundamental
error in order to ensure fairness and justice was done between the litigants.
Indeed, it is the error correcting and dispute resolution function of the
appellate court that provides the necessary confines to the discretion.
V. PROPOSED CONSTRUCT
In an effort to improve consistency and principled decisionmaking, a possible construct for addressing forfeiture and waiver is offered
as follows:

1995) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993)); see United States v. Lopez, 71
F.3d 954, 960 (1st Cir. 1995) ("In all events, our best guess is that the Supreme Court would
regard an omitted element reversible error per se if there were a timely objection-although not
automatically plain error if no objection occurred ....
) (internal quotations omitted), abrogated
by United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482 (1997); see also United States v. Ross, 77 F.3d 1525,
1540-41 (7th Cir. 1996) (performing similar analysis); United States v. Marder, 48 F.3d 564, 57475 (1st Cir. 1995) (performing similar analysis); United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 1287 (3d
Cir. 1993) (performing similar analysis). But see United States v. Birbal, 62 F.3d 456, 461 (2d
Cir. 1995); United States v. Colon-Pagan, 1 F.3d 80, 82 (1st Cir. 1993).
490 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1178
(1989).
491 Justice on Appeal, supra note 296, at 12; Scalia, supra note 490, at 1178 ("When a case
is
accorded a different disposition from an earlier one, it is important, if the system of justice is to
be respected, not only that the later case be different, but that it be seen to be so.").
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RAISE OR LOSE
1. Is the issue jurisdictional?(If yes, the issue is reviewed directly
and de novo. If it is not jurisdictional,proceed to No. 2).

This initial question goes to the authority of the court. It is a
preliminary question seeking to determine whether the raise or lose rule
even applies. Care should be given to be sure the issue is truly one of
'"jurisdiction" or the authority or power of the court to consider the issue or
action.
2. Did the party seeking review of a new or unpreservedissue
sufficiently briefthe waiverforfeiture issue and the basisfor
consideration?492 (If no, the inquiry ends, ifyes, proceed to No. 3).
This element is in keeping with the party presentation and court
competency principles. If the issue of waiver or forfeiture has not been
raised or adequately briefed the appellate court should be inclined not to
address the issue. If the court deems it necessary to do so sua sponte it
should clearly articulate its reasons for doing so and otherwise be sure to
provide opportunity to the parties to brief or present argument no matter
how confident the appellate court may be on the matter.
3. Did the party have a fair opportunity to raise the issue below?
(If so, proceed to No. 4. If not, there is no waiver or forfeiture and
the matter should be reviewed under the applicable standardfor
preservederrors).
Assuming the issue is non-jurisdictional and has been briefed, this
element seeks to address whether the raise or lose rule even applies. If
there was never any fair opportunity to raise the issue then there has been
no forfeiture or waiver. The appellate court may address under the
preserved error standard or otherwise remand.

492

See Bruno v. Bd. of Appeals of Wrentham, 818 N.E.2d 199, 203-04 (Mass. App. Ct.

2004); Turkey Creek, L.P.v. Layi No. C062080, 2011 WL 675935, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 25,
2011) (declining to consider argument because party did not sufficiently brief why exception
applied).

292

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XVII

4. Was the failure to properly preserve or raise inadvertent or was
it strategic, or is the error claimingparty otherwise estopped? (If
strategic or the party is estopped, the inquiry ends. If not present,
proceed to No. 5).
This element also seeks to determine whether the raise or lose rule
even applies. It is understood that determining whether the failure to
preserve was inadvertent or strategic, or that the claimed error on appeal
was invited, is not necessary easy. It may well be one of degree.
Nonetheless, it is a necessary question which, depending on the
circumstances, will require refusal to address the issue or otherwise militate
against reversal unless the existence of plain error and its affect upon the
integrity, fairness or reputation of the proceedings is apparent and
pervasive.
5. Is there a sufficient recordfor the appellate court to fairly and
fully address the new issue? (If not, the inquiry ends. If so,
proceed to No. 6 or otherwise remand or request missing or
needed briefing if applicable).
This is a vital competency element.
It includes even those
instances when the appellate court is considering the need to address the
issue for law declaring or clarification reasons as opposed to error
adjudication (see element No. 8). It is an institutional imperative that the
appellate court first be content and convinced that the record is adequate.
6. Will the opposingparty suffer prejudice if the issue is addressed
on appeal? (Ifyes, the inquiry ends. If no, proceed to No. 7).
This is in keeping with the party presentation principle. The
appellate court should be fairly searching in this inquiry with the appellant
charged with demonstrating the lack of prejudice.
7. Was there an obvious errorthat affected outcome, and would the
failure to consider the issue result in a miscarriageofjustice or
seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicialproceedings? (If yes, the inquiry ends. If no, proceed to

No. 8).
This plain error rubric applies to both civil and criminal
proceedings. The caveat is that the existing reluctance to find plain error in
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civil cases remains. The life and liberty aspects at issue in criminal
proceedings and absent in civil proceedings dictate such a practice.
Consideration and weight, however, should be given for matters such as
civil commitments, juvenile detentions, competency, and parental fitness or
child custody matters, and should depend on the particular facts presented.
It is understood and recognized that many courts, including Massachusetts
(as well as even those that do not recognize a discretionary exception
outside of a plain error type review), do not require a showing beyond
outcome determinative impact. Despite the shifting of the burden of proof
between harmless and plain error, absent "something more," then affecting
the outcome provides a virtually imperceptible distinction with harmless
error. This construct advocates, particularly in civil cases, that something
more than individualized harm must be shown-harm that is fundamental
to the integrity of the particular proceeding either from the litigant or public
perspective.
8. Regardless of lack of error,does the issue present a matter of
such substantialand widespreadpublic interest and needfor
appellate law declarationor clarificationthat it merits appellate
attention outweighing the concerns behind: (a)
declaring/clarifyinglaw not necessary to resolve the dispute
between the specific litigants before the court; and (b) the
significant interests underlying the raise or lose rule?
This last element should be utilized sparingly. The appellate court
should not be forced to resolve a dispute based on the parties terms where it
would require issuing an inaccurate statement of the law. However, it
should be invoked only where the appellate court is convinced, with a
compelling and reliable basis, that lower courts need guidance or the law
needs clarification in order to prevent future litigants or the public from
being misled as to the applicable law or grounds for the decision.
Appellate courts need to be highly sensitive to any instance of law
declaration or clarification that is removed from and unnecessary to resolve
the controversy of the litigants before the court. It is to provide recognition
of the law declaring role of appellate courts but which must be significantly
tempered in the unpreserved context and, at minimum, not utilized to either
reverse or remand absent plain error. Intermediate appellate courts need to
be particularly wary given their primary function of error review and
correction.
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VI. CONCLUSION
A rigid judicial practice where courts would invariably and under
all circumstances refuse to hear any issue or question not properly
preserved would be potentially out of step with fundamental justice in a
particular case. Leaving the determination to judicial discretion is certainly
salutary in principle, as it is aimed to allow for the striking of the proper
balance on specific facts and circumstances between avoiding a resulting
injustice and the prudential concerns underlying the raise or lose maxim.
Nonetheless, there remains a lack of evenness in articulation and
application given that "exceptional circumstances" has evolved to
encompass both the plain error/substantial risk of miscarriage of justice
default standard of review as well as a multi-factor strain of discretionary
exception. Consolidation of the existing strands of discretion under a
unified default standard of review provides for a measure of consistency
and equal treatment of cases.
It is likewise in keeping with the
indispensable task of review centered on the question of error as well as
transparency and public accountability.

